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All communications to be addressed to J. G. Weiss, M.A., Director of Research, Institute of Jewish Studies, University College, London, W.C.1.

The Crusading Movement in its Bearing on the Christian Attitude towards Jewry

THE history of western Jewry during the Middle Ages from the time of the Carolingians to the Reformation as established by nineteenth-century scholarship, is characterised by a downward trend to isolation and degradation. Whilst under Charlemagne Jewish long-distance merchants had provided the royal court and the nobility with luxury goods from the Mediterranean basin, the function of Jewish trade became gradually more and more marginal; at the end of the epoch moneylending on a small scale and pawnbroking formed the main basis of their existence.

Recent research has somewhat qualified this picture. Dr C. Roth has put an end to any illusion that the early centuries of our civilisation, the Dark Ages, brought security to the Jewish communities; and Prof. Kisch has made use of his comprehensive and profound knowledge of German legal literature to prove that the position of Jews, both in civil and criminal law, was still comparatively normal in the middle of the fourteenth century. But these contributions to a closer understanding of a complex period do not necessitate any fundamental change in interpretation.¹ It remains true that the desperate state of European Jewry at the beginning of the modern period had its roots in those three centuries after 1000, when increased population, new techniques of economic exchange, and forms of social organisation adapted to less primitive conditions had brought about an age of expansion.² The radical deterioration of the Jewish position from the end of the thirteenth century may have some connection with the stagnation of economic activities and the retrogression of population figures which are at present being much discussed as an important characteristic of the late Middle Ages. But the fact remains

¹ C. ROTH, "European Jewry in the Dark Age: a revised Picture" in *Huca*, XXXII, 2 pp. 151-170. S. W. BARON, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, IV (1957) p. 282 has accepted ROTH's results with some qualifications. His own most important contribution to this question is offered by his chapter: "The psychological after-effects", pp. 139-149. But ROTH in his final conclusions (p. 167) confirms the traditional view about the social position of the Jews before and after the crusades. The contrast between their status and function during the Carolingian period and the conditions which developed after the twelfth century are indeed striking. The problem remains to date the turning-point. In this respect the catastrophe of 1096, despite the gravity of its impact, may be a symptom rather than a cause of the change which had developed during the eleventh century.

² *Cambridge Econ. Hist.*, II pp., 338-349; 456-458 (1952). F. ROERIG, *Die europäische Stadt im Mittelalter* (1955).

that the origin of this catastrophic tendency can be traced back to the preceding centuries of European expansion and prosperity. It was at this time that Jewry was isolated from the rising class of *entrepreneurs* who created and exploited the new opportunities, and concentrated on moneylending.³ The contrast to development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when economic expansion prepared the way for emancipation and assimilation, is striking. We shall perhaps understand this fundamental difference better, when we consider the transformation in the religious life of the people in the West which brought medieval civilisation to its maturity. It is from that point of view that this paper reviews some motives behind the Crusades which had a lasting effect on habits and attitudes in the environment of Jewry.

I

We investigate first the fact that from the year 1000 onwards the idea of Christian society became more concrete in men's minds and became associated with emotions which had not been there before. The front facing the outsider showed a greater coherence than had existed in the early Middle Ages. The introduction of Christianity to the Germanic world during the period of migrations had, as its main basis, an alliance between rulers and Church, by which the Christian cult was established and maintained throughout the lands. Even in the time of Charlemagne, when diverse forces were integrated for the first time, it was still the monarchy through which the Church influenced society.⁴ The change brought about during the eleventh century meant a more direct and intimate contact between ecclesiastical ideas and institutions on the one hand, and the land-owning class (which established at the same time its character as military nobility) on the other. The impulse for this movement came from political and social conditions in France, where in most regions royal power was almost completely absorbed by the local dynasts; these in great numbers, and of varied importance and rank, lived in their fortified houses throughout the countryside, always in command of armed

³ Y. RENOUD, *Les Hommes d'Affaires Italiens du Moyen Age* (1949), p. 38. An early testimony to moneylending as the characteristic function of the Jews is Bernard of Clairvaux' letter (no. 365, Migne *P.L.* 182, col. 564), written in connection with his action to stop the anti-Jewish riots during the preparations for the second crusade in 1146.

⁴ An attempt to sketch the relationship between popular belief and the ideas behind the ecclesiastical policy of the government in the age of Carolingian Renaissance will be found in *Arch. f. Kultur-gesch.*, XXXIII (1950), pp. 28-32.

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retainers. Antagonism between neighbours, to be settled by the outcome of private war, was a permanent feature of this society.⁵

In this situation, active prelates felt it to be their duty to "support the commonwealth" or, in less classical and more biblical language, "to protect the peace of the poor, who are gravely suppressed by their rulers".⁶ Such intentions led to ecclesiastical legislation in dioceses and provinces. The "poor" and their property were placed under the Church's protection. In this context the word "poor" means all those who, because they were excluded from the privileges of the warrior class, were powerless to safeguard their rights by force of arms. The ecclesiastical leaders were eager to give power to their regulations by securing for them the support of the very class whose activities they wished to curb. After 900 there were not a few noblemen who, in quiet moments, felt the effects of feudal anarchy to be the outcome of human sin, for which those mainly responsible would have to account before the supreme Judge in heaven. It was this attitude which gave the Church the possibility of a new approach to the warrior class. Epidemics and famine after a bad harvest were understood as actions of divine retribution. The teaching of the Bible regarding peace on earth as the fulfilment of God's command made a fresh impact on the mind of the age. It was in this atmosphere that the first religious mass movement in the western Church was brought about. The French prelates convened synods in which the clergy was surrounded by a great number of lay folk, and the barons and knights, carried away by a wave of religious enthusiasm, declared their ready acceptance of the covenants of peace. Men of all strata of feudal society answered with uniform emotion to this call, being greatly stimulated by reports on the miraculous working of relics, which had been collected for these meetings. The biblical idea of God's people had again found concrete representation.⁷

⁵ MARC BLOCH, *Société féodale*, II (1940), pp. 194-213. H. MITTEIS, *Der Staat des hohen Mittelalters* (1943), pp. 144-155. H. DANNENBAUER, *Politik und Wirtschaft in der Kaiserzeit, in Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Welt* (1958), p. 444f.

⁶ *Chronicon Cameracense et Atrebatense*, Mon. Germ. Hist. S.S. VII, p. 477, Fulbert of Chartres, *Ep.* 44, Migne P.L. 141, col. 224B. L. C. MACKINNEY, *The People and Public Opinion in the Eleventh Century Peace movement, Speculum*, 5 (1930). The fundamental discussion of these ecclesiastical experiments to reform society against the background of religious change is by C. ERDMANN, *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens* (1935). I may add here that this eminent historian, who died at the end of the war, was an uncompromising and courageous champion of truth under the Nazi rule.

⁷ Rodulfus Glaber, *Historiarum libri quinque*, IV, cap. 5, Migne P.L. 142, col. 678f. The biblical influence is brought out well in the *Hymn on Peace* by Bishop Fulbert, Migne P.L. 141, col. 349, *Gaudeat lancea falx, gaudeat spatha/Devenire vomer/Pax ditat imos, pauperat superbos* (cf. Is. ii: 4, Mic. iv: 3).

But the dialectic which so often in history has brought about a contrast between intention and effect, had its full play in the ecclesiastical movement of the eleventh century. When the ancient Church had preached *Militia Christi*, it was intended as a paradoxical metaphor. The men of prayer who were described in this way faced death like soldiers in battle; but their way of life had been, in every other respect, in perfect contrast to that of a warrior. But the movement to mobilise religious forces for social betterment and peace made the Church a fighting force in the most literal sense of the word. The peace assemblies had shown the possibility of a direct approach to great numbers of lay people by emotional appeal. After this experience, the idea of rallying the believers against the outsiders became a practical policy. Some assemblies agreed to organise armed resistance against breakers of peace, and we hear of cases in which this programme was followed up.⁸ Moreover, the French warrior class developed the ideal of chivalry, which had as the centre of its code the fight in the service of God, and this finally influenced the formation of ruling classes throughout Europe. When in the second half of the eleventh century the Papacy took control of the ecclesiastical reform movement, the conception of *militia Petri* was coined to express the religious vocation of the knights' class. Gregory VII used this idea to mobilise the military forces of western Europe to exercise pressure and even to mobilise them for open war against the monarchy. In this he overplayed his hand and finally failed. But the overwhelming success of his second successor Urban II in 1095, when he called for armed pilgrimage to Jerusalem, proved that the direct contact between Church and warrior class had remained intact. The biblical stories about Israel's fighting in Palestine during the period of the Judges, and especially the conflict of the Maccabees with Antiochus of Syria, became topical as models for the new people of God, fighting on behalf of the right order. The Marchioness Matilda of Tuscany, whose forces fought against the Emperor Henry IV in northern Italy, was praised as the new Jael who was destroying Sisera, and the knight Erlembald, who directed the ecclesiastical rebellion of the artisans in Milan, was styled the new Judas Maccabaeus, because he had taken up the case of God's people against His enemies.¹⁰

⁸ *Les miracles de Saint Benoît*, ed. E. de CERTAIN (1856), pp. 192-193; discussed by ERDMANN, pp. 56ff.

⁹ ERDMANN, pp. 134-165.

¹⁰ Bonizo, *Liber ad amicum* VIII and VI, *Mon. Germ. Libelli de Lite* I, pp. 620, 5; 599,3; a survey in P. ALPHANDÉRY, *Les citations bibliques chez les historiens de la première croisade*, *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, 99 (1929), pp. 139-157.

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The most lasting result of this development was a stronger feeling of Christian solidarity, which could be mobilised against any whose attitude characterised them, in particular circumstances, as outsiders. This possibility would necessarily increase sensitivity towards any group who, of their own will, stood out as permanent antagonists of Christianity. For this attitude Jewry was the classical example in the midst of a world now deeply penetrated in its everyday life by ecclesiastical doctrine.

II

We illustrate this process by a few observations on the interplay of ideas and actions. One of the most important presuppositions of the crusading movement was the fact that, during the eleventh century, the project of unarmed pilgrimage to Jerusalem had become popular—especially among the members of the aristocracy. Already in the thirties this phenomenon had become so striking that people in reflective mood pondered over it, as a change in the world which called for explanation.¹¹ It was no coincidence that the new trend developed at the very time when ecclesiastical synods legislating for peace were transformed into mass meetings dominated by religious excitement. The “great journey” was the highest achievement of active piety available both to the clergy and to the layman. The pilgrim would expect to receive from Jerusalem and Palestine a palpable contact with the stage on which the history of salvation had been enacted. For the men of this age it was of tremendous significance to experience the decisive spiritual events of the remote past, incorporated into the things of the concrete world and so made accessible to the world of the senses. The pilgrim who saw the reality of the biblical landscape with his own eyes and touched its soil with his own feet, was reassured of the reality of the link between himself and salvation which had been secured through events in that very locality. When, by Urban II’s design, the pilgrim became also a warrior with the task of conquering the land of the Bible, a further motive was added: the Christian knight became the soldier and the vassal of his Saviour, and had to fight for the honour of his Lord. The biblical story was being continued, and the knight was enabled to take part in its action. The new active piety of the layman, certainly the product of an ecclesiastical movement,

¹¹ Rodulfus Glaber IV, 6, Migne, *P.L.* 142 col. 681f. The whole phenomenon is discussed by E. JORANSON, *The great German Pilgrimage of 1064-1065*, in *The Crusades and other historical Essays presented to D. C. Munro* (1928), pp. 3-43.

remained nevertheless in contact with feudal thought.¹² The relevance of this trend to the fate of Jewry is obvious. The expedition to Jerusalem, the city which, for Christian piety, stood mainly as a monument of the Saviour's death, would necessarily strengthen feeling against the Jews. The words which a Hebrew chronicler of the time quotes to describe the original intention of Godfrey of Bouillon, one of the leaders of the First Crusade, express this attitude only too well: "He would go on the holy journey while revenging the blood of his Saviour on the blood of Israel, and he would not allow anyone who carries the name of a Jew to escape".¹³

But there was a second group of ideas, which helped to carry the appeal of pilgrimage to Jerusalem and crusade to all classes of the population. Belief in the approaching end of the world had already been part of the religious lore of the ancient Church, but the Fathers had finally come to the conclusion that man must abstain from any speculation as to the date of the final events. The thousand years of the eschatological oracle in St John's *Revelations* were interpreted as the epoch of the Church in the world, and knowledge about the time when the end would come was reserved to God.¹⁴ But the ancient dramatic story of the final conflict between Christian witnesses and the demonic forces incorporated in the Antichrist, continued nonetheless to attract the religious phantasy of men. The intense interest in the life beyond which Christianity brought to every individual, had again and again made people infringe the principle of discretion established by the classical theology of the Church. No devaluation of this form of thought by the failure of calculations and prophecies could endure; readiness to accept the belief in the approaching end of the world was soon restored. The element of messianism which formed a part of this popular belief was an important factor of its vitality. Already in the beginnings of Christian eschatological thought, in St John's *Book of Revelations*, the prophecies about the last days were linked with the conception of the Millennium. In the Latin Church a group of writings was handed down, in which a fictitious author, purporting to have

¹² A. WAAS, *Politik und Kultur in der Geschichte der Kreuzzüge*, in *Die Welt als Geschichte*, XI (1951) pp. 225-248. The same author's *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge I/II* (1956) contains the most up-to-date bibliography.

¹³ Solomon bar Simon, in A. NEUBAUER and M. STERN, *Hebräische Berichte über die Judenverfolgungen während der Kreuzzüge*, with German translation by S. Baer (1892), p. 87. Criticism of text and translation by I. Elbogen in *Festschrift für M. Philippson*, pp. 6-24; I. Sonne, *R.E.J.*, 96 (1937), pp. 113-156.

¹⁴ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XX, cap. 7-9. For the interpretation of the famous chapter 20 of *Revelation* and its history, see W. BOUSSET, *Kommentar zur Offenbarung Johannis* (1906) pp. 56-70.

lived in Antiquity, presented well-known facts from the past in the guise of prophecies as a basis for eschatological forecasts. This meant that, as this literature was carried on from one age to the next, the great events of the moment were incorporated into the traditional material.¹⁵ The dramatic conflicts brought about by the course of ecclesiastical reform, especially after the pontificate of Gregory VII, stimulated such adaptation during the last quarter of the eleventh century.

At this epoch an ancient text was enlarged by a typical addition: The messianic emperor of the last days will enforce the baptism of all pagans, and transform their temples into churches. At that moment the Jews will accept conversion and so partake in salvation. Thus all conditions will be fulfilled for the last emperor's journey to Jerusalem, where he will lay down his crown and hand over his empire to God and Christ. In this text the traditional story of the fight with the Antichrist is replaced by the topical theme of the liberation of Jerusalem, summarised by the verse from Isaiah "His tomb will be glorious".¹⁶ The inclusion of Jewry's conversion in the eschatological story goes back, of course, to the famous chapters (ix-xi) in St Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*. There is probably no non-Jewish text that has had a greater impact on Jewish history than these very personal reflections by the Apostle to Gentiles on the parting of the ways between himself and his people.¹⁷

Another eschatological interpretation of the Crusade shows a certain relationship of type to the text just discussed: here the expedition to Jerusalem is characterised as a preparatory task, necessary for the completion of man's course. It forms part of the version which Abbot Guibert of Nogent, a skilful man of letters, gives of Urban's decisive address at the great assembly of Clermont. The essential idea runs as follows: According to a prophecy in the *Second Epistle to the Thessalonians* (ii: 4), the Antichrist will come to Jerusalem and, as his name

¹⁵ Edited by E. SACKUR, *Sibyllinische Texte u. Forschungen* (1898).

¹⁶ *Is. xi: 10*. C. ERDMANN, *Endkaiserglaube und Kreuzzugsgedanken im 11. Jahrh.*, in *Zeitschrift. f. Kirchengesch.*, 51 (1932), pp. 411ff. A. SCHARF's recent article in *JJS*, VII (1956), pp. 59-70 on a Hebrew text from the Byzantine world shows well the impact of Christian eschatological expectation on contemporary Jewry. But in the first paragraph of his English text I should like to restore D. KAUFMANN's translation "German Jews" for 'ashkenazim instead of "Franks", which SCHARF, following J. STAR, prefers. But people who have come in masses with their wives and all their money (p. 60), are Jews, not crusaders; and the objections raised can be solved by a change in the position of the inverted commas.

¹⁷ See a recent discussion of these chapters by A. OEPKE, *Das neue Gottesvolk* (1950), pp. 213-218.

implies, fight against the Christians—not against pagans or Jews. Consequently the Orient, as the stage whereon the Antichrist has to play his part, must be entirely returned to Christianity before he can appear and so complete the course of the world. Establishment of conformity with Christian belief as sign of the maturity of the human affairs for the coming aeon is again seen as the task in hand.¹⁸

The identification of Islam with the forces of the Antichrist, most apposite as the myth of the crusading age, had been represented in this literary tradition since the seventh century.¹⁹ We therefore find, about 1100, the Mohammedans described as a type of men who cultivate idols for the purpose of magic. At the same time the French legend of Roland's death and Charlemagne's revenge found its final form as the conflict between Christians and Saracens in the days of the Antichrist.²⁰

It is the peculiarity of this form of eschatological thought that the details of its content can be changed, without altering the fundamental tension which it creates in the mind of men. For the Jewish communities this possibility of exchanging the figures in the story made more acute the danger which was latent in every armed expedition against Jerusalem. It needed a small change of emphasis only to transform a voluntary conversion of the Jews at the end of the days, into an impulse to bring about the end of Judaism by every means, including violence and murder.

III

We shall now try to find out how all these trends led to catastrophic action by analysing the circumstances in which the grave persecution of the Rhenish communities originated. Why did it happen just in these regions? Was there a special antagonism between the minority and its environment? It is well known that the events were a terrible surprise for the communities concerned. The report of the anonymous Jewish chronicler has preserved the famous letter written by the "pillars of the world" in Mayence in answer to the French communities, who were terrified by the preparations for the great expedition of armed Christendom. The leaders of German Jewry emphasised

¹⁸ *Gesta Dei per Francos*, II, cap. 4, Migne P.L. 156, col. 700A.

¹⁹ Ps.-Methodius, introduction and text by SACKUR, *op. cit.* pp. 40; 46; 82; 86.

²⁰ C. D. MUNRO, *The Western Attitude towards Islam during the Period of the Crusades*, in *Speculum*, VI (1931), pp. 329 ff.—K. HEISIG, *Geschichtsmetaphysik des Rolandliedes*, in *Zeitschrift. f. Rom. Philologie*, LV (1935), pp. 38-40; 68-71.

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their sympathy and reported that they had ordered a day of fasting, to pray for divine intervention in aid of their brethren in danger. But they strongly assert that they themselves in their own lands have not heard anything like the news from France, no sword is hanging over their head.²¹ It is easy to take this feeling of security on the eve of a catastrophe as a very strong expression of self-deception. But when we examine the German situation at the time we must admit that there were factors which make the attitude of the men of Mayence understandable. It is very probable that no religious emotion had changed the surface of life in their surroundings. They lived just outside the borders of the Romance-speaking region, where the crusading movement had swayed the population. The tidal flow running from West to East became weaker as it reached Central Europe. The great armies which carried Urban's plans to success had as their core thousands of knights, organised by the great dynasts in west and south Europe who had handed on to their vassals the Pope's call to action, and had found willing compliance. This kind of mobilisation included Lorraine, the borderland, which belonged politically to the Empire, but by its social structure, recent ecclesiastical development and language also had strong links with the West. It is relevant to our problem that further to the East the German aristocracy remained in a high degree sceptical towards the new ideal of armed pilgrimage and considered the different groups of crusaders passing through the country with suspicion, as people who undertook as certain things which were in fact uncertain.²² The most obvious reason for this refusal to accept the idea of war motivated by religion was recent experience. During the last two decades before the proclamation of the First Crusade Germany had seen many years of internal warfare, with Henry IV stubbornly resisting the reduction of his royal rights over the Church against the claims of the reformed Papacy and its Canon Law. The Pope's decrees against the King had given a strong impulse to the antimonarchical forces within the nobility. But the consequence of this introduction of religious emotion into the field of feudal politics had been a great increase of knight-fiefs at the expense of the higher nobility, considerable devastations, great disorder in the ecclesiastical administration, and yet no decision. There were at this time still bishops who would not recognise Urban II as the legitimate

²¹ NEUBAUER, STERN, BAER *op. cit.*, p. 170.

²² Ekkehard of Aura, *Hierosolymita*, cap. 9. ed. HAGENMEYER (1877), pp. 109 ff.; a parallel text in *Chronicon Universale, Mon. Germ. S.S.* VI, p. 214.

Pope, and in 1095 Ruthard, the head of the diocese and ecclesiastical province of Mayence, belonged to them.²³

But the feeling against warlike activity dictated by piety was not restricted to the dwindling ranks of the opposition to the Gregorian Papacy. It was a conservative attitude with deep roots among the prelates of the imperial Church, who, in contrast to France, had formed a political body in association with the crown as their protector for 150 years. The underlying philosophy was formulated about 1030 by a bishop in the western borderlands of the empire, Gerard of Cambrai, whose diocese was under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the French archbishop of Rheims. He had been urged to join the peace movement which swept France, and to force the nobility of the diocese to subscribe to the oath on the articles of peace. Gerard opposed this demand, because he considered it contrary to the established order of classes, by which Christendom was divided into men responsible for prayers, for agriculture, and for the handling of the sword. And, as he added on another occasion, the ending of war and the vigorous maintenance of peace was the task of kings.²⁴

This conservative attitude on the part of the prelates in the imperial Church had prevented them from influencing the secular nobility, their own blood relations, in the same way and with the same vigour as their colleagues in Burgundy and south-west France had influenced their secular neighbours. The Swabian and Saxon nobility had certainly rallied in great numbers to the call of Gregory VII to resist Henry IV by the force of arms, but they had done so for their own reasons, for local interests and traditional rights. They accepted the papal condemnation of the King to justify their own political struggle, but they did not conform to the mental pattern of the western aristocracy which made the Pope's appeal in Clermont successful beyond all expectation. The optimistic attitude taken by the Jewish leaders in Mayence seems, therefore, to have had some reason behind it during the early months of 1096, while the great expedition was in its preparatory stage. The country in which they lived lay outside the movement which was shaking France with its passion. But it was just this situation which accounts for the suddenness of the catastrophe

²³ Ruthard joined Urban's side when Henry IV made him responsible for his failure to protect the Jews. see A. HAUCK, *Kirchengesch.* III (1920), pp. 880, n.7. and the monograph by SARA SCHIFFMANN, *Heinrich IV und die deutschen Juden zur Zeit des ersten Kreuzzugs*, Berliner Dissert. 1931.

²⁴ *Gesta episc. Canmerac.* II, cap. 27; 32; *Mon. Germ. S.S.* VII, pp. 474: 485. The chronicler confirms the bishop's attitude with the observation that almost none of those who had signed the peace pact remained free from perjury.

in Germany. The crusading movement in France, under direct control of the Papacy, kept to the rules as they were formulated by Pope Alexander II in 1063, when an enterprise which he organised against the Mohammedans in Spain had led to riots. He had differentiated between the Jews, as subjected infidels who ought to be left in peace, and the Saracens, whose hostility made them objects of a justified attack.

In so doing the Papacy was upholding the ancient principle, already formulated by Gregory I, that no conversion of the Jews ought to be attempted by force and violence.²⁵ For the great enterprise in the Orient the continuation of this policy was of considerable importance. The expedition had as one of its main conditions of success the preservation of strict discipline on the long journey through Christian, but not too benevolent countries. The task would have been made very much more difficult if, right at the beginning, the leadership had given way to the instincts and emotions of armed men against the almost defenceless and prosperous Jewish communities in their path. The blow which the French communities had foreseen did not, finally, fall on them, because the leader of the feudal army obeyed the rules of the Papacy. Even Geoffrey of Lorraine followed an order of Henry IV not to touch the Jews, because he knew that the excommunicated Emperor was, on this point, in agreement with the *curia*: the duke was content to receive from the Jews material help for his expedition.²⁶

But considerations of this type did not operate with the so-called Peasants' Crusade which developed quite unexpectedly in the West, parallel with the mobilisation of the feudal host. It spread mainly from man to man; which means that it was, by its very nature, remote from effective control in accordance with any national plan. The eremitical movement, which during the last decades of the eleventh century had reached France from Italy, had introduced the preaching of radical decisions to the countryside and created some readiness to leave homesteads and fields. Economic factors worked in the same direction. The autumn of 1095 brought a bad harvest. Prices for supplementary food were beyond the reach of the common man in the countryside. The idea of the great expedition appealed to many as the way out. The peasant sold his cattle to obtain the cash he needed for

²⁵ Alexander II to the Spanish bishops, Migne *P.L.* 146, col. 1386D. *Registr. Gregori I., Mon. Germ. Epist.* I, p. 72; II, p. 183.

²⁶ NEUBAUER, STERN, BAER, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

the journey. People, who on one day stood aloof from the movement and criticised others for their unreasonable selling, changed their mind on the next and gave away their possessions at any price available, in order to join the great journey. Other common people put all their belongings on a cart with two oxen and started on the journey with their family. At every town or castle the children asked whether that was Jerusalem.²⁷

It was in this atmosphere that the bands of crusaders crossed the Rhine in April and May 1096, i.e. three months before the organised feudal host had gathered.²⁸ They came from northern France, the lands between the lower Meuse the Scheldt, and England, and carried the movement into a land where prosperous communities of infidels, forming a long barrier in the path, seemed to offer an ideal object for an enterprise which would establish the preliminary conditions for the coming of the last days. The restraining influence exercised in France by the papal authority had no direct effect here, because there was no officially inspired movement. Peter of Amiens himself still respected the papal ruling about the Jewish communities, when he appeared with the first groups in Cologne in April and started, not without success, recruiting for the popular crusade. Single noblemen offered themselves as leaders. A month later, when another crowd arriving from western Europe was joined by Rhenish people under the command of Count Emicho, the catastrophe came. When the crusaders spared neither women nor children in their attempt to extinguish Judaism in Christian lands by the dilemma of "baptism or murder", the knights of the archbishop of Mayence refused to assist the victims of the attack; they did not wish to fight on the side of the Jews against Christians.²⁹ They had not joined the Crusade, but they felt sympathy with the enthusiasm for the sake of religion which caused the massacre. After the event the chronicles of the Crusade explained this catastrophe as the outcome of Emicho's greed, and his

²⁷ Guibert, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, III, 3. Migne P.L. 156, col. 704B.

²⁸ Albert of Aix, *Liber Christianae expeditionis* II, 26, Migne P.L. 166, col. 407. H. v. SYBEL, *Gesch. d. ersten Kreuzzuges* (1881), pp. 193-212; F. DUNCAN, *The Peasants' Crusade*, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.* 26 (1921), pp. 450-453; P. ALPHANDÉRY, *La Chrétienté et l'Idée de Croisade* (1954), pp. 43-72.

²⁹ This attitude of the "milites" is described by Analista Saxo, *Mon. Germ. S.S.* VI, pp. 729, 22. The Jewish report (NEUBAUER, BAER *op. cit.*, p. 95) is shorter, but by comparing the Bishop's servants with the broken reed of *Isaiah* xxxvi: 6, implies the same meaning as does the Christian chronicler. The most recent surveys are by E. DIETRICH, *Das Judentum im Zeitalter der Kreuzzüge*, *Saeculum* III (1952), pp. 94ff; P. ALPHANDÉRY, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-79.

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band was characterised as an unbearable rabble of men and women. Such judgments are quite independent of the chronicler's sympathies or antipathies towards the Jews.³⁰ They reflect mainly the fact that the Peasants' Crusade of 1096 had been a dismal failure. The majority of its followers did not penetrate beyond Hungary, where the undisciplined bands dissolved, in conflict with king and population. In contrast to the "wheat" of the army, which conquered Jerusalem, they were but the "husks", and their leaders could not escape responsibility.

IV

In the context of Jewish history the character of men like Emicho is less important than the situation in which the catastrophe developed. The attitude of Urban II, though limited in its power, was sincere and was backed by a tradition which can be traced back to Gregory I and St Paul; and it was continued as the official policy of his successors. But the failure to enforce it in Germany was not really the by-product of historical circumstances. The emotional atmosphere, emphasised by the chroniclers as characteristic of the Peasants' Crusade and the cause of its disorders and failure, was really the sign of a changed situation, no longer controlled by the traditional conceptions. The attitude of the knights in Mayence is significant in this respect. This combination of enthusiasm and primitive instincts was rather a pre-supposition of the Crusades than their consequence. It was one of the elemental factors at the basis of medieval civilisation as it developed fully during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Life in the towns, which in this period became more complex and rose to greater importance in society, gave additional emphasis to the feeling of Christian solidarity as it had developed during the eleventh century, and at the same time made the guidance of the masses a permanent problem for the Papacy. The great city churches, designed especially to hold large audiences listening to popular sermons, became a lasting monument of this situation. In this world the religious outsider was felt much more intensely to be an abnormality than had been the case

³⁰ Bernold, *Chronicon*, *Mon. Germ. S.S.* V. p. 464, 20; Albert of Aix *op. cit.*, col. 407; Ekkehard, *Hierosolymita op. cit.*, p. 126. Ekkehard's *Chronicon Universale* adduces the well known story that Emicho's soul, after his death during a baronial feud in Germany, had to join a group of souls which appeared in the region of Worms under the fiery burden of the arms by which they had once sinned. *Mon. Germ. S.S.* VI, p. 261.

in the more loosely knit society of the early Middle Ages. The enthusiasm for the Crusades, always intermittent, died down at the end of the thirteenth century.³¹ But the image of Jews and Judaism, in which the ancient antagonism of Synagogue and Church had come to life once more, had a much longer life than had the movement which had brought it to the surface.

It remains true that the change of the Jewish position in western society since the eleventh century had social and economic causes, which had no direct link with the *religious* history of the age. The new merchant class arose by shaping the institutions of its environment according to its needs; with its guild organisation it established an efficient instrument both for long distance trade and for the production of marketable goods by a very much increased artisan class. European trade was now carried actively into the basin of the Eastern Mediterranean, whereas in the previous period the chain of Jewish communities had served as the main link. The new organisation of commerce outclassed the older one by its greater efficiency. The change over to moneylending as the main function of the Jews was an escape route, dictated by the pressure of a new economic situation which allowed them precarious opportunities.

But this whole development was determined by the fact that the Jews remained outside the more intensely developed corporate life which carried on this economic expansion of Europe. And there is no doubt that the absence of religious conformity was the barrier on both sides. Both the increase of the emotional element and the deeper penetration of religious motives into everyday life increased the emphasis on group differentiation, while the concentration of the Jews on the money trade, which was outlawed for Christians by the rules of the Church, made the Jew more than ever the symbol of forces to be fought by Christian doctrine and preaching. The consequences were to dominate the fate of Jewry in the western world for many centuries. This aspect of the fully developed medieval civilisation accounts for the contrast between its impact on Jewish history and that of the parallel movement of European expansion during the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Enlightenment and free enterprise gave Jewry the possibility to become an active partner in the transformation of the world by industry and world trade, while the

³¹ See P. A. THROOP, *Criticism of the Crusade. A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda* (1940).

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Gothic age, with its papal monarchy, preaching friar and the commercial policy of its guilds and cities, had finally meant exclusion for the Jew. It was the lasting result of the forces which had prepared the minds of men for the Crusade.

Liverpool

H. LIEBESCHÜTZ

	Col. i	Col. ii	Col. iii	Col. iv
	Z. H. 6d	Z. H. 9d	Z. H. 14b	Zohar I, 109a-b
LINE ONE	<p>הכמה</p> <p>עולם עליון (מלאכים)</p> <p>צורה שכלית</p>	<p>צורת ראשונה כנגד מדרגת המלאכים</p> <p>הנפש השכלית</p>	<p>כת צדיקים נפורים</p> <p>כוח הנשמה הקדושה</p>	<p>הנהגת השכל וההכמות</p> <p>הנשמה הקדושה</p>
LINE TWO	<p>תבונה</p> <p>עולם תיכון (גלגלים)</p> <p>צורה מדברת</p>	<p>צורה שנייה, כנגד השמים</p> <p>הנפש המדברת</p>	<p>כת כינונים</p> <p>כוח המניע, כוח המגדלת והמניעת את הגוף</p>	<p>הנהגת המנהגת לבני אדם והמחזקת את הגוף</p> <p>נפש הגוף, כוח המחזיק</p>
LINE THREE	<p>דעת</p> <p>עולם תחתון</p> <p>צורה צומחת</p>	<p>צורה שלישית כנגד מדרגת תחתונת הנפש</p> <p>הנפש הבהמית והמתאווה האות</p>	<p>כת רשעים נפורים</p> <p>כוח המתאווה</p>	<p>הנהגת התאווה</p>
KEY-WORDS	<p>הכמה ובן-ג' עולמות</p> <p>ג' צורות</p> <p>(עולם תחתון = עולם קטן)</p>	<p>ג' פעולות-ג' צורות נפשיות</p>	<p>ג' כתות-ג' כוחות באדם</p>	<p>ג' הנהגות יש באדם</p>

Philo and the Zohar (Part II)

18d. After these preliminaries, the accompanying comparative table of the main expressions and terms appearing in the more important texts in the *MhN* should be instructive (see the diagram facing this page).

It appears that line 1 represents not so much the “rational soul” *strictu sensu*, as the sphere of Intellect or νοῦς from which the fully realized *intellectus acquisitus* is drawn down on to the soul,¹⁰⁸ viz. to which the soul attains. It corresponds, naturally enough, to the sphere of the angels which, in its turn, may or may not be identical with that of the divine Throne. This depends on how exactly the series angels-spheres-sublunar world or intellect-soul-sphere etc. are combined with the series *Beri’ah-Yesirah-’Asiyyah*. The kabbalists obviously tend to dissociate the sphere of the Throne or *Merkavah* from that of the angels (i.e. *Yesirah*), which is presided over by Metatron. This also seems to be the view of the *MhN* (Z.H. 7d) which speaks of four cosmic strata: the Throne, the Angels, Heaven (i.e. the spheres) and Earth (i.e. the sub-lunar universe). Since to these four we must obviously add the realm of the divine *plērōma*, it appears that ‘*Asiyyah*’ would correspond to Heaven or the spheres. In that case the *MhN* would agree with the system outlined, e.g. in the *Tiqquney Zohar* (3b): ‘*Ašiluth* (=the world of sefiroth), *Beri’ah* (=Throne), Angels (=Yesirah) and Spheres (=‘*Asiyyah*’), to be followed, though this is not mentioned, by the sub-lunar universe.

Line 2 represents the human, rational soul (cols. i and ii) or the animal soul—i.e. to be more exact, the human version of the animal soul (cols. iii and iv). Correspondingly the appetitive faculty (line 3) is attributed to the animal soul (col. ii) or to the vegetative soul (this must be the meaning of cols. iii and iv, and the implication of col. i). It is clear that the addiction to a certain terminological tradition, in conjunction with the desire to keep to a tripartite scheme, led to imprecision and uncertainty regarding the animal and vegetable souls. The source of the trouble, of course, is the reservation of line 1 not for the rational soul but for the “holy neshamah” (i.e. actually the *intellectus activus*) above it. The pattern as a whole is well in the neoplatonic tradition for which νοῦς comes above the three souls. The deviation in the conception of details, however, is thoroughly

¹⁰⁸ Cf. ibn Tibbon’s rendering השכל הנקנה הנאצל for Maimonides’ אלמנטספאר, *Guide*, i, 72.

Jewish in that this intellectual principle above the three souls is not the universal intellect, but the individual soul itself in its highest aspect. Once this intellectual and holy *neshamah* was identified with the first division of the tripartite psychology, the three standard souls (rational, animal and vegetative) had to be squeezed into the two remaining lower divisions. Hence the uncertainty in the distribution of the various faculties.

19a. We now come to the important passage *Z.H.* 17b concerning the verb ברא, as signifying *creatio ex nihilo*. The objection that the heavens were not created *ex nihilo*, but from the supernal light,¹⁰⁹ is answered as follows: נוף השמים מאין היה וצורתם מדבר ממשות וכן הוא האדם. Prof. Belkin (p. 45) considers this sentence incomprehensible, but believes that he can make sense of it by comparing it with another passage (*Z.H.* 10b) which echoes the well-known reference in B. 'A.Z. 5a, *Nid.* 13b, *Yeb.* 62a, 63b, to a *guf* (= אוצר הנשמות) in which all souls are said to be contained. The mysterious lines in the *MhN* are of course perfectly plain to anyone who knows that *guf* is one of the many mediaeval Hebrew words for "matter," the best witness being again Moses de Leon himself who, in his *הנפש החכמה*, discusses the origin of the soul in connection with the expression צלם אלהים which he interprets as *guf* and *surah*, i.e. matter and form. Moses de Leon actually goes on from there—exactly as our present text in *Z.H.* 17b—to discuss the divine name 'Elohim as a שם משותף: a thoroughly mediaeval technical term which, however, is used by the *MhN* in its purely Maimonidean, philosophical sense, whereas *הנפש החכמה* already gives it a characteristically kabbalistic twist. Our text thus simply tells us that the "matter" of the celestial substances was created *ex nihilo*, after which all the rest came into being by emanation.

Now all this merely echoes the well-known themes of mediaeval speculation. The distinction between creation from something and from nothing passed from (pseudo) Ammonius, al-Kindi and other early sources to Israeli¹¹⁰ and thence to the kabbalists of Gerona.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ For the underlying old *midrash* and its significance as the starting point for emanationist doctrines, see A. ALTMANN, "A Note on the rabbinic Doctrine of Creation", *JJS* vii, (1956), pp. 195-206; also *idem* in *Isaac Israeli*, pp. 130-2.

¹¹⁰ Cf. ALTMANN-STERN, *op. cit.* [n. 68], pp. 67f., 130-2, 171f.

¹¹¹ The kabbalists of Gerona knew the Mantua Text which, as has been proved by SCHOLEM and ALTMANN (cf. ALTMANN-STERN, *op. cit.*, p. 130 and the references there) is the work of Israeli. On the use made of this text by the Geronese mystics, cf. G. SCHOLEM's Hebrew article, *Traces of Gabirol in the Kabbalah*, in *Me' assef Soferey Ereš Yisra'el*, 1940, pp. 171-3, and I. TISHBY, *Azriel of Gerona's Commentary on the 'Aggadoth*, 1945, pp. 10, 83, 87-8.

Israeli held that the first two substances, the light of wisdom and first matter, were created by the power and will of God, whereas the subsequent spiritual substances were emanated. The lower, corporeal substances were brought into being by the "casuality of nature"—for the *MhN*, as we have seen,¹¹² by the elements and the three agents Heaven, Water and Earth.

The terminology, too, as Prof. Belkin is well aware (p. 45), is typically mediaeval. The terms *ברא—יצר* as corresponding to *יש מאין—יש מיש* were already discussed by David Kimḥi,^{112a} Ibn Ezra, Nahmanides, pseudo-Rabad on *Yeṣirah*, Abraham bar Ḥiyya (*Megillath ha-megalleh*), Yehudah Ha-Levi, Maimonides, etc. It is interesting to compare Nahmanides *ad Gen. i: 1* with our *MhN*. Nahmanides holds that primal matter alone was created from nothing. But primal matter is of two kinds: "heaven" i.e. the matter of the spheres, and "earth" i.e. that of the sub-lunar world. This primal matter is called *tohu*, whereas *bohu* signifies "form"; in the latter inhere the four elements which Scripture indicates¹¹³ by *darkness* (=fire), *abyss* (=water), *spirit* (=air) and *earth*. It is surely unnecessary to emphasize how far all this is removed from Philo, for whom matter is so definitely uncreated that even God's final verdict over creation "and God saw every thing that he had made, and behold, it was very good" (*Gen. i: 31*) is not meant to include matter.¹¹⁴ For matter is neither good, nor made by God.

19b. The other passage from the *MhN* which Prof. Belkin adduces in order to solve the imaginary difficulties of the first is concerned with a different subject altogether, and even the term *guf* as used in it means something else. The passage should be compared with *Zohar i, 7a, 38b, 81a, 90b-91a* etc. and with Moses de Leon's Hebrew writings¹¹⁵ where the word *בנין* corresponds to the zoharic *ריוקנא*. The meaning of the passage is obvious. The pre-existent souls, as we already know from the Talmud, bide their time in a celestial waiting-room or storehouse. In accordance with his marked eschatological interests, the author of the *MhN* now adds that after departing this

¹¹² *Supra*, §14a.

^{112a} *שם*, ed. BIESENTHAL and LEBRECHT, Berlin 1847, coll. 94-5 (pp. 47-8).

¹¹³ *Gen. i: 1-2*. Nahmanides' correlation of the four elements with the key-nouns of *Genesis* differs from that of the *MhN*; cf. *supra*, §14a.

¹¹⁴ *Quis Rer. 32*; on creation from primeval matter cf. also BREHIER, *op. cit.* [n. 54], pp. 80-2. On the midrashic antecedents of the *ex nihilo* controversy, see *Gen. Rabbah i: 5; ibid. 9*, בלחון בתיב בהן בריאה; also *ibid. iv: 6*. cf. also *Mid. Temurah* (Jellinek, *Beth-ha-Midrash i*, p. 109), שני דברים שלא פצינו להם בריאה, הרוח והמים.

¹¹⁵ Especially his *Mishqan ha-'Eduth*.

life, the souls of the righteous return to a similar state—*expectantes resurrectionem*. Even before their descent into this world, these souls existed in a form or shape similar to that of their future bodies; in the same way they will now be clothed in a spiritual form anticipating their *corpus resurrectionis*. The great merit of Prof. Belkin's juxtaposition of the two passages lies in the illustration which it provides of the complete indifference, or rather recklessness, with which the author of the *MhN* (and of the *Zohar* in general) draws on all available philosophic and aggadic sources, without bothering too much about consistency of theory or terminology when spinning the threads of his associations. This instance is on a par with the case of the souls of the righteous who, being angels, are created every day anew.¹¹⁶ There the momentary interest in identifying holy souls and angels led to the application to the former of aggadic sayings concerned with angels only,¹¹⁷ and to a temporary blackout of the traditional and undisputed doctrine of the pre-existence of all souls.

Summing up the argument, we may say that in Philo's account the ἀσώματος κόσμος of ideas is followed by material creation, whereas, according to the *MhN*, God first creates hylic matter and then form and all things.

20a. That enquiries into מעשי בראשית have to be conducted delicately is not only a well-known idea, but also a well-known *halakhah*.¹¹⁸ Hints to that effect by Philo or any other writer do not, therefore, call for special comment. If there is any point worth making, it must be, as Prof. Belkin well realizes, a very specific one, and it is this: both *MhN* (Z.H. 12d) and Philo (*De Migr.* 134-6) base themselves on *Gen.* i: 10 etc., "and God saw that it was good". The comparison is instructive indeed, inasmuch as it shows how differently two writers can think about the same subject. *MhN* bases itself on *Gen.* i: 10 "and God saw that it was good", the moral of the verse being that it is enough for us to know that God found it good—ours not to reason why. Philo's text, on the other hand, is *Gen.* i 31: "and God saw every thing that he had made". It is the Creator's omniscience before which man's vaunted knowledge dwindles into ignorance. The study of cosmology should therefore be relinquished in favour of the more profitable pursuit of self-knowledge.¹¹⁹

20b. There seems to be a real correspondence between the con-

¹¹⁶ *Supra*, §17.

¹¹⁷ Cf. *B. Hag.* 14a; *Gen. Rabbah* lxxviii: 1; *Lam. Rabbah* iii: 8.

¹¹⁸ *Mishnah, Hag.* ii, 1.

¹¹⁹ Cf. *De Migr.* 41-2 and 134-8.

tinuation of our *MhN* passage and Philo (*Quaest. in Gen.* iv: 24) where *Gen.* xviii: 21, "I will go down now, and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it", yields the moral lesson not to judge before careful personal investigation. Even the omniscient God, before judging Sodom, condescendingly said "I will go down and see". But need we assume any direct connection between Philo and *MhN* in this case? From whatever source this re-interpretation of an intolerable anthropomorphism in terms of divine condescension conveying a moral lesson may ultimately derive, it is sufficient for us to know that expressions like God "descending and looking" (*Gen.* xi: 5, xviii: 21) greatly disturbed all mediaeval commentators. The greatest of them all, Rashi, who can hardly be described as an allegorizing Neoplatonist, twice quotes the *Tanḥuma*¹²⁰ as saying *ללמד לדיינים שלא ירשיעו הנדון עד שיראו ויבינו*. This, one would think, is more than enough to answer the question of the *MhN*'s "source".

21. As an alternative interpretation of *Gen.* xv: 15, Philo (*De Sacr.* 5) suggests that Abraham's "fathers" are the four elements to which the body "returns" viz. into which it decomposes after death. It is not correct, as Prof. Belkin suggests (p. 50), that Philo rejects this view. What Philo rejects is not the idea of the return of the four constituent parts of the body to their elements, but the view that this undoubted truth was the meaning of that particular verse which, he believes, referred rather to the return of the rational soul to the heavenly company of λογισται.¹²¹ It is equally untrue to say that R. Isaac and R. Yoḥanan in the *MhN* (*Zohar* i, 122a-b) are at variance over this point. Clearly both admit the fact that the constituent elements of the body return to their respective sources.¹²² The discussion in the *MhN* is merely verbal, for whilst R. Isaac designates the four constituent parts as the "separate elements of the body", R. Yoḥanan prefers to describe them as the elements "joined within the body during its lifetime". Some kind of word-play on *חבריו* ("join") is inevitable. Philo uses the word as a symbol of the union of the soul (not of the four elements) with the body.¹²³ The *MhN*, unlike Philo,¹²⁴ takes Sarah to signify the body and Hebron to indi-

¹²⁰ The versions differ slightly; cf. ed. BUBER, *Noah*, 28 (p. 56).

¹²¹ Cf. also *supra*, §17.

¹²² On this commonplace cf. also ALTMANN-STERN, *op. cit.* [n. 68], pp. 122f. (*Mantua Text*) and p. 194.

¹²³ *De Post. Caini* 60-2; *Quod Det. Pot. Insid.* 15.

¹²⁴ Philo identifies Sarah with virtue and not with the body; cf. *Quaest. in Gen.* iii, 21 *et passim*; iv, 68 *et passim*; *De Cher.* 3-8.

cate the combination of the four elements in the body. It may be noted in passing that likewise the "four heads" into which the river that went out of Eden was parted (*Gen.* ii: 10) were taken to refer by mediaeval allegorists to the four elements. Philo does not propose this particular allegory, but it is found e.g. in ibn Gabirol¹²⁵ and the *Zohar*.¹²⁶ Elsewhere the *MhN* (*Zohar* ii, 15b) interprets the four rivers as the four archangels of the *Shekhinah*¹²⁷ who bear the Throne.¹²⁸ In this instance the kabbalistic character of the allegory is obvious: the *Shekhinah* is the "garden" and terminal point of the main stream (*Binah-Yesod*) issuing forth from Eden (*Hokhmah*), where it divides into four "separate" rivers. The world of separation begins immediately beneath the *Shekhinah*.

22. Philo, as we just said, never uses the four rivers of Eden as a symbol of the four elements. Instead, he offers different allegories which Prof. Belkin (p. 51) simply strings together as if they were identical. In the first allegory¹²⁹ Eden is compared with the divine σοφία or λόγος, the main river flowing forth from Eden with goodness or generic virtue (ἡ γενικὴ ἀρετή), and the four rivers into which the former divides with the four cardinal virtues. Of these four, the river Pison corresponds to Prudence. In the second passage¹³⁰ Philo discusses not *Gen.* ii: 10, i.e. the river going out of Eden, but verse 6 of the same chapter, "a spring went up out of the earth".¹³¹ There is no more obvious association for water springing up from the ground and irrigating the earth, than the annual flood of the Nile. For the religious implications of this phenomenon in terms of self-assured independence from "heaven" and from the caprice of the gods, we may compare not only Philo¹³² but also *Deut.* xi: 10-12 and Herodotus, *Hist.* ii, 13-14. Philo rejects this interpretation of *Gen.* ii: 6 as too "naturalistic", and proposes a more spiritual allegory: the mind (νοῦς) is like a spring (πηγή) watering the senses. In order to prevent his readers from falling into Prof. Belkin's error of identifying the two several allegories, on the two verses *Gen.* ii: 6 and 10, respec-

¹²⁵ Cf. Bacher, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 46; Kaufmann, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 69; ll. 72-4.

¹²⁶ i, 27a.

¹²⁷ The four thronebearer-archangels also preside over the "four camps of the *Shekhinah*"; this is a zoharic commonplace.

¹²⁸ Cf. *supra*, §13a.

¹²⁹ *Leg. All.* i, 63f.; cf. also *Quaest. in Gen.* i, 12.

¹³⁰ *De Fuga* 181-2; cf. also *Leg. All.* i, 28f.

¹³¹ Following the LXX: πηγὴ δὲ ἀνέβαινεν ἐκ τῆς γῆς.

¹³² *De Fuga* 180.

tively, Philo especially emphasizes the difference between ποταμός and πηγή.¹³³

The first allegory, as has already been mentioned, identifies the river Pison with Prudence. But Prof. Belkin prudently avoids the word “Prudence” and translates *φρόνησις* with *חכמה*. This enables him to see an analogy with a passage in the *MhN* according to which a “spirit of wisdom is carried with every drop flowing from Eden”. Pison being the first and therefore the foremost river,¹³⁴ it is only natural that it should carry wisdom with its waters.¹³⁵ But the *MhN* also identifies Pison with the Nile, and the land of Havilah with Egypt. Now this identification is a commonplace of mediaeval exegesis, though unknown in earlier sources.^{135a} For the Palestinian Targum, Pison flows round the *ארע הינדיקי* which is the “land of gold”, and the same view is held by Josephus.¹³⁶ Sa’adyah Ga’on¹³⁷ was apparently the first commentator explicitly to identify Pison with the Nile, and his interpretation has certainly become a truism for every Jewish reader of the Bible since the day that Rashi wrote

¹³³ Cf. in particular *Quaest. in Gen.* i, 12. Prof. Belkin (p. 52), simply takes it for granted that the interpretation $\pi\eta\gamma\eta$ = Nile in *De Fuga* refers to the river Pison. In this extraordinary misunderstanding of a plain text he was already preceded by L. GINZBERG, *The Legends of the Jews*, vol. v, pp. 91-2 who also refers to *Quaest. in Gen.* i, 12-3 for evidence that Philo identified Pison and the Nile.

¹³⁴ This is based on the common midrashic interpretation אחד-המיוחד; cf. B. *Meg.* 28a, and also Pal. Targum and Rashi on *Gen.* xxvi: 10.

¹³⁵ The form of the statement of the *MhN* (*Zohar* I, 125a, cf. also *ibid.*, II, 30b) *אית מיא מנדלון הכימין ואית מיא מנדלון טמטין* is clearly modelled on the saying (*Tanhumab Balaq* 26, ed. BUBER IV p. 145-7; *Num. Rabbah* XX, 22) *יש מטיינות ויש מטיינות* ששנמלך גבורים ויש ששנמלך הלשים וכיו' (the certain river gives wisdom cf. *B. Ber.* 59b מהוא בני מחווא). *האי דהרפי בני מחווא*

The *MhN* clearly presents a conflation of these two *midrashim*, the one providing the contents ("wisdom"), the other the formal element.

^{136a} GINZBERG's statement, *loc. cit.* [n. 133], that "in extant midrashic sources Pison is identified with Nile" is definitely wrong. Not one such midrashic source is (or ever was) extant; cf. *Gen. Rabbah* xvi, 4: פִּישׁוֹן וְהַנִּיל. Practically all early sources agree with this location of Pison in the east (Babylonia or India); if one of the four rivers had to be the Nile, then this was Gihon. Cf. n. 136.

¹³⁶ *Ant.* i, 1. 3: Gihon=Nile, Pison=Ganges. When Jerome (*in Gen.* 2: 11) says that "*Fison . . . Gangem putant*," he clearly refers to his Jewish teachers. For the view that the "land of India" of the Pal. Targum means Ethiopia (כוש), cf. the reference to EPSTEIN in GINZBERG, *loc. cit.*

¹³⁷ In his translation of the Bible; see J. DERENBOURG (ed.), *Oeuvres complètes de R. Saadia ben Josef Al-Fayumi*; vol. i: *Version arabe du Pentateuque* (1893), Arabic text p. 7. Sa'adyah is also quoted as the author of this interpretation by Ibn Ezra, though he probably did not invent it. It appears that "Pison" was in use as a Hebrew equivalent of "Nile" among the Jews (Rabbanites and Karaites) of Egypt; cf. the many references to Pison in the *Genizah*-documents printed in J. MANN, *The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs*, 1922, vol. ii, pp. 39, 150, 211 (במדינת פספסאט שעל נהר פישון), etc.

פישון הוא נילוס נהר מצרים.¹³⁸ Egypt is nowhere mentioned in early rabbinic literature as the epitome of wisdom though, of course, *Kings* v: 10 (A.V. iv: 30) shows that the "wisdom of Egypt" must have been proverbial since it was excelled by that of Solomon only.^{138a} The idea that the wisdom of a particular people or country is taken away one day can be found, *Obadiah* verse 8, *Jer.* xlix: 7, *Is.* xix: 9-12. The *Isaiah* passage is of particular interest as it also contains one of Rashi's proof-texts for the identification Pison-Nile (verse 9: עוברי פשתים).^{138b} Together with the underlying notion of rivers or waters of wisdom,¹³⁹ these elements could combine, in the fertile associative mind we have learned to admire in the author of the *Zohar*, to produce the *MhN* text quoted by Prof. Belkin. There is not even the faintest shadow of an analogy with Philo.

23. Both Philo and the *MhN*, as in fact every self-respecting allegorist,¹⁴⁰ have something to say on the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life. Philo's treatment of the trees is similar to that of the rivers. The Tree of Life is θεοσέβεια (*De Opif.* 154), ἡ γενναία ἀρετή (*Leg. All* i, 59), or εὐσέβεια (*Quaest. in Gen.* i: 10), whereas the Tree of Knowledge represents the prime virtue φρόνησις (and not חכמה as Belkin translates, p. 53). Eden is the dominion of the virtuous soul. From this allegory Prof. Belkin derives what he apparently intends us to take as a distinctively "hellenistic" moral, to wit that "Adam and Eve sinned by listening to the blandishments of the serpent to chose evil and reject the good, wherefore they were banished from the Garden" (Belkin, p. 54). The *MhN* (*Z.H.* 18c) also stresses the free will motif which, as Belkin shows, already occurs in the *Midrash ha-Gadol*. But the Tree of Life is of course, in true zoharic fashion, the Torah. The one really interesting point here, the anti-allegorist orthodoxy or, to be more exact, the "fundamentalist allegorism" of the *MhN*, has been overlooked by Prof. Belkin. This fundamentalist-allegoristic attitude is known to us also from Moses de Leon's Hebrew writings with their contemptuous polemics against the allegorists of his time whom he

¹³⁸ Cf. also Nahmanides, *ad loc.*, who inclines to locate Pison and Havilah in the east, but who quotes the view that פישון הוא נילוס מצרים.

^{138a} *Ben Sira* xxiv: 25 says of the *Torah* that it is "full with wisdom like Pison" (or "fillet men with wisdom like Pison", depending on the reading מלאה or ממלאה). Was the author of the *MhN* inspired by this or a similar text?

^{138b} The association Pison—פשתים is already stated by *Gen. Rabbah* xvi, 2 which probably served as Rashi's source.

¹³⁹ Cf. *supra*, n. 135.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. e.g. ibn Gabirol (BACHER, *op. cit.* [n. 25]), and Maimonides, *Guide* i, 2 *contra ibid.* ii, 30.

accused of using allegory as a means to get rid of the literal meaning instead of taking the plain sense as an objective reality indicative of another, deeper and more spiritual reality. Whereas Philo (and undoubtedly also ibn Gabirol, Maimonides etc.) would say that Eden and the trees were "not meant as realities but as symbols . . . for Trees of Life and Knowledge never grew on earth in the past nor probably will they ever in the future" (*De Opif.* 154), the *MhN* begins his exposition by aggressively asserting "it was a real tree and there were two of them".

24. It would be interesting to speculate on the existence of an old *midrash* on the theme of the Tree of Paradise being hidden from the sight of the vulgar. A trace of it may be preserved in the *Hodayoth*-Scroll viii, 10-14¹⁴¹ where, however, it is the Tree of Life that is referred to. The fruit of this Tree is hidden and protected from the sons of darkness that have neither knowledge nor faith. Similarly Philo says (*Leg. All.* i. 60-61) that Scripture did not divulge the whereabouts of the Tree of Knowledge¹⁴² lest those unacquainted with "natural philosophy" (φυσιολογία) should want to speculate too much on it. The relevance of physiology to the subject of the discussion is somewhat obscure, and neither the editor's note¹⁴³ nor Prof. Belkin's deft substitution of "philosophy" for "natural philosophy" (p. 55, last line of 3rd paragraph) really solves the problem. Philo apparently wants to say that those who have not passed through the primary study of natural philosophy and mastered the *propaedeutica* and *encyclica*, ought to be prevented from approaching such advanced and truly philosophical subjects as the Tree of Knowledge.¹⁴⁴

The *Midrash*¹⁴⁵ makes a somewhat similar point, though its theme is the name or kind of the tree, and not its location. Using a well-known rabbinic motif,¹⁴⁶ the *Midrash* explains this lack of more specific details by God's concern for Adam's honour; otherwise he and his sin would be remembered and cursed every time people

¹⁴¹ Cf. J. LICHT, *Megillath ha-hodayoth*, 1957, pp. 134-5. Perhaps even more striking than the implied motif of the "occultation" of the Tree is the imagery of Philo and the *Hodayoth*-Scroll which describes perfect, pious and spiritual men, viz. the righteous elect, as divine plantations, holy shoots, etc.

¹⁴² The exact location of the Tree of Life is indicated by the expression (*Gen.* ii: 9) "in the midst of the garden"; this indication does not apply to the words "... and the tree of knowledge of good and evil", which come as a sort of appendix to the sentence.

¹⁴³ Philo, vol. I, pp. 184-5.

¹⁴⁴ This interpretation was suggested to me by my colleague, Dr. D. Flusser.

¹⁴⁵ *Gen. Rabbah* XV, 7 and the parallels (see THEODOR, *Bereschit Rabba*, 1912, vol. I p. 141).

¹⁴⁶ Mishnah, *Sanh.* VII 4 and parallels (as given by THEODOR, *loc. cit.*).

beheld a tree of that particular kind. This answer is also quoted—clearly from the *Midrash*—by the *MhN* (Z.H. 19a), though rather *mal à propos*, since the *MhN*'s initial question referred not to the tree at all but to the exact nature of Adam's sin. It is, in fact, this question that is squarely answered by the second reply: Scripture conceals the true nature of the *peccatum originale* because God is concerned with *his own* honour and with the glory of his exalted name. According to Belkin (p. 55) this means that God concealed the details of Adam's temptation and fall, lest men should be tempted להרהר אחרי מדותיו של הקב"ה. Any reader of the *Zohar* who knows that Adam's sin consisted in separating the Tree of Life from the Tree of Knowledge, i.e. God-Tif'ereth from God-Shekhinah,¹⁴⁷ will realize the true reason of Scripture's discretion. It is an awesome mystery that such things can happen to the Godhead and even more ominous that they can be brought about by human action. This mystery may not be mentioned except within the closed, esoteric circles of kabbalistic initiates. The passage has been discussed by Scholem¹⁴⁸ who has shown that it provides the key to the peculiar restraint with which the subject of Adam's fall is treated throughout the main parts of the *Zohar*. The *Zohar*'s reticence in this respect is strikingly different from the profusion with which the problem was discussed by some of Moses de Leon's kabbalistic contemporaries.

Perhaps the guess may be ventured that^{148a} there existed an old *midrash* on the theme of the "occultation" of the Tree of Paradise. We know of three variants: (1) The name of the Tree of Knowledge was concealed out of respect for our ancestor Adam (*Gen. Rabba*, whence the first reply of the *MhN*). (2) The location of the tree was concealed from the vulgar (Philo), and possibly from the reprobate and unredeemed children of darkness (*Hodayoth*-Scroll), i.e. from all those unfit for true *gnosis*. (3) The nature of Adam's sin was hidden because the mystery was too deep and dangerous (*MhN*).

25. Everything created by God is composite (בשתוף). But should not the angels, made as they are of the Holy Spirit, be regarded as simple rather than composite substances? If composite, they would be no better than humans. The *MhN* solves this quandary (*Zohar* i, 136b) by admitting that everything is composed of body and soul. Though the angels have no material body, they too consist of some

¹⁴⁷ I.e. the great kabbalistic sin of קיצוץ ופירור.

¹⁴⁸ *MTJM*, pp. 231-2.

^{148a} This is the suggestion of my colleague, Dr. D. Flusser.

kind of substance that is inert until a holy supernal "soul" descends on it. In other words, the angels, too, consist of some kind of body—albeit an exceedingly spiritual one—and a soul.

Now, whatever Philo may have to say about composition in the "parallel" texts collected by Prof. Belkin (pp. 56-57), there is nowhere the slightest hint about the body, matter or composition of angelic beings, pure souls, *logoi* etc. On the other hand, the problem of the *MhN* is extremely familiar to students of the mediaeval controversy between Aristotelians and Platonists on the question whether angels were "pure form" or composed of celestial matter and celestial form. We need merely to remind ourselves of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, the pseudo-Empedoclean Fragments, Isaac Israeli, ibn Gabirol, Maimonides etc. As a matter of fact the doubtful oscillation of the author of the *MhN* is characteristic of other thirteenth century kabbalists. Gikatilla, for instance, in his *Ginnath 'Egoz*, agrees with Maimonides that angels are pure form, yet in the *Sha'ar ha-Niqqud* he makes reservations and attributes to them also "matter". Prof. Belkin's juxtaposition of texts shows merely that both the *MhN* and Philo, like everybody else in the world, held angels to be spiritual beings.

26. Prospects of more conclusive comparisons seem to brighten as we turn from stock philosophic ideas to detailed and definite allegorical interpretations. Are the symbolic equations of Philo and the *MhN* so specifically identical that there is something definite and new to be learned from them?

Of Sarah's tent (*Gen.* xviii: 9) Philo says (*Quaest. in Gen.* iv. 11) that it signifies the body. Falling victim to the law of the association of ideas, Prof. Belkin has misread the unequivocally clear text of the *MhN* (*Zohar* i, 101b-102a) which states that Abraham=soul, Sarah=body. The same allegory is repeated by the *MhN* (*ibid.*, 122b; the passage is actually quoted by Belkin, p. 64), so that the reader cannot help feeling puzzled by the confidence with which Prof. Belkin asserts that according to the *MhN* "Abraham is the soul, the tent is the body" (p. 60).¹⁴⁹ For Philo, as is well-known, Sarah herself consistently and invariably signifies virtue.

The *MhN* paints, on a large canvas, an allegorical picture of the soul's descent from its celestial home to a particular body on earth,

¹⁴⁹ Not that it would make any difference to the central problem. Was there anybody who did not know that the body served as a house, tent, covering or prison for the soul?

its separation from the latter at death, and their reunion at the resurrection. The triptych begins with the exodus of Abraham (the soul) from his homeland i.e. heaven (*Gen.* xii: 1). Philo¹⁵⁰ says the exact opposite: the soul is bidden to abandon its country, i.e. the material world and the senses, and, by governing the body, rise to ever greater heights until it arrives in the promised land of the supra-sensible world. Most readers will probably find it difficult to agree with Prof. Belkin that the two allegories are "evidently" identical, and that the purely external variations in terminology do not weigh against the "essential correspondence" of the two texts.

The *MhN* repeatedly states that soul is to body as male is to female.¹⁵¹ In spite of Prof. Belkin's assurances, this idea is nowhere stated by Philo¹⁵² whereas it is a commonplace of mediaeval symbolism.¹⁵³ For Philo, as we have seen, Sarah is either virtue or wisdom;¹⁵⁴ he certainly never wrote that Sarah's grave was a symbol of the virtuous man's body. The passage quoted by Belkin (p. 64-5) simply means that the body is a grave; the righteous man does not possess a grave but, on the contrary, acquires "property" (אחיות (קבר), i.e. he exercises dominion over his body and does not deliver it to the "sons of Heth", the lower passions. The "parallel" passage in the *MhN*, on the other hand, does not say that God grants the privilege of resurrection to those with whom it has "ceased to be . . . after the manner of women" (*Gen.* xviii: 11), i.e. who have mortified the body during this life (Belkin, p. 64), but something very different. The allegory is this: After death, the body remains separated for a long time from the life-giving soul, i.e. it has ceased to be after the material, biological "manner of women". This body, after a long time in the grave, will be called to the resurrection, i.e. to new bodily life (i.e. "after the manner of women"), albeit transformed and glorified. Prof. Belkin claims that it is "clear as day that the yeast of Philo is present in the dough of the *MhN*, minor terminological divergencies notwithstanding". Coming as it does after serious misinterpretations of both Philo and the *MhN*, the claim seems somewhat exaggerated.

27. The *MhN* allegorizes the three sons of Noah: Shem=the good

¹⁵⁰ *Leg. All.* iii, 83-4; *De Migr. Abr.* 1f.

¹⁵¹ E.g. *Zohar* i, 124b.

¹⁵² Though, of course, Philo repeatedly says that man is by nature closer to the spiritual world than woman, who is nearer to the senses.

¹⁵³ Cf. e.g. Maimonides, *Guide* iii, 8: the strange woman=bad matter, the virtuous woman=good matter; the kabbalistic equation *Shekhinah*= "earth" etc.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. *Quaest. in Gen.* iv, 73.

influence of the holy *neshamah*; Ham (the “hot” one)=the evil *yeşer*; Japheth=the good *yeşer*. Prof. Belkin’s quotation from this text (p. 67) oddly enough breaks off in the middle of a sentence, the end of which runs “and who stops man (from following the good *yeşer*) . . . ? This is matter which spoils and destroys all”.¹⁵⁵ The abrupt ending of this quotation saved Prof. Belkin from the necessity of asking himself whether an old *midrash* would have used the word **מַלְא** as a technical term for “matter”—well-known, of course, from Maimonides and other mediaeval writers. The continuation of the *MhN* (Z.H. 22c) that Canaan castrated his father Noah is, of course, based on the ‘*aggada* B. *Sanh.* 70a, and is therefore irrelevant for comparative purposes. For Philo the relation of Ham to Canaan is that of potential to actual evil; the *Zohar* does not seem to know anything of the kind. For Philo, Japheth, like Lot, represents the indifferent type, easily swayed,¹⁵⁶ whereas for the *MhN* he emphatically signifies the good *yeşer*. Prof. Belkin undoubtedly misrepresents Philo with his statement (p. 69) that Japheth signifies the “golden mean”. He signifies nothing of the kind, but rather the indifferent man who has to be swayed by the good *yeşer*—and here, incidentally, Philo and the Palestinian *midrash*¹⁵⁷ agree. Prof. Belkin argues that it cannot be accidental that both texts regard Ham as “hot” and therefore evil, and here he is undoubtedly right. The interpretation is not accidental, but an obvious and self-evident matter of course.

28. The *MhN* compares Lot and his two daughters with Laban and his daughters Leah and Rachel (*Zohar* i, 137b). The comparison, which is developed by the *Zohar* in an eschatological perspective, is reminiscent of patristic discussions about the ultimate salvation of the devil and of sixteenth-century kabbalistic speculations concerning the final destiny of evil and the *kelippoth*. Lot is the evil *yeşer*, and his daughters are the two forces of the body that incite to evil. Laban is Lot purified, even as Leah and Rachel are the two afore-mentioned bodily forces weakened (**לֹאֵה**) and silenced (**רָחֵל**; cf. *Is.* li: 7), i.e. transformed and saved. For Philo Lot is either the weak or the “progressive” man,¹⁵⁸ and his daughters signify the virtues of Counsel (**βουλή**) and Consent (**συγκατάθεσις**).¹⁵⁹ Leah is a positive ἀρετή

¹⁵⁵ Z.H. 21c: (ומי מעכבו ומפסידו... והגולם המפסיד והמשחית את הכל)

¹⁵⁶ E.g. *Quaest. in Gen.* i, 88. An analogy to Philo, not noticed by Prof. BELKIN, can be found in *Zohar* I, 62a where Noah’s three sons represent the

respectively. ¹⁵⁷ *Gen. Rabbah* xxxvi, 6; *Tanḥuma Noah*, 21 (BUBER, I, p. 43).

¹⁵⁸ *Quaest. in Gen.* iv, 31f.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 55 and *De Post. Caini* 175.

—whatever its exact nature. Rachel, elsewhere representing αἰσθησις, represents τὸ ἄλογον in the text quoted by Belkin (pp. 69-71) from *De Congressu* 25-26. In a masterly piece of understatement Prof. Belkin admits (p. 70) that the details of the two texts “are not quite the same”. What they have in common is that they both allegorize.

29. Another thoroughly eschatological allegory is found in the *MhN* (*Zohar* i, 127b-128a) on *Gen.* xxiv: 11f. At the time of the resurrection the souls of the righteous return to the graves where their bodies lie.¹⁶⁰ For Philo¹⁶¹ the city is the body, and the allegory refers to perception, memory and knowledge. The only real resemblance is Philo’s remark that Rebekah, the soul of the lover of God,¹⁶² lightly bears everything pertaining to wisdom. Similarly the *MhN* says וְכָרָה עַל שְׂכֵמָה—מִשָּׂא הַחֲכָמָה עָלֶיהָ. For the rest Rebekah signifies the body—a holy body, of course—“that was born to Bethuel, i.e. the daughter of God”. The etymology is almost inevitable, and it is obvious that Philo, too, could not have failed to exploit it and use it in his own context.¹⁶³

Prof. Belkin’s analysis of the two texts (pp. 72-4) is somewhat surprising. “Without the city” refers, as we have seen, not to the body, but to the grave in which the body lies; the women drawing water are the bodies of the saintly scholars who had devoted their lives to *Torah* and who were now “going out” to be resurrected—there is not the slightest hint here of scholars studying the Law as they rise from the dust (Belkin, *loc. cit.*) Philo nowhere says that this verse refers to the rational soul לַעֲתָ קֵץ בְּשִׁתְּעוּרָר (*Belkin, loc. cit.*, p. 72) to acquire wisdom; what he does say¹⁶⁴ is that the intellect arrives at true wisdom when sense-perception is suspended. The *MhN*, on the other hand, does not say, as Philo does, that the “daughter of God” (בְּתוּאֵל) was “Wisdom”.

After this sample of Prof. Belkin’s “comparative method” we may proceed to the interpretation of the *MhN*. The key is provided by the statement that the “daughter of God” is also the “son of the king of the world” (בֶּן מַלְכָּה). In other words: we are dealing here with

¹⁶⁰ The scene takes place “without the city, by a well of water” (*Gen.* xxiv: 11), since graves are always outside the city-walls; cf. B., *B.B.* 25a.

¹⁶¹ *Quaest. in Gen.* iv, 94f.

¹⁶² This is exceptional; usually Rebekah is the virtue of Constancy, cf. *De Cher.* 41: ἐπιμονὴ τῶν καλῶν.

¹⁶³ Cf. *De Fuga* 50-1: Bethuel=θυγάτηρ θεοῦ, i.e. σοφία.

¹⁶⁴ *Quaest. in Gen.* iv, 94.

the soul which, though described as God's "daughter",¹⁶⁵ is legitimately also called a "son" since according to neoplatonic convention the higher and more spiritual is always male with regard to the lower and more material.¹⁶⁶ Now Rebekah, i.e. the holy body whose soul is the subject of our discourse, is also the wife *viz.* companion of Nahor (=the intellect) who is the brother of Abraham (=the soul). Intellect and Soul are brothers, and the Body is their (female) companion, both in this life and after the resurrection.

Since there is no mention here of חכמה, Prof. Belkin's juxtaposition of *Zohar* i, 15b is completely irrelevant. Moreover the passage does not teach, as Prof. Belkin says it does, that the *Torah* emanated from the Throne of Glory. The passage discusses various primordial emanations: the Throne of Glory from God, the Heaven¹⁶⁷ from the "supernal firmament above the heads of the *Hayyoth*",¹⁶⁸ and the *Torah* from "Supernal Wisdom".¹⁶⁹ This may be meant in a specifically kabbalistic sense, relating to the emanation of *Tifereth* from *Hokhmah*, or in a more general way. It may also refer to the view already held by the kabbalists of Gerona that *Torah* was identical with חכמה עליונה.¹⁷⁰ At any rate Prof. Belkin's texts on *hokhmah* are besides the point, and even his seemingly innocent identification of Philo's λόγος with the σοφία of *Wisdom* takes for granted, in an unduly simplified and uncritical manner, what scholars like Gfrörer, Eichhorn, Siegfried, Holmes etc. have ventured to treat in the most cautious and tentative manner only.

30. Lot's two daughters have already been mentioned,¹⁷¹ and we have also seen that the problems relating to the animal and vegetative souls, the כוח המחזיק and the נפש הגוף are far more complicated than Prof. Belkin seems to be aware.¹⁷² That sin, sensuality and matter are opposed to the nobler, intellectual and spiritual part of the soul is neither here nor there, since this is a truism for every Platonist.¹⁷³ It has already been pointed out that Lot's daughters are the virtues of Counsel and Consent, and there is no justification whatsoever for interpreting βουλή as "evil counsel" (Belkin, p. 76)

¹⁶⁵ Cf. also *Zohar* II, 97a.

¹⁶⁶ *Supra*, §26; cf. also *Zohar* I, 124b-125a.

¹⁶⁷ The spheres?

¹⁶⁸ I.e. the *Shekhinah*?

¹⁶⁹ Cf. *Zohar* ii, 85a: אוריינתא טחכמתא דלעילא נפקת.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. *Azriel of Gerona's Commentary on the 'Aggadoth*, ed. TISHBY, p. 84.

¹⁷¹ *Supra*, §28.

¹⁷² Cf. BELKIN, pp. 75-7.

¹⁷³ Why, by the way, does Prof. BELKIN (p. 76) translate the Philonic νοῦς or λόγος by Hebr. לֵב?

and describing Lot's elder daughter as "denying God's providence" (Belkin, p. 77). It is true that she went wrong, but her error was of exactly the same kind as that of Rachel, who desired offspring from her $\nu\omicron\upsilon\zeta$, Jacob, without sufficiently committing herself into the hands of the divine providence.¹⁷⁴ Prof. Belkin has here misinterpreted Philo in the light of his understanding of the *MhN*.

31. The question why the most perfect of men, Moses, had to die and be buried outside the Holy Land, exercised pious minds more than once. Moses de Leon discusses the subject in his Hebrew *responsa*¹⁷⁵ as well as in the *Zohar*.¹⁷⁶ The *MhN* (Z.H. 14a) contents itself with the answer of the *Midrash*¹⁷⁷ that Moses died in the wilderness so that all others that had died there might share with him in the resurrection. Philo, on the other hand, explains¹⁷⁸ that *seeing* the land was enough for Moses, because the perfect man's life is contemplative (*sic*). Since Prof. Belkin regards the Philonic and zoharic passages as "parallels", one would very much like to know more about the literary and philological criteria of his comparative method.

It is only fair to add that Prof. Belkin has himself advanced, at least by implication, the kind of criticism that most readers would bring against his method and argument. On one occasion (p. 78) he draws attention to what he considers a "parallel" between Philo and *Tosafoth*, whilst admitting that *Tosafoth* could not possibly have known Philo. On his own premises Prof. Belkin could have asked himself here what this analogy implied in terms of historical and comparative analysis. He might e.g. have enquired whether the idea under discussion could not have percolated from some early Islamic philosophical source—say, *via* Sa'adyah and the German *Hasidim*—to the intellectual horizon of *Tosafoth*. Considerations of this kind would have been of some relevance for evaluating the cogency of his argument about the *MhN*.

32. In a most interesting and arresting phrase, the *MhN* declares (Z.H. 19a) that the High Priest entered the holiest בנשמה ולא בנוף . Prof. Belkin rightly points out that this expression cannot be taken literally, but omits to add that בנשמה or בנפש or "not in body" are standard mediaeval terms for "ecstasy". The passage has already been

¹⁷⁴ Cf. *De Post. Caini* 175-6 with *ibid.* 179; also *Quaest. in Gen.* iv, 55-6.

¹⁷⁶ ed. TISHBY (in *Qoveš 'al Yad*, N.S. v), 1950, p. 24ff.

¹⁷⁸ i, 21b.

¹⁷⁷ *Deut. Rabbah* ii, 9; *Tanḥuma Wa'ethḥanan*, (BUBER V, p. 13).

¹⁷⁸ *De Migr. Abr.* 45.

pointed out by Scholem.¹⁷⁹ Likewise, it is hardly necessary to emphasize that expressions of this kind do not occur in other (early Palestinian) *midrashim*. True, a hint of ecstatic experiences in the holiest can be found in the *Midrash, Lev. Rabbah* xxi, 12 quoted by Belkin (pp. 79-80), but the characteristic wording of the *MhN* obviously presupposes a development, such as described by e.g., A., Altmann,¹⁸⁰ for Plotinus's account of his ecstasy which was reproduced in the *Theology of Aristotle* (whence it was copied by al-Farabi), in the Epistles of the *Ikhwan* (whence it was copied by Moses ibn Ezra) and also by ibn Gabirol. Ibn Ezra's version was translated into Hebrew by Shemtob Falaquera and thus became accessible to kabbalists and philosophers who had little Arabic and less Latin.

Philo's allegorical interpretation of the High Priest as the *type* of the perfect man, free of all passions, is quite different both from *Lev. Rabbah* (which does not speak of systematic emancipation from the body but of a kind of "transfiguration") and from the *MhN* (which speaks of actual ecstasy). Philo certainly does not extol the High Priest in order to impress upon him the dignity and duties of his high spiritual office (Belkin, p. 82), but takes him as a type and symbol of the perfect man.

33a. The most significant but, alas, also the most obscure and inconsistent piece of Philonic teaching is that concerning the *logos*.¹⁸¹ In the same way as Philo's λόγος are made up of platonic ἰδέαι, Stoic δυνάμεις and Jewish angels, so also his speculations about a supreme *logos* are clearly influenced by Jewish doctrines concerning a supreme angel-prince.¹⁸² The assertion that the *MhN* teaches "that Metatron is the omnipotent Word descending from the Throne of Glory" (Belkin, p. 82) is, as we have seen¹⁸³ simply untrue and merely Prof. Belkin's own fond invention. The *MhN* obviously derived its idea that Metatron is the allegorical referent of "Eliezer" (זקן ביתו, *Gen.* xxiv: 2), from *B. Yeb.* 16b¹⁸⁴: Metatron is the "old man" and the "young lad" at the same time.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁹ *MTJM* p. 378, n. 9.

¹⁸⁰ ALTMANN-STERN, *op. cit.* [n. 68], pp. 191-2.

¹⁸¹ Cf. Brehier, *op. cit.*, p. 98 and also the sane and scholarly summing up of C. H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, 1953, p. 66ff.

¹⁸² On Logos-Metatron cf. already SIEGFRIED, *op. cit.* [n. 30], pp. 220-1.

¹⁸³ *Supra*, §13a.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. also *Tosafoth ad loc.*

¹⁸⁵ On this profound and paradoxical symbol cf. TISHBY, *op. cit.* [n. 3], pp. 451-5.

For a proper understanding of Meṭaṭron in the *MhN* it would be necessary to analyze his development, first in the *Hekhaloth* literature, and later under the impact of more specifically philosophical speculation. It is fairly obvious that certain key-words such as כבוד, נער וקן,¹⁸⁶ will always be found associated with Meṭaṭron, and it is clearly unnecessary to assume that a zoharic reference to כבוד is necessarily and immediately related to Philo's δόξα,¹⁸⁷ particularly when the latter is said to signify not the λόγος but the many δυνάμεις. As a matter of fact the request of Moses to behold the divine essence, or at least the essences of the δυνάμεις or ιδέαι,¹⁸⁸ is reminiscent more of mediaeval philosophical interpretations of *Ex.* xxxiii: 18 than of the *MhN*, with its more naive and midrashic understanding of the request, viz. to see God's viceregent archangel.¹⁸⁹

33b. Now it is a normal neoplatonist view that complete knowledge of the *mundus intelligibilis* and the higher essences is possible after death only (except for the rare cases of ecstasy). Though the Philonic passage chosen by Prof. Belkin to illustrate this view¹⁹⁰ does not say this at all, it may nevertheless be readily granted that this is the kind of view that Philo would have endorsed most heartily. What the *MhN* wishes to say is, however, something very different: not *after* death, but *at* his death, i.e. in the last moments of his life, man is granted the vision of what he could not behold so far—that is of either Meṭaṭron¹⁹¹ or the *Shekhinah*.¹⁹² The sources of this idea are midrashic;¹⁹³ space does not permit here an examination of the intriguing problem of the relation of Meṭaṭron to the *Shekhinah*.¹⁹⁴ Analogy between Philo and the *MhN* there is none.

33c. Perhaps the main difference between the Philonic λόγος and the zoharic Meṭaṭron concerns their creative function. The λόγος is, among other things, an instrument and ὄργανον of creation.¹⁹⁵

¹⁸⁶ Cf. *Z.H.* 24a: מהו בכבוד וזהו מטטרון.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. *Leg. All.* i, 45.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. *De Fuga* 165, *De Mut.* 9, *De Post. Caini* 169; on the vague and by no means consistent and systematic identification of "ideas" and "powers" by Philo, cf. also BREHIER, *op. cit.* [n. 54], p. 156.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. *infra*, §34.

¹⁹⁰ *De Somn.* i, 185-8. The passage is difficult, but seems to say that in order to arrive at a knowledge of the κόσμος νοητός, one has to pass first through the lower stages of knowledge, i.e. knowledge acquired through the sensible world.

¹⁹¹ *Z.H.* 10a.

¹⁹² *Zohar* i, 98a; cf. also *Zohar* i, 57b, 65b and particularly 79a.

¹⁹³ Cf. *Num. Rabbah* xiv, 22; xix, 18; *Tanḥuma* (*Huqqath* 39, ed. BUBER, IV p. 124), *Yalqut* §396 etc. A typical formulation is that of *Num. Rabbah* xix, 10: צדיקים... אינן נפטרים עד שראוין פני שכינה.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. the following section, §33c.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. *supra*, §14a.

Meṭaṭron, though perhaps presiding over the lower emanations, is primarily God's viceregent, overseer and—above all—Meṭaṭron ψυχοπομπός. Philo *De Plant.* 8, quoted by Belkin in connection with the doctrine of Providence, does not seem to have anything to do with the subject. Whereas *Quaest. in Ex.* ii. 13 merely reaffirms the Philonic commonplace that it is only an incorporeal intellect that can meditate on God's blessings to this world of generation and corruption, the *MhN* (Z.H. 28b) expresses the thoroughly kabbalistic notion that the power given by God to his viceregent depends on the good works of the righteous. Whatever divine effluence the angelic mediator infuses into the world, it comes from God and depends on the saints on earth—here Meṭaṭron's function is described in terms reminiscent of the *Shekhinah*.

33d. The lines quoted by Prof. Belkin (p. 86) from *De Somn.* i, 157-8, and described by him as the "obscurest passage concerning the *logos* and all but inexplicable", really seem to be a most straightforward affair. The world and the fullness thereof is borne and supported by something firm, stable and at rest: this is the κύριος standing above the ladder. Our doubts concerning the correct interpretation of the passage flow from Philo's usual vagueness and oscillation when it comes to the *logos*: does κύριος here refer to the *logos* or to God Himself? The aforementioned passage *De Plant.* 8 suggests the *logos*, and so does the sequel in *De Somn.* i, 228 f. However the text *De Somn.* i, 157-8, as it stands, definitely suggests God Himself. Alternative allegorical interpretations offered by Philo are: the ladder is the air inhabited by ascending and descending souls and angels,¹⁹⁶ viz. by "demons" and viceroys of the ruler of the universe¹⁹⁷ or it may be the soul in which divine words move up and down.¹⁹⁸

33e. The *MhN* (Z.H. 28b-c) continues its kabbalistic elaboration of the allegory by identifying the ladder itself with Meṭaṭron. The ladder may be on the earth, i.e. without establishing contact with heaven (when there are no good works), but it may also reach heaven, and then Meṭaṭron can fulfil his function of transmitting the divine effluence of life and blessing. Then angels will be moving up and down in the dynamic give-and-take of the human and divine spheres. It is God Himself who stands above the ladder, i.e. above his vice-

¹⁹⁶ *De Somn.* 134-5.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 140-1.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.* 146-9; this comes very close to ibn Gabirol's allegory, quoted by D. KAUFMANN, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 73, n. 3: רב שלמה הספרי אמר—כי שלם רמז לנשמה חעליונה ומלאכי אלהים פחשבות החכמה.

regent Metatron. It is thus patently wrong if Prof. Belkin says (p. 87) that Philo and the *MhN* agree that (a) "the Lord stood above it" refers to the head-angel or *logos* (in Philo it may, in the *MhN* Metatron is represented by the ladder and not by the Lord above it), and (b) the angel-prince is called *κύριος* (in the *MhN* the "Lord" is certainly God Himself).

33f. That the line of division between *λόγος* and *λόγοι* is not always very sharp in Philo has frequently been observed,¹⁹⁹ and that angels fulfil an important rôle in the Philonic cosmos^{199a} is a commonplace too trite to deserve mention. All this, however, does not yet warrant a comparison of these *logoi* with the angels of the *MhN* (Z.H. 4a): "in the beginning God created the form of angels and they are the ground of all other creatures and from this ground the heavens were created".²⁰⁰ The passage means the exact opposite of what Prof. Belkin (p. 88) wants it to mean; it does not say that the angels were instrumental in creating the heavens, but that the angels were created *ex nihilo*²⁰¹ whereupon the heaven was emanated from the angelic "form". Only earth, which is of a different substance altogether,²⁰² was again created *ex nihilo*. For that reason earth can be said to be founded on *Hokhmah*²⁰³ whereas the heavens were established with *tevunah*.²⁰⁴ The very phrase on which Prof. Belkin bases his argument actually contains a typically unhellenistic and unhebraic romanism which, had Prof. Belkin noticed it, he would certainly have ascribed to the mediaeval redactor. The expression *המלאכים הם יסוד מכל הנבראים* [= *של כל*] is clearly based on the use of *de* in the Romance languages. Moreover the meaning of *יסוד* is obviously far removed from Philo's corresponding usage.²⁰⁵ The conclusion that either the *MhN* draws on Philo or both depend on a common earlier source (Belkin, p. 88) is thus found to be drawn *ex nihilo*.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. BREHIER, *op. cit.* [n. 54], p. 90f.

^{199a} On *logos-logoi* and angels cf. already Gfrörer, *op. cit.* [n. 44], vol. 1, p. 368f.; cf. also BREHIER, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-33.

²⁰⁰ Cf. also the whole column, *ibid.*

²⁰¹ Cf. also *ibid.* 1a and 6d.

²⁰² Cf. *supra*, §19a and e.g. Maimonides, *Yad, Yesodey ha-Torah* III, 10.

²⁰³ I.e. *ex nihilo*, since *Hokhmah* from *Kether*=*יש מאין* in kabbalistic language.

²⁰⁴ Here equated with the *sefirah Binah* of the kabbalists. The whole exposition is, of course, a *midrash* on Prov. iii: 19-20. These highly suggestive verses were favourites with all those interested in *ma'aseh bereshith*, authors of cosmogonic *midrashim* etc., particularly if they were kabbalists. For the uses made of this text cf. B. Ber. 55a, Hag. 12c, Pirq. R.E. III (Engl. translation by G. FRIEDLANDER, 1916, p. 18), *Midrash Kohen*, Zohar I, 207e etc.

²⁰⁵ *Quaest. in Ex.* ii, 90.

34. We have seen that Metatron, both as *psychopompos* and as God's viceroy, is mainly an administrative and providential angel, whereas the *logoi* are agents of providence as well as of creation.²⁰⁶ One of Philo's reasons for the existence of these mediating agents is the axiomatic truth that God cannot soil his hands by as much as touching matter.²⁰⁷ All this has clearly nothing to do with the idea of the *MhN* that God may be concerned to protect His angels from contamination by a particularly virulent and infectious impurity (e.g. that of Egypt), and instead of sending them thither on divine errands rather gets things done more immediately by His omnipotent will and word.²⁰⁸ The fact that even Philo agrees that God was personally responsible for the slaying of the Egyptian firstborn²⁰⁹ does not prove that Philo and the *MhN* are related, but merely that Philo had read his Bible²¹⁰ and that the well-known *midrashim* on this verse²¹¹ were already in existence, in one form or another, in his time. Prof. Belkin's proof-text for the contention that according to Philo man can communicate with God through mediating powers only (Belkin, pp. 90-91) is not very convincing. It is true that God's two chief attributes, His creative (εὐεργέτης, viz. ποιητική) power symbolized by the name θεός, and the kingly (βασιλική) power symbolized by the name κύριος, are so close to "Him that IS" that He, the Father of the universe, generally manifests Himself as a triad.²¹² It is also true that this is how Abraham first perceived the divine manifestation.²¹³ But shortly afterwards,²¹⁴ Philo points out that Abraham's mind was soon capable of a clearer and more lucid vision. Therefore the One could manifest Himself to Abraham "without the powers that belong to Him, so that he [Abraham] saw His Oneness directly before him, as he had known it earlier in the likeness of a triad".²¹⁵ How to square this with Philo's exposition of Ex. xxxiii: 18²¹⁶ is, of course, another matter, particularly since the

²⁰⁶ Cf. *supra*, §14a.

²⁰⁷ *De Spec. Leg.* i, 329.

²⁰⁸ *Zohar* i, 117a-b.

²⁰⁹ *De Vita Mosis* i, 97.

²¹⁰ Ex. xii: 12.

²¹¹ E.g. *Mekhilta* (Bo vii); also *Leqah Tov*, Bo XII, 2 (ed. BUBER, 1880, p. 59); *Midrash Tanna'im*, XXVI, 8 (ed. HOFFMANN, 1909, p. 173); Pal. *Sanh.* II, 1. The polemical point against the view expressed Ex. *Rabbah* XVII, 5 is obvious.

²¹² Cf. *De Abr.* 121-2; also *Quaest. in Gen.* ii, 51.

²¹³ *Quaest. in Gen.* iv, 2; this is the passage referred to by Prof. BELKIN.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, iv, 4.

²¹⁵ Cf. also *De Praem.* 43-5.

²¹⁶ Cf. *supra*, §33a.

“central” being flanked, as we have seen, by goodness and royalty, appears at times to be not the Supreme Existent but the *logos*.^{216a}

III

35. We have examined most of the zoharic and Philonic texts assembled and juxtaposed by Prof. Belkin according to the strict rules of the comparative method and not, so we were assured, according to the doubtful criteria of probability or subjective insight. We have found that in practically all cases the alleged similarities vanish at closer inspection. What remain are neoplatonic commonplaces, and even these are tinged with unmistakeably mediaeval features. Even the common denominator of Philo and the *MhN*, their addiction to allegory, turns out to be far less significant as soon as we begin to pay attention to the phenomenon of mediaeval allegory in general. Already in the few passages from the *MhN* which we have had occasion to examine, we have found such characteristic technical terms as *שם משותף*, *גולם*, soul as *צורה*, *כוח המדבר*, *נברלים*, etc. We have even detected echoes of the doctrine of the *intellectus acquisitus*, attributed, to cap it all, by the *MhN* to a certain R. 'Alexandra'i, who seems to be none other than Alexander of Aphrodisias, the author of this doctrine²¹⁷ and mentioned as such in Maimonides's *Guide*.²¹⁸

Not one of the basic problems of zoharic criticism has been mentioned, let alone appreciated by Prof. Belkin: the contents of ideas, the language, the historical and chronological evidence of the names occurring in the *MhN*; the topography;²¹⁹ the far closer and more cogent parallels of the *Zohar* with the writings of Moses de Leon and other thirteenth-century authors. Even if all of Prof. Belkin's parallels were conclusive, the last mentioned facts would still stand out and clamour for an explanation. Did the “redactor” get hold of an old hellenistic *midrash*, “translate” it partly into bad thirteenth-century Aramaic and partly into mediaeval philosophic Hebrew, bring it up to date by throwing in a number of late Aristotelian and neoplatonic doctrines mixed with post-Geronese Kabbalah, and then “edit” the

^{216a} Cf. BREHIER, *op. cit.* [n. 54], pp. 145-6.

²¹⁷ See E. ZELLER, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, §82.

²¹⁸ Cf. *supra*, §16c. S. J. RAPOPORT seems to have been the first to have noticed that our R. 'Alexandra'i was none other than Alexander of Aphrodisias as known to the author of the *Zohar* from Maimonides's *Guide*; see 'Iggeroth Shir, 1885, pp. 6-7.

²¹⁹ R. 'Alexandra'i, we remember, taught at כפר קרדו (*Z.H.* 11b). Apparently Kurdistan, like Cappadocia, is a locality in the zoharic map of Palestine.

whole concoction? Why do the contemporaries of the redactor show no traces of acquaintance with this old hellenistic *midrash*? Or is mediaeval allegory as a whole indebted to the mysterious hellenistic *midrash*—a possibility which even Kaufmann²²⁰ did not dare to envisage?

36. The present argument will rightly be considered as unduly detailed and long-winded, and out of all proportion to the intrinsic significance of the case. One does not, as a rule, use a sledge-hammer to crack nuts. The only justification for the present somewhat ungrateful—and ungracious—undertaking is the fact that Prof. Belkin's article is merely the most recent and most pretentious salvo from a barrage that has been directed for a long time against the modern, critical study of the history of kabbalism. Even the mild innuendo of contempt, conveyed by Prof. Belkin's reference to the representatives of the modern *Wissenschaft des Judentums*²²¹ does not compensate for the woeful lack of scholarly standards with which Scholem's researches and conclusions are still being criticized.²²² Prof. Belkin's aims, arguments and methods seem to be representative of a tendency cultivated in certain quarters and institutions. Or is his article perhaps merely one of those unaccountable freak phenomena that may happen anywhere and at any time—*כשננה שיצא מלפני השליט*? That, for the sake of Jewish Studies, is what one would like to hope.

Jerusalem

R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY

²²⁰ Cf. *supra*, §10.

²²¹ Why e.g. the inverted commas surrounding the expression "הבטי ישראל" (Belkin, p. 28, ll. 6-7)? I hope I am not oversensitive.

²²² The reviewer [Dr. H. L. GORDON] in the issue of *Hadoar* of 27.2.1959 (vol. 39, no. 16), p. 289, devotes a whole page of three columns to Prof. BELKIN's "fascinating study . . . [which is] based on sound philological and philosophical foundations". This verdict seems to suggest that philology and philosophy have by now come to mean different things to different people—a most unfortunate semantic development.

An Analysis of the Ma'amar yiqqawu ha-Mayim by Samuel b. Judah Ibn Tibbon.

THE name of Samuel ben Judah Ibn Tibbon (c. 1150-1230) is perpetuated in Jewish literature by his masterly translation of the *Guide of the Perplexed* of Moses Maimonides. More explicitly defined this statement, banal in itself, means that the work of Samuel Ibn Tibbon the translator will always outweigh the personal contribution of this scholar which is certainly of no more than mediocre importance though by no means devoid of value or interest. Even his main work, which has been printed—though not very satisfactorily—has hardly aroused the attention of scholars, and historians of Jewish thought have seen fit to dispose of it in a few lines.¹

The fact is that this book, a work of the maturity, or even of the old age of the author,² deserves to be given a place of recognition, modest indeed yet honourable, on account of its own intrinsic qualities; but it is also entitled to the historians' attention for other reasons—the use made of it, its influence, if one cares to put it that way, on Jewish philosophical writing of the XIIIth and XIVth centuries (which the research of one of my students, now in progress, will one day bring to light), as well as the fact that it occasioned, or served as pretext for one of the most significant statements of the position taken up by Jewish esoteric thought towards philosophy, namely the refutation of the *Ma'amar yiqqawu ha-Mayim* by Jacob ben Shesheth of Gerona in his *Meshiv devarim nekhohim*.

It was the study of the last mentioned work, unfortunately not yet published, which led me to an interest in the text which was being refuted. I hope, in the fairly near future, to be able to lay before the limited number of readers interested in this kind of research a few of the results of my enquiry into this most important treatise by Jacob ben Shesheth. On the present occasion I shall only attempt to give a reasoned analysis of the *Ma'amar yiqqawu ha-Mayim*, the construction of which is not particularly clear.

¹ See *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, XXVII, 575; L. HUSIK, *A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy* (1941 edition), p. 309; J. GUTTMANN, *Die Philosophie des Judentums*, 211 f. (Hebrew edition, p. 180); J. SARACHEK, *Faith and Reason*, pp. 183 f., 245. For the study of the text, published by M. BISLICHES, Pressburg, 1837, I was able to use the two MSS., unfortunately both incomplete, in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris (Hébreu 673 and 976).

² Its composition is not earlier than 1221: cf. M. STEINSCHNEIDER, *Hebr. Übers.*, p. 200.

The initial problem of the treatise seems, at first sight, to be purely physical: according to the theory which saw the four elements as forming an equal number of concentric spheres of earth (in the centre), water, air and fire, water should cover the whole of the earth. In fact, this is not the case: water enters the hollows of the earth's surface; it follows that the earth is not a perfect sphere and that parts of it are in contact not with water but with air. The question arises: why is this so?

This difficulty had already presented itself in Antiquity and the Stoics, who maintained the theory of the concentric spheres of the four elements, met it with a theological consideration. That concrete reality gives the lie to the theory is, in their eyes, the effect of a special intervention on the part of Providence which so modified the fundamental structure of things as to make the earth habitable for man. This thesis was to find widespread acceptance among the Arabs, and with several Jewish writers.³

Samuel Ibn Tibbon makes special reference to Ibn Sina, passages from whose writings⁴ were probably mainly responsible for keeping him awake to the cosmological problem in question. Having given an account of the arrangement of the elements in layers and of the location of water in the cavities, Ibn Sinā returns to the problem in a later chapter of the *Shifā'*, where in particular he writes as follows:

"From the nature of water and of earth it should (in theory) follow that earth is contained by water, this latter enveloping it on all sides. Such is not (however) the situation in concrete reality, which does not in the matter of earth and water conform to what is natural to them but to what is natural within the ordering or the Whole . . ."

Ibn Sinā then expounds at length the efficient causes for the interpenetration of the respective globes of earth and water. One of the causes is the partial transformation of elements into one another, a process in which the influence of the stars is not without bearing. The Muslim philosopher, however, adds this:

"This shows the (working of) divine wisdom without whose (intervention) the terrestrial animals, dependent on the air they

³ Cf. the information collected in connection with a passage from the commentary by Dunash b. Tamim on the *Sefer Yeşirah*, in *REJ*, CXII, pp. 7, 14f., 17f.

⁴ The passages in question are to be found in the *Physics* (*Ṭabī'iyat*) of the *Shifā'*, *jumla* 1, *fann* 4, *maqala* 1, part 1, pp. 226-227 of the Teheran lithographed ed., and in *fann* 5 (conforming with the *Meteorologica*) p. 255f.; this last passage is given in Hebrew in ch. III of the *Ma'amar yiqqawu ha-Mayim*, p. 1, line 14f.

breathe, would have no natural habitat. It is for similar reasons that part of the earth emerged (above the waters), although the earth should normally have been wholly covered (literally: dominated) by water whose function it is to flow over the entire earth."

A serious difficulty is, however, implicit in this specious solution.⁵ How indeed could a monotheistic thinker admit a subsequent modification in the original structure of the created world? The philosophers reply that this is not a genuine problem, but merely an apparent one conceived by the imagination which ascribes to the universe a beginning in time. There is in reality nothing of the kind. Things have always been, for all eternity, what they are today.⁶ This way of thinking is, in its turn, unacceptable to believers, for whom the temporal origin of the world is a cardinal article of faith.⁷

⁵ So, perhaps, the opinion of Moses b. Nahman, who (Commentary on *Gen.* i: 9) expresses himself on this subject with some animus against the "Greeks": *ka'asher yidmu ha-yewanim mimofetheyhem ha-nir'im 'o ha-mefattim* (the text of current editions is faulty; corrections according to MSS. 221 and 222 of the Bibliothèque Nationale, correct reading also in the recent edition of M. Z. EISENSTADT, New York, 1958, p. 30).

⁶ *Ma'amar*, ch. II, p. 5, line 24f.: . . . *ki kullam sefeqoth mithhaddeshoth middimyon tehillah warosh la 'olam 'o zeman samukh litehillah*.

⁷ Samuel Ibn Tibbon sees two differences between the doctrine of Ibn Sīnā and that of other philosophers: (a) (p. 8, 6-7) The emergence of the earth "is a situation which came about not having existed before, which is not the opinion of other philosophers who follow the theory of Aristotle." (b) (p. 8, 7-11) "He is equally in disagreement with them as to the respective constant localisation of water and earth (lit: maintaining the place), a disagreement resulting from his theory which sees the emergence of the earth as the result of an event. In fact, all philosophers teach that this constant localisation is necessary, not subject to alteration or to generic corruption; it is not possible for the earth to be entirely covered by water and for all the beings which can live on the earth only to perish". Ibn Roshd in particular demonstrates in this way that the existence of earth not covered by water is not possible but necessary (8, 12-15). I have not succeeded in finding this text by Ibn Roshd in any of his commentaries on the *Meteorologica*: "If the possibility existed of the whole earth being covered by water, that possibility would have become actual, since according to them [the philosophers] time has no beginning. As a result of this possibility becoming actual, the plants and animals [on earth] would have perished. Now there are many species of animals [individual members of] which are neither born nor exist without the help of another individual member of the same species . . ." The animal and vegetable species actually in existence therefore imply the existence of an indefinite (*a parte ante*) series of specifically identical ancestors; whereas Ibn Sīnā does not hold it to be impossible (p. 8, 22-25) "that a deluge should come about which would cover the whole or part of the habitable zone of the earth, destroying either all or some of the animals, the latter being able to return to being later, with the mingling of the elements, helped either by the sole influence of the stars or by separate Intelligences . . ."

Indeed (pp. 8-9) generation from like beings is, in the opinion of Ibn Sīnā, simply the most frequent occurrence; there can sometimes be spontaneous generation, a theory which can be compared to the aggadic notion of worlds being destroyed and replaced by others, and if one wishes, to *Eccles.* iii: 1, *to everything there is a season and a time . . .* (see also Commentary on *Eccles.* iii: 2, MS. Br. Mus. Or. 1023, fol. 74).

There is worse to come. To admit that a modification, even a modification dictated by divine Wisdom, took place during the six days of the Creation, is to assume the presence of "nature" as experiencing the modification (since the latter cannot take place except in relation to something, i.e. a substratum); and without conceding an infinite regression, it is difficult to conceive of this nature as other than eternal. We must therefore be extremely wary of accepting the speculations of a "believing" philosopher, which is precisely what Ibn Tibbon claims to be, when he puts forward a theory which, under pretext of justifying the "dogma" of Providence, in fact maintains the notion of "nature" and therefore also, by implication, the notion of the eternity of the world.⁸ However this may be, Samuel Ibn Tibbon thinks that he has found the solution to the problem in the Bible itself, namely, in Psalms ciii and civ, to be exact in the last four verses (19-22) of the former (which are really linked to what follows rather than to what precedes them), and in the eight or nine opening verses of the latter.⁹ These texts, our author believes, not only serve to indicate the localisation of the water; they also complement (and this is equally, or perhaps even more important) the account of the Creation in the first two chapters of *Genesis*. It is indeed obvious that this account omits to mention an order of beings with which neither the faith of the simple nor philosophical and theological speculation have subsequently been able to dispense, namely the angels which, as one might expect, Ibn Tibbon identifies with the "separate intelligences" (*ha-De'oth ha-Nifradoth*).¹⁰

From this point things become more complicated. The physical problem set out at the beginning has led us to a passage of the Bible where a solution is to be found guaranteed by the inspired quality of the text, on condition, to be sure, that the latter is minutely interpreted and that every related argument in the Scriptures and in tradi-

⁸ This is brought out by Jacob b. Shesheth in ch. XI of the *Meshiv devarim nekhohim*. Generally speaking, the idea of nature with theoretically immutable laws was outrageous in the eyes of the Cabbalists: see *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, XXIII, 1956, 66 et seq.

⁹ Ch. IV, pp. 10-18.

¹⁰ p. 10, l. 28. Not always, however: the angels of Ps. civ: 4, which are winds and fire, are pure meteorological phenomena and not intelligible beings (p. 16). Nor, indeed, are they to be identified, as they were by Maimonides (*Guide*, II, 6, ed. MUNK, p. 68), with elemental fire and water, or to be placed on the same footing as the angels created on the second day, as the Rabbis teach (cf. ch. XX, p. 142).

tion is taken into account—not forgetting philosophical considerations.¹¹

The last four verses of *Psalm ciii* contain several indications, or rather suggest several themes, each of which needs to be examined.¹²

Verse 19 The Lord hath established his throne in the heavens
And his kingdom ruleth over all.

Verse 20 Bless the Lord, ye angels of his
Ye mighty in strength that fulfil his word
Hearkening unto the voice of his word.

Verse 21 Bless the Lord, all ye his hosts;
Ye ministers of his, that do his pleasure.

Verse 22 Bless the Lord, all ye his works,
In all places of his dominion
Bless the Lord O my Soul.

This text mentions the *angels*, the *throne*, which rabbinic tradition will later refer to as *kisse' ha-Kabod*, “throne of Glory”, the *heavens* (not in Ibn Tibbon's view, the visible heavens, but the higher, invisible heavens, *ha-Shamayim ha-'elyonim*), with their *hosts*, the beings which populate these heavens; note also that the participle of the verb *to do*, *to fulfil*, is here linked to two notions: *his word* and *his will* (“pleasure”) two entities both of which in the sequence of enumeration, precede *all the works of God*.

Now “all the works” of God are none other than the work of the six days, *ma'aseh bereshith*, set out in the first chapter of *Genesis*. If this is so, then clearly that which in our Psalm is prior to “all the works”, i.e. the higher heavens, the throne and the angels has some kind of existence prior to the work of the creation; this is incidentally

¹¹ This obviously raises the question of scriptural hermeneutics, and it is not certain whether Ibn Tibbon is clear in his mind about this problem. One would not be far wrong in attributing to him a kind of distinction between the Torah and the other two sections of the Scriptures. The latter are perhaps (possibly under a cloak of allegory) richer in philosophical teachings strictly so called than is the Pentateuch. In any case, according to Ibn Tibbon, who declares (p. 132) himself to be in disagreement with Maimonides on this point, the Torah is an essentially political book conceived “in order to be of use to the masses” (*leho'il'el he-hamon*); it contains, it is true, an esoteric meaning wrapped in terms which occasionally meet with reservations on the part of philosophers and in this context the famous exegesis of *Proverbs xxv: 11*, set out by Maimonides in the introduction to the first part of the *Guide*, remains valid. As regards this position not everything is clear, but I cannot go deeper into the question within the framework of this article. It seems at least to show that Ibn Tibbon comes close to the position of Ibn Roshd in his *Faṣl al-maqāl*, and thus reveals himself as a precursor of that far more radical Averroist of the end of the XIIIth century, Isaac Albalag.

¹² In the translation of this passage I have tried, while using the rendering of the *Revised Standard Version*, to keep near to the meaning which Samuel Ibn Tibbon will lend to the terms of the text.

implied in the discussions in the Midrash concerned with these questions.

Of course Ibn Tibbon is here reading into the text far more than is warranted. The famous controversy, reported in *Genesis Rabbah*¹³ between R. Yoḥanan (angels created on the second day) and R. Ḥanina (angels created on the fifth day) specifically sought to exclude all idea of entities existing prior to the creation of the present universe. The Midrash itself emphasises further on in the text that the two teachers admit (by implication) that nothing was created on the first day, so that angels such as Michael or Gabriel could not have collaborated in the "extension" of the heavens.

As against this, our author firmly upholds his doctrine of the prior existence of the separate entities, by explaining that the exclusive nature of the creative power brought out by the Midrash with the help of an appropriate exegesis (*mi 'itti, quis [erat] mecum for me'itti*, in *Isaiah* xlv: 24) means merely that the separate entities are powerless without the force which divine emanation (*shefa'*) alone can confer on them. And after quoting from *Pirqey de-Rabbi 'Eli 'ezer*, chapter IV (the "firmament" divides the waters above from the waters below and from the "angels created on the second day"), he continues:

"This text does not say simply between [the waters above and] the angels, but specifies: 'the angels created on the second day'. This restriction is doubtless intended to exclude other angels, as the author had already said at the beginning of this paragraph that the angels were created on the second day; [in fact] he is here postulating another kind of angel about which he has not [yet] spoken."

The real subject under discussion between R. Yoḥanan and R. Ḥanina now therefore comes to be:

"What order of creature, brought into being during the six days of the Creation, requires the intervention of an angel, that is to say of a separate intelligence, as an intermediary? The existence of the species in question makes manifest that of the angels, since its existence postulates their intervention; for the intermediary is the cause of that which follows after it, and the existence of the effect proves that of its cause."¹⁴ As for the things created without the mediation of an angel-intellect, "a material intermediary sufficed to to bring them into being" (*hispiq bo 'emša'i ba 'al ḥomer*).

¹³ 1, 3, ed. Theodor, p. 5.

¹⁴ Ibn Tibbon firmly asserts, together with Maimonides (*Guide*, II, 6) that God does nothing without an intermediary; see also, apart from the passage here analysed, ch. XX, pp. 117-121, ch. XX, p. 148, ch. XXI, pp. 167 and 169, 12-15.

In any case, neither R. Yoḥanan nor R. Ḥanina could really maintain that the separate intelligences were created on the second or on the fifth day only, because it is evident that they existed together with the Throne of Glory (higher heavens): and both our teachers and the philosophers are unanimous in professing, each for his part, that "the Throne of Glory was created before the beings of this lower world whose creation is related in the account of the six days of the creation, beings [who together are] described simply as *world* or as *lower world*". There is thus a unanimity between the teachers of religion and the philosophers as to the "prior existence" of angel-intellec[t]s; it is but their divergent views as to the origin of the universe that affect the nature of this prior existence. In the timeless universe of the philosophers the prior existence of the separate intelligences means an anteriority of rank and cause as against corporeal beings; the universe of scriptural belief which "began" in time does not exclude this ontological priority of the angels, but does not admit of their co-eternity with God.¹⁵

* * *

We have been led from the initial problem into speculations on the invisible world. Invisible, indeed to ordinary mortals; but a few of the prophets and the patriarch Jacob were privileged in their visions to glimpse aspects of it. Of these, Isaiah's vision (examined at great length in chapters vii-ix, pp. 25-45) was the most revealing; that of Ezekiel (examined in chapter x, pp. 45-53) somewhat less so, and in the texts which relate this vision, the ordering of the elements is confused; Jacob's dream (commented on in chapter xi, pp. 54-57) was far more summary than the visions granted to the two prophets.

The principal theme common to all three visions is, according to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, the allegorical illustration of the progress of human intelligence towards gradual purification.¹⁶ They also however

¹⁵ I have had to condense and simplify Ibn Tibbon's development of thought, but I should be sorry to leave out an intrepidly candid sentence in which he justifies the special treatment of the passage from *Genesis Rabba*: "I agree that we are here taking the phrase *from when on were the angels created*, in a sense different from its obvious meaning generally accepted by the masses, but it is better to force [the meaning of] a phrase than to force reality" (*qov lidhoq ha-lashon millidhoq ha-meši'uth*, p. 17, 13-14; cf. also ch. VI, p. 24, 10-12; in matters of cosmology and physics it is often better not to accept the pronouncements of the Rabbis in their literal sense).

¹⁶ Ch. X, p. 54, 6-8: *sheloshtam ram zu 'el derekh hassagath sekhel ha-'adam wehaggi'o 'el shelemutho ha-'aharon she'i 'efshar lehaggi'a 'elaw raq ba-hassagah ha-sikhlith (raq from MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. hébreu 976); especially in connection with Isaiah (p. 40, last line, 41, 1): zoth ha-marah be'arah lanu madregoth ha-sekhel ha'enoshi mittehillah we'ad sof.*

contain information of a cosmological¹⁷ and metaphysical¹⁸ nature, to elucidate which is the function of the progressively refined intelligence; the visions do not, for all that, lift the impenetrable veil that hides the essence of God.¹⁹

* * *

Having paid tribute to the vast subject of angelology and to the exegesis of prophetic visions connected with it, Ibn Tibbon now con-

¹⁷ In this context, Ibn Tibbon summarises very briefly (p. 47, 7-19), the astronomical theory, quite recent he says, of a contemporary writer, on the uniform movement of the spheres from East to West and the slowing down of the spheres below the first in relation to the speed of this latter. This reference is doubtless to al-Bitruji, in fact a contemporary of our writer; see his *De Motibus Caelorum*, ed. Fr. J. Carmody, University of California Press, 1952, ch. VIII, p. 92 (cf. the editor's analysis, p. 40).

¹⁸ I do not consider it useful to analyse them here in detail: a study conducted under my direction of the *Mar'oth 'Elohim* by Hanokh 'al-Qonstantini (who certainly made use of our text) will offer a great deal of information on this subject. Let us simply note, by way of example, a few allegorical correspondances placed in the interpretation of Isaiah's vision (the data of which must be linked to those of Ezekiel's *Merkabah*): The canopy of the throne is the canopy of the firmament spread out over the heads of the *Hayyoth* (Ezekiel's animals) . . . , the drapery about the throne descends to the top of the spheres . . . ; *heykhal* (sanctuary) is the global term for the higher world, that is to say the *Hayyoth* and the firmament above them . . . (p. 28). The seraphim calling to one another allegorically signify the procession of beings from God; the trembling of the thresholds, the circular movement caused by desire (p. 35-36). The seraph holding a glowing ember in his hand is the last Intelligence (the Active Intellect of Ibn Sinā): "glowing ember" in Hebrew is *rispah*, because this Intelligence purifies (*mešaref*) and clears the thoughts (*de'oth*) [of men] since also "the Angel in question perfects the intellect of man and actualizes it" (p. 40).

¹⁹ Thus, part of Maimonides' exegesis concerned with the Throne (*Kisse*, cf. *Guide*, I, 9) is to be followed without however admitting, as Maimonides does, that this term is intended solely to express one aspect of what we imagine God to be, having no proper ontological reality distinct from the divine essence (on this point, and on this point alone, Ibn Tibbon comes fairly near to the anonymous Cabbalist whose thoughts on the chapter in question of the *Guide* I have examined in *Mélanges* . . . Etienne Gilson, Paris-Toronto, 1959, pp. 652-657). "Throne" and "heaven" both describe the highest being (except God) attesting the prime Mover and that by which God takes oaths, not wishing to swear by his own self (ch. VI, pp. 21-24), interpretation of *Psalm* ciii: 19). Now it is under this aspect that Isaiah received his vision; consequently the object of the latter is not the very essence of God either. In ch. X, p. 51, expounding *hashmal*, Ibn Tibbon claims that he wishes to complement and not to contravert Maimonides; in the *Guide* (III, p. 5 particularly p. 32 of MUNK's translation, where note 2 to this page is of special interest, also p. 7 MUNK, p. 42f.), Maimonides teaches in fact that the vision of a man "divided" (above and below the thighs) reveals nothing of God Himself. Ibn Tibbon, whose interpretations on the most vital point do not err on the side of clarity, is probably of the opinion that the upper part of the illumined figure indicated in *Ezek.* i: 27, represents symbolically (*ramaz*) either God alone or God and the higher angels having no direct contact with men; one could also refer the head to God (metaphorically speaking, of course—*dimyon*), the other limbs as far as the waist represent the other angels, while the lower part of the figure would symbolise the angels in contact with human beings.

siders the rest of the universe, taking up once more the interpretation of *Psalm* ciii: 19b, "his kingdom rules over all" or, rather, to render the Hebrew preposition more exactly, "in all". The philosopher-exegete sees here an affirmation of God's universal providence extended to the lower world. The exegesis of this verse than becomes the starting point for a long series of analyses of texts, especially from *Psalms* and *Job*, bearing on Providence; these analyses constitute almost the whole of the remainder of the treatise.²⁰

The problem of Providence had certainly engrossed Samuel Ibn Tibbon for a long time before the composition of the *Ma'amar yiqqawu ha-Mayim*; he had even tried to obtain explanations of the contradictions which he thought he had discerned in the two sections dealing with the question²¹ in the *Guide* (III: 17-18 and 51) from Moses Maimonides in person.

It is strange that in the work with which we are here concerned Ibn Tibbon should make no reference to the letter he had at one time addressed to Maimonides,²² any more than he mentions the contradictions which had once so seriously perturbed him; at any rate he does not so explicitly, unless I am mistaken. It is nonetheless true that his efforts to harmonise the divergent views which he believes that he has found expressed in the biblical texts still somehow reveal, if not a real anxiety (which doubtless lengthy reflection and advancing years had allayed), yet a persisting awareness to shades of meaning. Certain distinctions must be made by anyone trying to harmonize the often unpleasant and indeed outrageous reality of everyday life with a belief in a God perfectly just and infinitely wise. It is for this reason

²⁰ Ch. XII, pp. 57-63, interpretation of *Psalm* ciii: 19b; ch. XIII, pp. 63-70, the doctrine of Providence in various *Psalms*, notably viii and xxxvi; ch. XIV, pp. 70-100, conclusion of this particular study contriving a transition to those which are to follow, i.e. the speeches of Elihu in *Job*, and thos of *Malachi*; ch. XVI, pp. 102-114, the theory of Elihu on Providence; ch. XVII, 14 pp. 114-5, continuation of this exegesis in particular, we find it specified that the "storm" from the midst of which God answered Job (*Job* xxxviii) signifies the "countless sufferings and painful physical trials"—*hamon yissuraw weša'ar nega'aw*—of the hero, and not some dream or prophetic vision; ch. XVIII, pp. 116-117, fundamental agreement of the respective doctrines of the author of *Malachi*, the Psalmist and the Book of Job on the subject of Providence; ch. XXI, pp. 162-172, further exegesis of various passages in *Psalms* on the same theme.

²¹ See already the note by MUNK on *Guide*, III, 51, p. 446 as well as the study by Z. DIESENDRUCK: *Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon on Maimonides' Theory of Providence*, *HUCA*, XI, 1936, pp. 341-366. The date of this letter presents a problem on which the last word has perhaps not yet been spoken, but it does not concern us here.

²² It is no less strange that neither MUNK nor DIESENDRUCK in their considerations of the difficulties presented by Maimonides' doctrine of Providence refer to the *Ma'amar yiqqawu ha-Mayim*.

that we find here, together with an emphasis on the transcendence and majesty of a God who yet condescends to let every being on the sub-lunar world benefit by the measure of providence he is capable of accepting,²³ a tripartite division of the action of Providence²⁴; this division allows our author to transfer into the domain of the other world all that is most sublime in individual Providence, whilst retaining the idea of protection exercised by angelic meditation affecting all men in their terrestrial state and even attributing a modest but unquestioned share to astral determination.²⁶

Providence at the highest level, transferred to the plane of supra-terrestrial existence is doubtless synonymous with the state of spiritual perfection which can be called immortality, beatitude, bliss, or, in the more specialised vocabulary of the Jewish thinkers in the Middle Ages, "junction", "adhesion" or "communion" (*devequth*).²⁷ Ibn Tibbon expresses himself fairly clearly on this point. *Devequth* is for him the union of the disincarnated intellective soul with the Active Intellect.²⁸ We are here confronted by a final solution as intellectua-

²³ Ch. XII, end, p. 63, 14-20, where we also find stressed that the best [individuals] in the human species are the object of a special providence (*hashgahah yetherah*); Ibn Tibbon here refers the reader specifically to *Guide*, III, 17.

²⁴ See ch. XVIII, p. 117, 4-19; "Our account has shown that, on the subject of Providence, the texts of the book of Job, of the Psalmist and of Malachi all lead to the same conclusion [.] they have all [three] proceeded from providence [watching over] the first [state of man] to that which concerns his final [state] (*ne'ethequ min ha-hashgahah bereshith el ha-hashgahah be'aharith*) and they clearly teach that the essential Providence is this latter, although there exist other forms of providence". These forms are: 1. natural providence, the immediate instrument of which is an angel; 2. elective and intentional providence (the choice and intention of God, naturally), manifested through the instrumentality of an angel of a specified order (read *mal'akh 'ehad mimin 'ehad min ha-mal'akhim*); 3. miraculous providence (*mofthith*) as described in *Psalms* xci (*shir shel pega'im*); here Ibn Tibbon clearly has in mind a passage of Maimonides, *Guide*, III, 51, MUNK, pp. 448-449.

²⁵ The terminology *hashgahah bereshit*—*hashgahah be'aharit* is based on *Job* VIII, 7, a verse into which Maimonides (*Guide*, III, 23, MUNK, p. 178 et seq.) reads the Biblical expression of the Mu'tazilite theory of compensation (*'iwaq*). Our author is concerned with something quite different.

²⁶ See e.g. ch. XXI, pp. 166-167: as sole creator and sovereign, God entrusts the celestial beings with certain functions relating to the lower world, according to determined laws.

²⁷ See G. VAJDA, *L'amour de Dieu dans la théologie juive du moyen âge*, Paris, 1957, passages under *Adhesion* in the index.

²⁸ See ch. XIV, p. 91, 5-14 (in some passages, the detail of the text is not clear and the tentative translation offered here shows this to a marked degree): the final lot of the just (*'aharith ha-Ṣaddiqim*) is: "the truly highest good that it is given to man to attain; this is a good the existence of which does not prevent (contradict) the pre-eminence of God, because it is the effect of its cause, I mean of the perfection (*shelemuth*) of the soul [.]; the perfecting (*hashlamah*) of the soul is [in fact] the cause of its immortality as substance, I mean it is the substantial cause

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lised as the one given by Maimonides, and probably not uninfluenced by the thought of Ibn Roshd.²⁹

* * *

I shall consider but very briefly the long chapter XX (pp. 122-162) which is a detailed commentary on *Psalm* civ and in the course of which an equally ample digression (pp. 125-235) expounds and discusses various methods of interpreting the first verses of *Genesis*. Samuel Ibn Tibbon here explicitly declares himself at variance with the exposition of Maimonides,³⁰ whom he accuses of leaving out of

²⁹ The expressions used in the passage translated in the preceding note can only be understood in a context of total fusion leaving no room for the individual survival of disincarnated souls, which is definitely an idea of Ibn Roshd's. It is probably also present in Maimonides (*Guide*, I, 74, MUNK, pp. 433-435, with notes by the translator) who shows himself however to be very discreet when concerned with "these profound . . . obscure things, that minds are not able to conceive". Ibn Tibbon is even more circumspect, for while he presents a very radical doctrine of union, he takes great care not to draw any conclusions except, as we have seen, to transfer Providence as acting in the visible world from the terrestrial plane to the plane of the separate Intelligences; in other words he avoids the real difficulty which troubles man in his bodily condition. His radical intellectualism turns out to be, in the end, a sleight of hand in apologetics. On the other hand his Active Intellect is, as in Ibn Sīnā and in Maimonides, the last of a descending series of separate Intelligences. One will therefore not be far wrong in saying that while he is to a certain extent inclined to accept the doctrine of Ibn Roshd, he yet remains in the current of the Avicennian tradition reinforced by the authority of Maimonides.

³⁰ See pp. 131-132. Ibn Tibbon's reservations certainly refer to the *Guide*, II, 30, especially to pages 232 and 236 of MUNK's translation (as regards the double meaning of *'eres* ["earth"] in *Gen.* i: 1, on the one hand, and 2 and 10 on the other, see MUNK, p. 236, n. 1.).

of its immortality, not a particular, contingent miraculous cause in that God would undergo change on account of it as is the case with happiness in our present life (*hašlehoth ha-reshith*); on the contrary, the state in question is necessary to every man who, once his soul is perfect and separate from matter, is united with the Active Intellect. The latter is [sometimes referred to in the Scriptures as] *'Elohim*; it is [there] [also] called *'Ishim*. He is the Seraph flying toward man and touching his mouth with a burning coal, who takes from him his iniquity and expiates his sin [.]. The soul then unites with the Intellect and they become one single thing, for then the soul becomes divine, of a higher order, immortal as is the Intellect with which it has united, the Intellect [I say] whose being is separate from matter . . ." (The terms used here are almost the same as in the philosopher's creed set forth in the *Kuzari* (I, 1 [cf. IV, 137]; see also Abraham Maimonides, *Milhamoth 'Adonai*, Hanover, 1840, 22, 11-12). Towards the end of the same chapter (p. 99 2f.) the author again emphasises that survival is the lot of the intellectual part of the soul only, while in ch. XXI, p. 170, 26-28, an exegesis of *Jeremiah* viii: 22-23 brings out that the supreme favour which God can grant man here below is "union with a being of a higher level"—*devequth ba'elyon*, which the souls of the just can attain; this interpretation certainly refers to, and intentionally modifies the one given by Maimonides at the end of the *Guide* (III, 54, MUNK, p. 465f.), where this passage was applied to Providence manifested here below and to the obligation incumbent upon us to imitate the moral attributes of God.

account several points in the text.³¹ He himself sees two possible constructions that can be put on the three opening verses of the Bible.

According to the first of these,³² a paraphrase of the text would read as follows:

Before God created the heavens and the earth in the manner to be explained in describing the work of the second and third day, the earth³³ was *tohu*, etc.

In this scheme of things the word creating the light (verse 3) was also uttered before the creation properly so called of the heavens and the earth.

The second interpretation takes the initial *waw* of verse 2 to be conjunctive; verses 1-2 would thus form the protasis and verse 3 the apodosis:

"Before God created the heavens and the earth, the latter being at that time (!) *tohu* and *bohu*, God said let there be light."

Summing up both these interpretations one page further on,³⁵ the author specifies, in connection with the second, that the earlier coming into existence of the light in relation to the heavens and the earth suggests its mediating role at the time of their creation (*lirmoz shebbe'emša'iyutho nivre'u*). But as the mode of this mediating action is not specified in the text, the reference to it remains obscure.³⁶

³¹ See p. 130, *in fine*: Maimonides passes over in silence the *tohu wa-bohu* and does not succeed in fitting the element earth into his system of interpretation.

³² See pp. 125-126.

³³ The *waw* would then have the value of the Arabic *fa*.

³⁴ See pp. 126-127.

³⁵ P. 128.

³⁶ The author may have had in mind the famous passage on cosmology from *Pirquey de-Rabbi 'Eli'ezer*, ch. III: "From what were the heavens created? From the light of the garment of the Holy One, Blessed be He" which Maimonides (*Guide*, II, 26) explained as well as he could, although he found it very strange. On the other hand, in his first interpretation of *Gen. i: 1-3* (see above, note 32), Ibn Tibbon makes a brief reference to the pre-existent Wisdom (*hokmah*) as having anteriority of cause over the rest of the created universe and as being instrumental in its creation, and gives the quotations usual in this context, *Prov. iii: 19* and *viii: 22*. Here again, it seems to me, there is a veiled criticism directed at Maimonides. The latter clearly has no sympathy for the concept of hypostasised Wisdom with which, even before certain medieval philosophers and mystics, the *Midrash* had toyed somewhat too readily. Of the last two verses mentioned by Ibn Tibbon, the *Guide* quotes the first only, in III, 25 (MUNK, p. 201), which is indeed about divine wisdom, but in the sense of a method supremely skilled and conscious of its ends; about a mode, if one cares to put it that way, characteristic of divine action, but not mentally, let alone ontologically separable from the latter. Moreover, in III, 54, a chapter whose initial theme is a study of the term *hokmah*, Maimonides breathes no word about any wisdom other than human. When therefore Ibn Tibbon stresses briefly but formally, in the passage under discussion, the fact that the two verses which he has quoted support those who see

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Here also we at last get the solution of the problem with which the treatise started. It is, however, set out in a rather obscure manner (pp. 133-135 and 143-146). To put it briefly, there has been no alteration in the primitive order of things: the mountains rose from the smooth surface of the earth as soon as the light created on the first day knocked against the abyss; thus the way was laid open to the water to pour into the valleys.

* * *

This brief outline of the three major themes of the *Ma'amar yiqqawu ha-Mayim*, cosmology, angelology and Providence will have demonstrated the clear interest of the treatise. Samuel Ibn Tibbon is here shown to be if not a philosopher of the first order (and he certainly is not) at least a thinker *sui juris*, not afraid to stand up to the authority of Maimonides. The ideas he develops seem to show already clear indications of the influence of Ibn Roshd, even though in certain respects he still adheres to an Avicennism already out of date and even to a perfunctory Neoplatonism which ill befits the progress which the speculations, of an Aristotelian character, of his two masters had achieved. This is incidentally characteristic of a great number of semi-philosophical, semi-theological works in this century and the next. We can thus see in Samuel Ibn Tibbon something like a *venerabilis inceptor* of a composite ideology, average in quality, yet inspiring several generations of Jewish intellectuals. In this respect the study of his writings, begun in a very provisional way in the preceding pages, is not only justified but indeed imperative, in order to obtain a more exact knowledge of the history of Jewish thought in the Middle Ages.

Paris

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the intervention of Wisdom in the creation of the world, and go against those that motivate the creation by Will alone, he again makes use of Maimonides (*Guide*, III, 25, especially MUNK pp. 199-201); but by adding the second verse of *Proverbs* to the first, which thus appears in quite a different light, he shows his support for an ideology which Maimonides quite clearly will not accept.

Yiddish Versions of Early German Prose Novels

IT has often been recorded that a number of the early German prose novels were, from the sixteenth century onwards, adapted for Jewish readers; but the extent to which this secular fiction must have flourished in the Jewish communities has been little realised. Six of these adaptations into Western Yiddish (*Kaiser Oktavian*, *Fortunatus*, *Die Sieben Weisen Meister*, *Die Schoene Magelona*, *Till Eulenspiegel* and *Schildbuerger*), are still extant to-day, most of them in more than one version, and there is definite bibliographical evidence that other titles once existed. Some of these exceedingly rare books perished in the recent holocaust, others were already no longer available in the nineteenth century. Leo Landau asserted that nearly all the topics of the German *Volksbuch* exist also in "Hebrew German".¹ This is a rather sweeping statement for which there is insufficient evidence, but there must have been other *Volksbuch* adaptations which have not survived.

German scholars have, in general, never investigated these books and consequently know very little about them. They usually rely on Jewish sources for their information, which is often in the nature of scant bibliographical references. Occasionally a degree of Judaization has been assumed² which our books certainly do not reveal. It is undoubtedly true that a considerable number of *Volksbuch* motifs can be found in the stories of eastern European Jewry, and in many cases this is due to the adaptation of definite German texts. In fact, it is a testimony to the peculiar rôle of the Jews as transmitters of culture that many oriental motifs which owe their presence in European literature to the activity of medieval Jewish translators³ here made their appearance in Hebrew letters for the second time, thenceforth to amalgamate with the then growing Jewish folklore of Eastern Europe. But there is no instance of a story being adapted to actual Jewish conditions when a book as such was made accessible to the Jewish reading public. That may have been the case with the Yiddish short story, but never with the prose novel.

Indeed, there is no reason why it should have been so. When German literature borrowed the early French prose novel, the plot

¹ L. LANDAU, *Arthurian Legends*, Leipzig, 1912, p. xxix.

² L. MACKENSEN, *Die deutschen Volksbuecher*, Leipzig, 1927, p. 31.

³ M. STEINSCHNEIDER, *Die hebraeischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher*, Berlin, 1893.

was not transferred to German conditions, though the translations did reveal the immense social changes of the times and it is this that makes their study so very fascinating. Neither are the Yiddish versions without significance in this respect, but in a Jewish setting most novels would in any case lose all pretence to realism. Many depicted a world of action alien to the Jew yet tempting to him; from much of it the population of the ghettos was isolated, and precisely this was one of the great attractions that this *genre* held for the simple reader. Thus the effect of the occasional Judaization of the characters is intentionally comic, and the Jewish adapters made no attempt to remould the actual story beyond that. It is, moreover, improbable that many of them would have been capable of such a task.

These books have, then, more commonly been regarded by Jewish scholars as transcriptions of German editions; and however dubious the appositeness of this terminology, such an attitude is understandable enough when we compare them with the earlier Yiddish literature as represented by a *Shmuel-bukh* or a *Bovo-bukh*, or with the contemporary Yiddish short story. Only fleeting attention has been paid to some of the texts, and where collation with German editions has been undertaken it appears to have been casual, and generally restricted to the beginning and end of the book. Other adaptations have certainly never been examined at all. A more careful collation of German and Yiddish texts can, however, be very rewarding. Admittedly, no new *genre* of staggering wealth emerges from such an investigation. Most of the books are more in the nature of close translations, but they contain matter of considerable interest, and they have never received the attention they merit.

Some attention has, of course, been paid to them by both German and Jewish scholars. Wolf, v.d.Hagen, Gruenbaum, Lotze, Landau, Perles, Karpeles, Ave-Lallemant, and others have recorded or described some of them; in particular the descriptions by Steinschneider⁴ and Erik⁵ must be mentioned. It was, however, the German-Jewish scholar Meir Schueler who in some articles, and particularly in a survey of early secular literature,⁶ has dealt more extensively with

⁴ M. STEINSCHNEIDER, Juedisch-Deutsche Literatur, in *Serapeum*, vol. 25, 1864, pp. 39-41, 53-4, 74-7.

⁵ M. ERIK, *Di geshikhte fun der yidisher literatur*, Warsaw, 1928, pp. 323-31; *Vegn altyidishn roman un novele*, Warsaw, 1926, pp. 145-7, 211-6.

⁶ M. SCHUELER, *Beitraege zur Kenntnis der alten juedisch-deutschen Profanliteratur*, in *Festschrift zum 75 jaehrigen Bestehen der Realschule mit Lyceum der I. Religionsgemeinschaft Frankfurt a. M.*, Frankfurt a. M., 1928, pp. 79-132.

some of the Yiddish versions.⁷ Unfortunately, most of the books were not accessible to him, and he often had to be content with a late eighteenth-century edition, or even a fragment. Of the existence of other adaptations he was not aware; thus, of six Yiddish versions of *Die Sieben Weisen Meister*, four were known to him, only two of which he was able to procure. He examined certain passages only of the texts, and most of the deviations of interest escaped his notice; that he did not collate the books with the relevant contemporary German editions is quite obvious from some of his observations. He has also drawn certain conclusions as to bowdlerization, moral tendencies, and supposed Jewish tactfulness with regard to Christian details, on the basis of his knowledge of late eighteenth-century texts; these are not at all borne out by the earlier texts.

It may therefore be claimed that a detailed investigation to show precisely how these versions depart from the German originals has hitherto not been made. A confrontation with the contemporary German editions clearly establishes that the extent of deviation has been underestimated, and that significant alterations occur in books which have been regarded as mere transpositions of German editions. It goes without saying that editorial attention to passages containing a specifically Christian element is the predominant feature of these adaptations, but they reveal different techniques, gradual elimination and a variety of attitudes—conscientious alteration to an astonishing degree of laxity. Although the Judaization of the texts is always slight, some books reveal an impact of Jewish life going beyond the purely religious context. Moreover, our bibliographical information is incomplete and sometimes incorrect; some editions have not been recorded, and others are not, as had been assumed, mere reprints, but represent further stages of adaptation. There is not a single German *Volksbuch* in Yiddish which does not, in addition to omissions, show further deviation motivated by the Jewish faith of the writer. However, most of the books evince alterations going beyond the religious sphere; new motifs and details have been added in many texts. It is by no means an original literature, but the adaptations are never mere replicas of German texts, and the term “transcription” is tenable neither from a textual nor from a linguistic point of view.

We shall call these books “Yiddish versions”; in the light of modern Yiddish research such notions as “High-German in Hebrew

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 101-22.

letters" cannot for one moment be entertained, even when, as is here the case, the individual text is very closely related to a German original. Yet while the earlier attitude was manifestly wrong these adaptations are, unlike original Yiddish creations, much less easy to place. We know that early Yiddish texts never represent a reliable picture of the stage of the Yiddish language as spoken.⁸ There was always a marked influence of German in the West, and naturally this will have been much stronger when a definite German text was transferred. At least one book (*Fortunatus*) appears to have been set up by a Jewish type-setter from a contemporary German edition. No doubt the Jewish readers interpreted it in accordance with their own pronunciation, but does this make it pure Yiddish? A few books do not contain a single term of exclusive Yiddish usage; in some, German expressions alternate with others then current amongst Jews only. Sometimes the German text proved stronger, sometimes the language of the Jewish adapter superimposed itself. Hebrew words which had long since become an integral part of everyday Jewish speech are rare in most texts, some are altogether without them. Only in the *Schild-buerger* does their (very inconsistent) use approximate to one per cent. From some books, printed in Amsterdam, the use of the Holy Language was deliberately excluded, and a compromise between Dutch Yiddish and the Yiddish current in other parts of Europe was consciously aimed at,⁹ so as to ensure a wide appeal. To apply to some of our books the term *Kunstsprache* is thus fully justified. A comparison of the adaptations of the texts with the Yiddish short story or with Jewish documents of any relevant stage, or even with their own accompanying prologues and epilogues, shows how far removed from spoken Yiddish these versions must have been. Whilst they all correspond in varying degrees to the Western Yiddish of their time, many of them would appear to be linguistic hybrids.

When these particular texts have to be reproduced in Latin characters they have to be transliterated. Only transliteration can be considered as an absolutely reliable yardstick when one is making accessible versions which vary considerably and originated over a period of three hundred years. This makes difficult reading, and for this article an alternative method has been adopted; quotations are trans-

⁸ J. FISCHER, *Das Jiddische und sein Verhaeltnis zu den deutschen Mundarten*, Leipzig, 1936, p. 64.

⁹ See JOSEPH MAARSEN'S interesting preface to an adaptation of tales from the *Decamerone*, Amsterdam, 1710.

cribed in accordance with a standardised late Western Yiddish phonology.¹⁰ Naturally such transcription has to be tentative and will not always be correct, since our knowledge of western Yiddish is still very incomplete. The relevant German quotations which precede them stem from German sixteenth or seventeenth-century editions which most likely served the first Jewish adapter, or come closest of those accessible to the Yiddish text.

Unfortunately, a survey of the Yiddish adaptations has to be restricted by factors outside the student's control. I have for three years been engaged in a most frustrating search for surviving Yiddish editions. It is evident that some very rare items are now lost, including Yiddish versions of *Herzog Ernst* (Fuerth, 1597 and later editions), *Florio und Biancafora* (Offenbach, 1714), *Prinzessin Helene* (Frankfurt a. Oder, 1782-3) and a third Yiddish version of the *Eulenspiegel* which was printed in Frankfurt a. Main in the early eighteenth century. Yet it would appear that the six extant titles are representative of the whole range of Jewish adaptation, and in what follows we can observe all the trends which emerge in the making of this literature available for Jewish readers.

The *Oktavian* is an example of conscientious and extensive religious alteration. It is also the oldest extant example of this *genre*, having been written down by the Bavarian Jewish scribe Yitzkhok Reutlingen and completed early in 1580. The (incomplete) manuscript is in the possession of the Bavarian State Library (Munich, *Cod.Hebr.* 100, ff. 1-66). In some ways the book seems a surprising choice for a Jewish adapter. Its theme of suffering innocence, the tale of the calumniated and exiled wife, undoubtedly had its appeal for him; but this story is set against the background of a religious struggle not likely to stir a Jewish reader to partiality. Christian France battles for her survival against the enemies of the faith, who swarm in from Babylon to ravage the land. The nature of the narrative, and the effusive piety of the characters, induced Reutlingen to introduce changes on almost every page. Although in his adaptation one of the contending parties remains definitely Christian, religious observances tend to be somewhat vague. From the main hero, however, he removed all Christian traits, and occasionally he even imbued him with Jewish characteristics. Naturally the result is quite ambiguous, since he is an imperial prince fighting for Christian France. Thus, as an obvious

¹⁰ I gratefully acknowledge here the generous assistance of Dr S. A. BIRNBAUM, London.

witticism, his royal scion saddles his horse even before he had time to recite the traditional Jewish morning prayers:

1548 Strassburg	1580
sattelt seinen gaul [27a]	zootylt zain pfert, ee èr talys un tfllyn benšt ¹¹ [16b]

and the hero's Mohammedan bride is willing to embrace the Jewish faith:

den Christlichen glauben an- nemen, vnd wie ein gute Chri- stin mich halten. [69a]	aièryn glaabyn oon nemyn, un an frumy iïdin verdyn. [49b]
--	---

The adapter removed a reference to *swine* from a statement intended to elicit admiration for the hero's great physical strength:

er ist stark, er würt feisste sew wol auff seinen breyten rucken tragen. [21b]	vail èr is štark. [12a]
--	-------------------------

The many prayers which occur in the text were considerably altered. In one, where protection from a lioness is sought, we find an apt reference to Daniel introduced.

bey allen seinen heyligen die bey jhm in dem hymmel seind, das du weder krafft noch mache- te über mich nit habest. [18b]	du zolst kaan gyvalt ibèr mix hoobyn cu šeedigyn, alys di leevyn dooniiyl in dèr gruubyn niks teetyn. [10a]
--	--

Christian pilgrims are consistently referred to as merchants:

In dem selben schiff was ein frommer bilger. [13a]	untèr dyn zelbigyn kaaf-lait im šif voor aanèr [6b]
---	--

Cathedrals are transformed into fortresses:

er hette sanct Dionysius Mün- ster angehoben zu bawen. [30a]	hot erst an gyvaltigyn festyn oon heebyn cu baayn. [19a]
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While in some adaptations of German texts *christlich*, *Christ* etc. very occasionally survive, they disappeared entirely in the *Oktavian*.

Frequently, they were replaced:

Die Fürsten..der Christen [30a]	di firstyn..untèr edym ¹² [19a]
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Naturally we can here single out some only of the many peculiarities of this adaptation. Thus it is noteworthy that where, in the German text, the heathen enemy is referred to as the "cursed infidel" or "Turkish dog" the Jewish adapter has dispensed almost entirely with these terms. This is perhaps not surprising, in view of the much more favourable treatment accorded to the Jews in some Mohammedan

¹¹ Hebrew *Tallith* = praying-shawl; *tefillin* = phylacteries; Yiddish *bensyn* = bless.

¹² The name Edom-Esau was identified with Byzantium-Rome; hence = *Christendom*.

lands at the time. On the other hand we observe a much sterner attitude towards the muddled notion of Mohammedan "idolatry" as portrayed in the original. Here the Jewish scribe, in a curious manner, avoids introducing the name of God ^(12a):

mein Gott Machomet [29a]	main bok maxmet [18a]
O Gott Juppiter vnnnd Venus [52b]	oo bok iupytér un veenis [36b]

Reutlingen also added a rhymed epilogue, which, with its strange blend of alien fiction (so much frowned upon by the rabbis), general moralisation, and Jewish piety, is a particularly good example of the method by which the scribes sought to justify their occupation and to render their works more respectable. By his painstaking avoidance of reference to Christian observances and his many other alterations this adapter has produced a version which differs noticeably, and often in a curious manner, from the German original. Only a few decades after the publication of the German *Oktavian* (1535), there was to circulate amongst the Jewish communities a text which constitutes the only real variant of the German *Volksbuch* ever to originate in Germany.

The *Fortunatus*, on the other hand, shows a greater preparedness to compromise and a more limited deviation from its German parent. The only surviving edition (Frankfurt a. M., 1699) does not appear to have been based on a Yiddish manuscript. It was probably set up from a contemporary German edition by a Jewish type-setter employed by a Christian printer (the municipal laws of Frankfurt forbade the setting up of a printing press by the Jews). Linguistically, it is the closest of all the adaptations to a High-German text.

This story of a burgher-Croesus seems to have enjoyed a fairly brief popularity in the Ghetto; it is the only one of the Yiddish versions of which no eighteenth century edition is known to have existed. Our adaptation differs but slightly from the German text, and primarily in its omission of reference to certain Christian rites such as baptism:

1680 (?)	1699
der ward getauft, und geheis- sen Fortunatus. [4]	der vard gyhaasyn fortunatus [2b]

The equation of the concepts "human" and "Christian" was not retained in the Jewish version:

^{12a} We have here the oldest literary example of this substitution. For further evidence of this usage, see J. J. SCHUDT, *Juedische Merckwuerdigkeiten*, Franckfurt und Leiptzig, 1714, part 2, p. 249. Schudt quotes *der Goym ihr Bock*.

so . . . verlaeugnet er den
Christlichen Glauben . . . und
haette er hundert Christen er-
mordet, so waer er sicher ge-
wesen. [26]

zoo . . . forlaagnyt ér zainyn
glaabyn . . . un het ér hundèrt
menšyn èrmordyt, zoo veer
ér zixèr gyveezyn. [10a]

In some cases, most inappropriately in the context, the word
"German" appears:

dass die Heyden keinem Chri-
sten weder treu noch hold seyn
[89]

doos di haadyn kaanym tai-
čyn veedèr trai nox holt zain
[32b]

Once only, when the hero endows a church foundation, do we find
a whole sentence replaced:

stift da eine Probstei, und
zwoelf Pfaffen, die solten all-
zeit singen und lesen. [71]

štift an špitool for alty un
kranky lait, velxy voul for-
pfleegy vurdyn bis oon ir ent.
[26b]

Although this is certainly not a specifically Jewish idea, it is yet not
without significance that it perhaps occurred to a Jewish type-setter
at Frankfurt on the spur of the moment. Quite a number of Christian
details were, however, not omitted and on the whole this version is
religiously not sufficiently neutral even to be ambiguous. Yet it does
at least contain some singular alterations.

Finally, as in the other adaptations of a German *Volksbuch*, there
appear here in a greatly modified form in Hebrew print motifs (for
instance, from the *Gesta Romanorum*)¹³ which had been transmitted
centuries earlier from the Orient by the unflagging activity of Jewish
translators.

Of no other *Volksbuch* are there so many Yiddish versions as of
Die Sieben Weisen Meister. Throughout two centuries this story again
and again caught the imagination of a Jewish adapter. Quite apart
from two early manuscripts seven printed versions are recorded, and
of the five surviving editions only one is a simple reprint. This story,
of Indian origin, was probably transmitted to European literature
through the agency of a medieval Jewish translator.¹⁴ A Hebrew ver-
sion was printed at least three times.¹⁵ In Hebrew it was of no use to
the mass of Jewish readers, but it is noteworthy that all the Yiddish
versions go back to German and later Dutch texts. In most cases this

¹³ H. GUENTHER, *Zur Herkunft von Fortunatus und seinen Soehnen*, Freiburg,
1914, pp. 20-9.

¹⁴ H. SENGELMANN, *Das Buch von den Sieben Weisen Meistern*, Halle a. S.,
1842, p. 24.

¹⁵ Constantinople, 1516; Venice, 1544 and 1608.

must have been as much a matter of the adapter's competence as of his taste.

Two late sixteenth-century manuscripts of the novel have survived; both are incomplete. One is in the possession of the Bavarian State Library (Munich, *Cod. Hebr.* 100, ff. 90-132), the other is owned by Dr J. Maitlis of London. The first printed edition appeared in Basle in 1602. These are three independent adaptations, based on contemporary German editions which differ little from each other. All the later Yiddish versions now extant (Amsterdam, 1677; Berlin, 1707, reprinted Offenbach, 1714; Amsterdam 1776) are, directly or indirectly, based on Dutch versions which are very similar to the German texts, the Christian elements being practically identical. This affords us an opportunity to study their treatment by the several Jewish adapters; and in their range from relative strictness and casual elimination to laxity and disparagement, our books display the differing approach of scribes and publishers, in one case even within the same manuscript. The Munich MS. was started by one scribe and completed by another. The first omitted the Christian element more carefully and shows himself more squeamish than most of his fraternity; the other, apart from one notable alteration, took the Christian expressions quite unconcernedly, even allowing a reference to the Virgin Mary to stand.

Most of the adapters did not omit casual references to church-going, but sometimes we find witticisms or deliberate alteration:

1554, Frankfurt a. M.

darnach gieng die Fraw eins
mals in die Kirchen, da bege-
genet jr jr Mutter. [27b]

dérnoox gink di fraa ains
mool in di šuul¹⁶ doo bygeeg-
nyt ir ir mutér (1602) [42b]
azou gyfil ys auf an caat,
doos ir mutér ir bygeegnyt,
um auf an luthouf cu geen
(1677). [17b]

Occasionally nearly all Yiddish editions take objection to a passage. Thus, a tale-telling magpie which is taught Hebrew in the relevant German editions (Hebrew and Latin in the Dutch texts), is debarred from achieving this accomplishment by all adapters but one. The others will doubtless have regarded it as a profanation of the Holy Language.

One of the anecdotes related in this book contains a particularly

¹⁶ i.e. Synagogue.

strong Christian element. It tells of a king who besieges Rome in order to carry away the remains of the apostles. The relevant leaves are missing in the Munich MS., and one may conjecture that the fact of their not having survived is not accidental. In the second manuscript the tale is deliberately curtailed, the king's erotic escapades alone remaining. Only one printed version is relatively faithful to the original. All the other adapters censored and altered.

es ist vielleicht der Christen
Gott, vnd ist vom Himel herab
kommen. [39a]

ys is filaixt dër šet¹⁷ heer
kumyn (1602). [62b] doos is
dër kiinik fun di taivylyn, dër
oubêrstêr taivyl aus dër helyn
(1677). [27a]. ys is gyvis
an engyl gots, dër doo is fun
himyl kumyn (1776). [26b]

Some adapters were not very tactful in their choice of a substitute, and references to Christian "idolatry" can be found in other passages. But derogatory references to Christianity will be mentioned in another context.

Amongst the many alterations which we find in our texts, by no means all are of a religious character. It has been maintained that Yiddish adaptations eschew the obscene and bowdlerize their originals; and that the very choice of subject matter reveals how the true spirit of Jewish literature has not remained without effect in the field of secular writing.¹⁸ Such conclusions were reached on the basis of a knowledge of late eighteenth-century versions, for not one of the earlier ones reveals any restraint. Indeed, the continual adaptation of *Die Sieben Weisen Meister* over two centuries attests the extent to which the erotic and the lascivious were appreciated. For at least one of the early adapters (1602) the book still did not reach what he thought to be the required standard of titillation for his public. He consequently embroidered certain passages in the story of *Ludwig und Alexander*, a tale of selfless friendship which concludes the book. The effect of these alterations is that one only of the two friends, Ludwig of Israel, remains true and faithful, while his companion, Alexander of Egypt, proves susceptible to temptation; some psychological factors were no doubt at work here. Whereas Ludwig never touches Alexander's bride when, in his stead, he marries her, Alexander enjoys the favours of Ludwig's future wife. This gives an incongruous

¹⁷ Hebrew *shedh* = demon.

¹⁸ M. SCHUELER, *Beitraege*, p. 87.

twist to the story, and at certain points the language is definitely pornographic.

With their many alterations, and with their variety of rhymed prefaces and epilogues, these adaptations of *Die Sieben Weisen Meister* form a particularly illuminating chapter in the utilization of secular literature for the benefit of the Jewish masses.

The Yiddish version of *Die Schoene Magelona* is a unique example of a whole German prose novel having been adapted into rhyme by an anonymous Jewish poetaster. For a century and a half edition after edition was printed in the ghettos of Germany and beyond. Four of them (Fuerth, 1698; Prague, 1705-11; Offenbach, 1714; Fuerth, 1791) still survive. The title of the Yiddish adaptation is *Sigmund un Magelene*. Since in the German version it is stressed that the hero takes his name from St Peter, the Jewish adapter changes it altogether.

Sigmund un Magelene is an epigonal work, and the poet tended to apply the techniques of the Jewish minstrels of the past. The first stanzas in particular are reminiscent of works like the *Shmuel-bukh*. Yet he seems to have found it difficult to maintain this style, and soon the conventional poetic diction is superseded by rhythms and expressions of colloquial speech. The Yiddish version follows the German original closely and often complete sentences were taken straight over with very slight alterations and the introduction of rhymed words. The story, however, has been much de-christianized.

1661, Nürnberg

Es gedauchte mich, dass Christus unser Erloeser zu mir kaeme, und fuehret einen schoenen jungen Ritter bey seiner Hand. [63a]
gieng die Amme in die Kirchen, den Ritter zu suchen, und fand ihn allein betend. [15b]

die Pilgerin sprach: Gnaedige liebe Frau, so . . . solt ihr darumb die Leut Jesu Christi nicht spotten, denn solcher schoener Rock, den ihr antraget, zieret euch den Leib, aber mein Rock, hoffe ich, werde mir meine Seel zieren. [44a]

1698 Fürth

ix hob drai naxt noox anander gyzeehyn, zolt ir mir glaabyn, vi an engyl in dër hant fiirt an fainyn knabyn. [15a]
gink di am un volt fun ritèr veryn gyvoor, doo bygeegynt zi in glaix bai dyn tour. [3b]

di betlèrin šproox: main gyneedigy frau, ir zolt di armyn nit aus špotyn azou. den ir hot klaadèr, ciiryn aièrn laib zeer, ober mainy mus ix hoobyn cu geeyn betylyn hiin un heer. [9b]

The Yiddish version is also distinguished by other traits. The adap-

ter endeavoured to amend certain inconsistencies in the original, and such attempts at a more logical working out of the story are very successful. There is also considerably more stress on the amassing of large fortunes and a greater accent on monetary values, which is quite natural in view of the enforced position of the Jews in the economy of the time. On the other hand there is a much greater emphasis on parental love.

This version also served another Jewish poet for a further adaptation, a much shorter poem (*Magelene-lid*), which was printed at Amsterdam in the early eighteenth century. Neither of them can lay claim to any great literary merit, yet they are two curious monuments to the transplantation of a German prose novel to the Ghetto.

At least three versions of the *Eulenspiegel* were made accessible to Jewish readers. We know of a condensed version, first published in the eighteenth century and repeatedly reprinted, of which apparently no copy survives. But we still have two complete Yiddish versions—a manuscript written by the scribe Benjamin Merks in the year 1600 (Bavarian State Library, Munich, *Cod. Hebr.* 100, ff. 134-91), and an edition printed in the year 1736 at Homburg. The two are not related, being based on contemporary German editions of the late sixteenth century and of the early eighteenth century respectively. The MS. has always been regarded as a mere transcription;¹⁹ neither of them has ever been examined. It is true that the Yiddish versions follow the German original quite faithfully, not even the most blatant vulgarities being toned down for the benefit of Jewish ears; a single one of *Eulenspiegel's* pranks concerning Jews, a nauseating story, is indeed missing in the printed version, but in the MS. we find it with all its details. *Eulenspiegel* is also the only Yiddish *Volksbuch* hero ever to be baptised. The first episode, relating his accidental triple-baptism, was retained by both adapters.

Yet precisely in these versions we find some very remarkable alterations. It has been asserted that the Jewish adapters usually exercised great restraint with regard to matters of Christian concern, even to the point of toning down remarks offensive to the clergy. This is allegedly a marked trait of our adaptations.²⁰ In fact, the evidence points rather the other way; and we have already met with some alterations which are anything but tactful. There are a fair number

¹⁹ See STEINSCHNEIDER, SCHUELER and ERIK.

²⁰ M. SCHUELER, *Beitraege*, p. 88.

of instances where various books or manuscripts go even further in slight or mockery. It is well known that amongst the victims of constant persecution there had developed from early times a considerable vocabulary, not only of Hebrew substitutes of Christian terms which a pious Jew would never utter, but also of derogatory slang. Intentional corruptions, cant phrases and abuse of Christianity, also crept into many Yiddish adaptations, adding even more to the incongruous effect of the changed religious setting. In some cases it can, admittedly, be argued that the intentional transposition of letters signifies no more than pious avoidance, but other spoonerisms, word-plays and substitutions insinuate idolatry on the part of Christians or are otherwise intended in a derogatory manner, as plainly emerges from the new meaning.

In some Yiddish adaptations the "sacrament" is alluded to in general terms. The *Eulenspiegel* provides us with one example of considerable abuse and one of the senseless mutilation of a sentence.

1532

vnd vor der beicht die Sacra-
ment zu sehen nicht wirdig.
[29b]

un for dër paixt šEEKÈR toomy
²¹ cu zeehyn nit virdik (1600)
[153a]
un for dër baixt cu zeehyn nit
veertik (1736). [15b]

The Hebrew phrase *Sheger tamē* used by the earlier scribe (he also applied it in *Die Sieben Weisen Meister*) is suggested by the word *Sacrament* itself, and we must regard it as a very ingenious pun.

"Saint" as a prefixed title has been dealt with in various ways by the different adapters. We find this transposition repeatedly in one of the *Eulenspiegel* versions.

ein arm man der nicht zu essen
hat, fastet wol mit Sanct Ni-
clausen, vnd wann er etwas
hat, so isset er wol mit S. Mar-
tins abent. [5a]

an armÈR man, der nit cu esyn
hot, fast vòul mit staan klaa-
syn, un ven ÈR epys hot, zo
est ÈR vòul mit staan martins
obynt (1736). [2b]

Obviously the spoonerism is intentional,^{21a} the analogy between "stone" and "image" being apparent. The following is an observation on the "Easter-play":

wie sol daz Marien spiel zu
gehen. [10b]

vi zol dos naryn-špiil cuu
geen (1736). [5b]

²¹ Hebrew *sheger* = falsehood; *tamē* = impure.

^{21a} It is probable that the later German edition at the disposal of this Jewish adapter read *Sant Niclausen* etc.

Wherever the Holy Ghost is mentioned, both adapters employed the same derogatory prefix.

in den spital . . . (der hies zum
heiligen geist) . . . der heilig
Geist solt in mich komen.
[77b]

in den špitool . . . der hiis
'cum šmaaligyn gaast' . . .
der šmaalik gaast zol in mix
kumyn (1600). [188b]

šm is a well known derogatory prefix in modern Yiddish. In the manuscript we now have the earliest written example; it must have been the accepted substitute already in the sixteenth century.

The two *Eulenspiegel* versions contain a relatively high share of such deliberate corruptions of the German text. The reason is not far to seek. The original abounds in mockery of the clergy and of certain Christian observances. Into a book of this nature Jewish derogatory references were bound to penetrate.

Finally, we have the *Schildbuerger*, a great favourite with the Jewish reading public in the eighteenth century. The earliest extant print is an undated Amsterdam edition and we have three later editions (Amsterdam, 1727; Offenbach, 1777; Fuerth, 1798). The Yiddish versions are based on an adaptation of the German original by Pomponius Filtzhut. A *Schildbuerger* edition has been described twice, first by Jeep²² and then by Schueler.²³ The later editions seen by them are, however, not simply reprints as they assumed. Collation of all the extant versions would dispose of the assertion of the former that a Yiddish *Schildbuerger*-edition was necessarily the corrupt product of a speculative Jewish bookseller, and of the latter that it necessarily shows a commendable restraint in matters of Church and sex allegedly typical of Yiddish literature. In fact, these editions represent various stages of adaptation.

The earliest edition available (170?) is a faithful translation into Yiddish, with the usual editorial attention to whatever might prove offensive to Jewish readers.

1698 (?)

ist ihnen eben so unbekandt,
als einem Jueden, welcher
eigentlich nicht weiss, von
welchem Stamme der Kinder
Israel er eigentlich entsprossen
sey. [2]

170?, Amsterdam

is zi eebyn zou umbykent,
alys an haat, velxer nit vaas,
vuu er entšproct is. [3b]

²² E. JEEP, *Hans Friedrich von Schoenberg der Verfasser des Schildbuergerbuchs*, Wolfenbuettel, 1890, pp. 140-4.

²³ M. SCHUELER, *Beitraege*, pp. 116-22.

Such changes may include anything from the elimination of "bacon" to the transfer of mundane activities from Saturday to Sunday.

ihnen auch kein Speck . . . darvon in die Kueche wuechse. [22] als sie verwichenen Sonnabend ihme das Haupt gewaschen. [129]	zi aax kaan fet . . . doofun in kix vakst. [10a] alys zi forgangyn zuntoog iim dyn kop gyvesyn hot.. [48a]
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In 1727 another edition appeared. An itinerant Jewish bookseller had it printed in Amsterdam, and in his very amusing epilogue claimed to have translated the German original word for word into Yiddish. Yet his translation is neither literal nor new. It is clearly based on the older Yiddish version. This adapter altered the preceding version considerably. He omitted, condensed and corrupted. On the other hand he provided some very apt variants, and, with a keen eye for the Jewish love of verse he added rhymes and transformed many of the prose passages. Some of the products of this rhymester's activity are quite spirited, others are outrageous. But his is a very much altered version and, as an example of *Reimwut*, probably unique.

Later Jewish publishers used this version and in these late editions we actually do find an unusual degree of reticence in matters regarding Christianity and the clergy. All slighting references to priests are now omitted. The earlier adapters had corrupted the prefixed title of sanctity. Now, certain protestations were not even tolerated in their altered form.

Ich weiss bey S. Velten nicht, wie es. [55]	ix vaas bai poc feltyn nit, vi ys (170?). [22a] ix vaas vi ys (1777). [15b]
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In this final Yiddish version the German text is whittled down by at least one quarter. The extent of bowdlerization is striking, even in an age of sensibility.

Throughout the eighteenth century we can trace the history of this *Volksbuch* in the Jewish communities; from a faithful translation, to a version which departs considerably from the German original, and finally to a mere rump. Stories of the *Schildbuerger* continued to be cherished amongst the Jews, and they have directly inspired the tales of the *Khelemer Naruunim*,²⁴ their Jewish counterparts. Many of the

²⁴ M. ERIK, *geshikhte*, p. 324.

antics attributed to this Eastern confraternity are clearly borrowings adapted to prevalent Jewish conditions. Thus many of the anecdotes came to find a permanent place in the rich folklore of the Jews of Eastern Europe.

Most of our adaptations are accompanied by rhymed prologues and epilogues, many of them modelled on those used in the earlier period of Jewish minstrelsy. Some of these contributions may, amid pious protestations, summarize or relate the whole plot in advance. In others the itinerant bookseller expatiates on the trouble he has taken to satisfy his discriminating customers. The author of the 1677 adaptation of *Die Sieben Weisen Meister*, after reiterating the heinous crimes of the evil royal stepmother, advises all Jewish householders to be extremely circumspect in the choice of second wife; and all this in endless couplets, replete with allusions to Jewish religious doctrine. Or a pointed Jewish expression may stand, in amusing contrast to the enumeration which preceded it of the powerful kingdoms which the Gentile princely pair is to inherit. Furthermore, valuable information can be gleaned here about both the author and reading public. For instance, the verses of the adapters offer convincing evidence that these prose novels were by no means primarily addressed to women, as has so often been maintained.

In such a brief survey as this we can give some indication only of the many points which emerge from a full investigation of our texts.²⁵ That most of the Jewish adaptations of German books are casual or corrupt—a view coloured by the attitude to Yiddish, entertained by many Jews and Germans, which sees in it but *Jargon* and *Mauscheldeutsch*—certainly cannot be maintained. Usually, our versions are not markedly inferior to the cheap contemporary German editions on which they are based. The question of the wide dissemination of this literature is also very interesting. It would appear that many early

²⁵ See A. PAUCKER, *The Yiddish Versions of the German Volksbuch*, Dissertation, The University of Nottingham, 1959.

ADDITIONAL NOTE:—

The first Yiddish edition of *Die Sieben Weisen Meister* (Basle, 1602) is in the Bibliothek der Universität Basel; the second version of the *Schildbuerger* (Amsterdam, 1727) in the Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt. All the other Yiddish editions mentioned here are either in the British Museum or in the Bodleian Library, with the exception of the last reprint of *Sigmund un Magelene* (Fürth, 1791) which is in the possession of the Universiteits-Bibliotheek, Amsterdam.

The German editions quoted are in the British Museum, but the Yiddish versions have also been collated with almost all the accessible German prints of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

YIDDISH VERSIONS OF EARLY GERMAN PROSE NOVELS

manuscripts were in circulation at the turn of the sixteenth century, and that from then onwards a wholly literate Jewish public must have been more familiar with many German prose novels than were their Gentile neighbours.

The *Volksbuch* has justly been assigned a very minor place in Yiddish literature. Compared with older works, these translations mark the decline of the Jewish adaptation of German texts. The new authors were generally copyists and publishers, not poets. Most of the Yiddish versions originated in Germany, and are significant of the still greater isolation of the German Jews in later times. They take their place on the lowest level, that of popular mass entertainment. But of a constant and active preoccupation with this popular literature of Germany our books are both evidence and symbol. They fully deserve our interest.

London

ARNOLD PAUCKER

NOTE

On the formula melekh ha-'olam as anti-Gnostic protest

WHEREAS the history of early Christianity is already being rewritten in view of the new assessment of Gnosticism,¹ no spectacular revision of the beginnings of Rabbinic Judaism has so far been made, nor indeed is such to be expected²; the reason being that Christianity lends itself more naturally to Gnostic interpretation than does Judaism.

Nevertheless, on many specific points cumulative evidence can be adduced to show that the struggle against Gnosticism within Judaism, though not as fierce as in Christianity, did extend further afield than has hitherto been held to be the case by historians.

Since Rabbinic Judaism coined the fixed formula acknowledging God as "King of the world" the Divine appellative *melekh ha-'olam*³ is incorporated in apposition, as the standard form of every statutory Rabbinic benediction; this tallies with the general Jewish idea of the Kingship of God, which itself had many ramifications. As late as the end of the Biblical period God was as yet not described as "King of the world". In the Psalmist's description *melekh 'olam*⁴ the word 'olam is used in its original sense; the phrase belongs to a quite different group concepts and simply means "forever King".

In the course of the semantic development which took place in early post-Biblical Hebrew,⁵ 'olam came to mean "world" instead of "perpetuity". *Qoheleth* already seems to have used 'olam in the new sense,⁶ as did *Ben Sira*.⁷ In Rabbinic literature the first instance of 'olam in the new sense of "world" is perhaps to be found in the

¹ Cf. e.g. the recent works by Puech, Quispel, Grant.

² It is likely that G. Scholem's forthcoming book on the origins of Jewish Gnosis will shed more light also on this decisive point.

³ A. Marmorstein's *Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God*, I, 1927, does not list the term *melekh ha-'olam* among what the book calls the Rabbinic "synonyms" of God.

⁴ x: 16. On the biblical usage see E. Jenni, *Das Wort Olam im Alten Testament*, 1953.

⁵ On this see C. von Orelli, *Die hebräischen Synonyma der Zeit und Ewigkeit*, 1871, p. 103, 109; A. Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu*, Leipzig, 1898, pp. 132ff. ("Die Welt") and A. Altmann's remarks *Olam und Aion, Festschrift Jakob Freimann*, Berlin, 1937, p. 10; R. Loewe, *Jerome's Rendering of 'olam*, HUCA xxii, 1949, pp. 267, 298.

⁶ iii: 11.

⁷ xvi: 7.

famous dictum of Simeon ha-Saddiq of the 2nd century B.C., על שששה דברים העולם עומד וכו'.⁸

The post-Biblical formula *melekh ha-'olam* though possibly inspired by the Psalmic phrase *melekh 'olam*, clearly reflects the new meaning of the word. The date of the coining of the phrase must be left open.

It cannot be said with any degree of certainty that this coining had anti-Gnostic polemical overtones, though the emphasis on the idea that the world is ruled by God as King (and, by implication, not by an anti-god or demiurge) may not be coincidental. Divine appellatives habitually reflect cultural contacts. It would therefore seem very likely that the new appellative *melekh ha-'olam* did not emerge *in vacuo*. One is tempted to put forward the suggestion that the formula was originally coined as an anti-Gnostic polemical term, but no strong case can be made here, because of the uncertainty in the dating of the phrase.

It is a well-known fact that early post-Biblical Jewish prayers were dogmatically orientated. Before Pharisaic Judaism had become normative and, in a process of crystallisation, took on final shape whilst fiercely fighting against doctrines which henceforth were branded as heretical, prayer was employed as the chief vehicle of declaration of faith and of dogmatic statement.⁹ This is patently the case regarding corporate prayer, where the institutionalised form which the synagogue assumed was laid down in such a way as to exclude any heretical formulations that might be smuggled in by the *sheliah shibbur*,—a not uncommon danger when liturgical infiltration was a constant menace.

Even statutory benedictions, however, which are not usually corporate, came under the strict control of heresy hunting. A good example of this is the tannaitic statement by R. Jose in *Tos. Berakhoth* 4,5 כל המשנה ממטבע שטבעו חכמים בברכות, לא יצא ידי חובתו "he who changes the prescribed formula of a benediction has not fulfilled his duty".¹⁰ This general statement is obviously directed, in the historical context of its pronouncement, as much against individual

⁸ 'Avoth, 1,2. For another, but unconvincing, view see J. Goldin's arguments in the *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, xxvii (1958) pp. 52-53. Goldin holds that in Simeon ha-Saddiq's dictum 'olam is still used in the old way; he follows, but presses *ad absurdum*, L. Finkelstein's attempts in his *Mavo' le-Massekhtoth 'Avoth d'rabbi Nathan*, New York, 1950 pp. 220-221 to postpone the time of the semantic transition right into Rabbinic times.

⁹ The problem has been treated repeatedly and it is still a favourite subject with historians of Jewish liturgy.

¹⁰ Cf. also the variant in Bab. *Berakhoth*, 40 b.

eccentricities as against the possibility of heretical variations on the fixed text of benedictions. Such a ruling is patently part and parcel of the great process of the crystallising out of the normative faith. The statement of R. Jose implies a fixed wording. Indeed, the technical term for the fixed wording is *matbea'* (*stamp, coin*).¹¹

A further step in this anti-heretical tendency is a development from the general statement of R. Jose towards a specific injunction, which we find in a third century pronouncement by Rav, כל ברכה שאין עמה מלכות אינה ברכה "A benediction in which there is no mention of the kingship [of God] is no [valid] benediction".¹² This statement coming from a third century Palestinian teacher may well echo an even earlier Palestinian view. The pronouncement is well attested in both the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmud.¹³ Although the names with which the ruling is connected have been confused in the variants, there can be no doubt as to the authenticity of the statement itself, which occurs nearly *verbatim* in both Palestinian and Babylonian versions.

We must now ask ourselves, against what practices Rav's ruling was directed. The historically definable group which would have theological reasons to avoid reference to the Kingship of God on earth can only be a group of Jewish Gnostics who, as such, could conceive of God as divorced from the world. It is against them that Rav's ruling is directed. If the birth of the formula *melekh ha-'olam* with its emphasis on the idea that the world is God's may have more to do with anti-Gnostic polemics than can at present be substantiated, the third century flare-up of the problem and the definitive establishment of the formula by Rav's ruling¹⁴ clearly reflects a protest against a particular heresy whose adherents may be identified as Jewish Gnostics.¹⁵

London

J. G. WEISS

¹¹ מטבע של ברכה or מופם ברכה.. Cf. Elbogen, *Geschichte des jüdischen Gottesdienstes*, 1931, p. 5.

¹² Jer. *Berakhoth*, 9,1.

¹³ The Babylonian version of the saying is כל ברכה שאין בה מלכות אינה ברכה (Ber. 12a) in the name of R. Yohanan, but it fits better into the well attested liturgical interests of Rav. As to the relevant Rabbinic passages, see the detailed discussion in S. Lieberman, *Tosefta ki-feshutah*, New York, 1955, pp. 59-60.

¹⁴ Cf. also the positive corollary in the formulation of the *Musaph* for New Year, generally attributed to Rav (*Pal. Rosh Ha-Shanah*, 1,5, etc.). See Zunz, *Gottesdienstlichen Vorträge* 1892², p. 386, Elbogen, *Der jüdische Gottesdienst* 1892, p. 386; p. 143.

¹⁵ Marmorstein (op. cit. n. 3), p. 99 surmised that there are Gnostic connections with the analogous title for God as "Sovereign of the World" (*Ribbono shel 'olam*).

Current Literature

HANOKH ALBECK, *Mavo' la-Mishnah*. Devir, Jerusalem-Tel Aviv 1959, viii, 295 pp.

THE new commentary to the Mishnah by Professor Albeck published by the Bialik Institute was so planned as to include also an *Introduction*—and it is this object to which, the commentary being completed, Professor Albeck has now addressed himself. He is at once up against problems both diverse and complex, inasmuch as the very notion of an introduction to the Mishnah is an ambiguous one. It is possible to approach the Mishnah as a book, in which case the introduction will cover principally the questions that are bound up with its formation from a literary-historical point of view. On the other hand, an introduction may be focused on to the contents of the Mishnah in general. If so, its primary concern must be with the *prolegomena* to the *Oral Law* which has been embodied above all in the Mishnah where it has crystallised out; i.e. the introduction must present an account of the development of the *Halakhah* up to the close of the age of the Mishnah, which obviously constitutes the corresponding chronological landmark. Though there are no precisely defined frontiers, for form and content presuppose each other, nevertheless, the aims of an Introduction may be either of the two. If we are to suppose that the literary-historical angle is concerned, another question arises—*viz.*, how to present the overall picture of the problems of the Mishnah and the solutions that have been propounded to them, to the reader whose special concern lies outside this branch of scholarship. The present edition is essentially aimed at the educated layman.

Ever since modern scholarship took the study of the Mishnah in hand, introductions and special studies orientated in various directions have been produced, including a particularly important study by Prof. Albeck himself (*Untersuchungen über die Redaktion der Mischna*, 1923), and he has also dealt with some of the problems involved in his book *Mehqarim ba-Baraita uva-Tosefta* (Jerusalem 5694/1954). A distinguished list of predecessors lay before him—Krochmal, Frankel, Brill, Dünner, Levy, Weiss, Hoffman, Bassfreund, Rosenthal, Halevy, and Ginzberg—and, since his own work, there has appeared also that of Epstein. Several distinct schools of thought have emerged. It is true that there is little need for a piece of research or of a book in

which the author is endeavouring to set forth simply and in a straightforward manner the facts and processes involved, and in which he is naturally entitled to convey, in the main, his own point of view; but he is under an obligation at least to indicate other views, even though this in no way precludes him from choosing his own standpoint or from limited controversy. All such matters must be decided before pen is set to paper.

It seems, however, that in the present case there was no overall and unequivocal decision, nor any preconceived plan able to embrace all the details. The author was given a free hand, and it is precisely this that has involved him in no slight confusion. He wishes, apparently, to do his duty by all aspects of the subject, with the result that his book suffers in places from both omission and from prolixity. If one opens the volume and scans both the material and the way in which it is divided, one is compelled to recognise that, while it does indeed contain an introduction to the Mishnah as a book, the author has not felt debarred from touching also on other problems involved in the history of the chain of halakhic transmission—e.g. the problem of the dating of the Oral Law early *halakhoth*, and the relationship of *midrash* to *halakhah*. The author is unquestionably right here, since to avoid dealing with problems such as these is impossible; the Mishnah was not created *in vacuo*, so that the necessity arises of explaining the antecedents of its formation and literary redaction. But the author has let his subject run away with him, and has included within the first three chapters a number of things not directly relevant, such as a close examination of the views of the Rabbi regarding the early *Taqqanoth*, and he has, moreover, entered unnecessarily into individual particularities and niceties. On the other hand, one might perhaps have expected some concise description of the whole methodology of the *Halakhah*—one searches in vain, for example, for consideration of what is meant by *minhag* or *sevara*, and for precise differentiation between the categories *midde-'oraita* and *midde-rabbanan*. These chapters amount to 63 pages.

Nor is this all. Professor Albeck is the *doyen* of talmudic scholars living in Israel, and his way of doing things, with all his *penchant* to combativeness, is familiar. The tone in which he is accustomed to enter into controversy with his opponents is markedly astringent, and occasionally there is struck an unpleasantly personal chord of derision, or authoritarian assertiveness. This sort of thing is sufficiently to be deprecated in a work of pure scholarship: *a fortiori* in a book

intended for the general public, where it is an urgent necessity in controversy to observe such self-restraint of both style and subject matter as will obviate any offences to the dignity of fellow-scholars and as will ensure that their arguments are not presented with an unfair slant. It would seem that Albeck does not subscribe to this thesis, and proportion has suffered accordingly. It is not just that he has failed to observe the proprieties in polemic both relevant and gratuitous; there are passages which give the impression that his whole purpose in writing the book was for the sake of polemic against his predecessors and his contemporaries, and even in order to square his account with those who have gone before. It is a pity that a book intended as a classic in the fullest sense of the word should suffer from this blemish.

The inter-relation of the chapters, too, is not as clear as it might be. One half of the book (chap. 8 onwards) is devoted to the language of the Mishnah and various aspects of its lexicology (neologisms, aramaisms, words without Aramaic parallel, semantic developments from biblical Hebrew, and foreign words), and to a catalogue of *Tanna'im* mentioned in the Mishnah together with a chapter on its commentators. The first two of these subjects are today reckoned as forming a part of Hebrew linguistics and lexicography, whereas the main item has been overlooked, *viz.* an outline of the stylistic forms found in halakhic writing—the casuistic and the apodeictic, the generalisation as found in the Mishnah (*Kelal*), etc. With regard to the tannaitic scholars, the question may be mooted as to whether it is feasible to draw any valid distinction between those teachers who are mentioned in the Mishnah and those cited in other tannaitic sources only. All this material is compressed into pp. 128-253 and constitutes, as will be obvious, but an arid summary—a feature which robs it of much of its value—with the exception of the chapter on the commentators of the Mishnah. In the latter the author spreads himself more, particularly with regard to Maimonides, but the chapter is deficient in historical perspective. In the appendixes (pp. 257-290) matters are dealt with in detail which have been but touched upon in the body of the book. The author is here full of acrimonious polemic, aimed particularly at the late J. N. Epstein. (One gains the impression that the author's *animus* was in the main sparked off by a few expressions in Epstein's book *Mavo'oth le-Sifruth ha-Tanna'im*, in which he more or less hinted that Albeck's views are not original by use of the concluding phrase "followed by Albeck" (*we-'aḥaraw Albeck*). But

this volume of Epstein's, which appeared posthumously, consists of but his university lectures printed as delivered: it is not a book in the true sense of the word.)

Literary-historical questions are allotted 64 pages, embracing chapters on *the writing, of the earliest mishnahs, the mishnahs of the Tanna'im and their method in study, the editing of the Mishnah, and the text and order of the Mishnah*. Without entering into the question as to whether the proportions here followed are justifiable ones, it may be stated definitely that within such space there is no room for expatiation or excessive detail. Everything is presented in concise form, and with great clarity; and if one were to remove from this section, likewise, its polemical sting, it might be said—to the author's credit—that he had succeeded in his objective and had given us a presentation, in a simple and intelligible form, of his own views of the problems involved and of their solution. But here, too, one senses a *lacuna*: as in the earlier chapters, the historical background is lacking, although there can be no doubt of the connections between this and the emergence of the various *strata* to be found within the Mishnah. One senses, too, a lack of the modern and scientific instruments of thought and expression, which might elevate an introduction to the Mishnah from the formal point of view, too, up to the level of introductions composed for other branches of scholarly investigation. The expression is lucid, the style clear and uninvolved, indeed excessively straightforward—a circumstance dependent to no little degree upon the primary defect, i.e. the lack of historical grasp. The discussion proceeds almost within a total void, as if the subject matter concerned not the crystallising out of a living tradition in a period pregnant with dangers, but rather the introduction to a mere manual of study preserved from antiquity.

To turn to the problems themselves. Albeck follows a line that diverges from that of the majority of scholars on three central issues: (i) the *date* of the first editing, (ii) the *nature* of the editing of the Mishnah, and (iii) the *purpose* of the Mishnah. As against Krochmal, Hoffmann, Rosenthal, and Epstein—and thus in even greater contrast to I. Halevy in his *Doroth Ha-ri'shonim*, Albeck holds that it is impossible to talk of the first redaction before the age of Jabneh. This opinion had, with limited variations, already been advanced by Dünner, following up a suggestion that originated in a footnote by Graetz to his *magnum opus*. This assumption is held to explain the purpose of the tradition found at the beginning of 'Eduyyoth in the

Tosefta and to account for the primitive and casual editing of the corresponding mishnaic tractate, which will have constituted but a beginning. Albeck rejects the theory of the *mishnah ri'shonah* which postulates a formally arranged Mishnah, if not complete at any rate of a partial nature, the editing of which is referred to the latest period of the Temple and the days of Hillel and Shammai. The discussions between them sometimes seem to be conducted upon the basis of an edited Mishnah-text, traces of which some scholars have claimed to be still recognisable in various places in the Mishnah as it stands. As against this, in Albeck's opinion until the period of Jabneh each individual teacher had his own diction, style, and arrangement.

As for the second point, Albeck maintains that the redactor of the Mishnah—i.e., according to talmudic tradition supported by internal evidence, R. Judah the Prince—changed nothing: he neither edited it *ab initio*, nor modified, nor corrected the individual *mishnayoth*, but he merely collected and assembled them just as he found them in manifold sources of dissimilar and uneven arrangement. In so doing he followed, eclectically, several different principles of arrangement—the topical, the associative, and that of the halakhic *midrash*. This will account for the doublets, inconsistencies, and relics of all modes of arrangement still to be discerned in the Mishnah in its present form.

With regard to the pre-eminent purpose of the present Mishnah, Albeck concludes that contrary to the opinion of Bassfreund and Epstein the Mishnah was never intended as a work of codification. The very character of its editorial handling shows that the redactor's only intention was to provide a kind of *compendium* for study. This *compendium*—albeit unfinished—found its way into the hands of students, and the circumstance of its circulation amongst them precluded its completion. R. Judah the Prince had consequently to transmit his supplementary material in the course of his lectures (*talmud*), which contained additional and different matter, explanations, amplification, variant readings, and the resolution of inconsistencies.

Albeck's reading of the facts is clear and forms an organic whole, giving an explanation for all the difficulties which are continually cropping up. This is decidedly an advantage; but literary-historical scholarship is unlike other branches of scholarship which are patient of exact criteria. It is possible for a literary-historical thesis to be crystal-clear and to leave no room for doubts, while all the same making one hesitate to accept it as right. In much of Albeck's argumentation against his "opponents" right is on his side; his eagle eye

picks upon every logical flaw however insignificant, every slip of the pen and every error, even though in many other cases he is, for all his own authoritarianism, mistaken. But it is in the nature of a branch of scholarship in which measuring-rods cannot be applied that in spite of errors, logical faults and inconsistencies, the main thesis may still be correct.

Albeck's approach is a severely literary one; that in the Mishnah we are confronted by a book is the starting-point for all his superstructure, and he therefore refrains, deliberately, from taking any account of comparison with other tannaitic sources when he is dealing with the Mishnah in its entirety. Yet it is certain that factors historical, social, political, and religious, as well as the comparison of other source-material, are likely to shed a different light on the date of the editing of the Mishnah and on its essential quality as a book. Albeck will recognise nothing but the synod in the vineyard of Jabneh, which is explained in connection with the Mishnah. On the basis of that source and the explanation given for it in the text the author concludes that it was at that time only that the work of the first editing began. This, it would seem, would account for the strange phenomenon of the tractate *'Eduyyoth*, so different from the rest in its arrangement and composition, and also for the existence of individual *mishnahs* whose connection is neither organic nor has anything to do with the subject-matter. These phenomena would be hard to explain if there already existed a formally arranged and edited Mishnah—unless one follows Halevy, whose dogmatic proof of his thesis is on entirely different lines. Albeck, however, is concerned merely to controvert the proofs offered by Halevy and Hoffmann—not those of their successors, e.g. Ginzberg (in his book of the tractate *Tamid*) or Epstein, both of whom discuss instances taken from a wider field (the tractates *Tamid*, *Hagigah*, *Qiddushin*, *Yevamoth*, etc.). One is not entitled to treat without seriousness the concept to which expression was given by Rosenthal in this book *Über den Zusammenhang der Mischna* (Strassburg, 1891-92), according to which the earliest Mishnah was directed against Sadducean influence, so that it is no accident that all the fragments cited in support of their own case by scholars connected with the "first Mishnah" (*Mishnah ri'shonah*) form part of sectors of the halakhic field connected with cultic, ceremonial, and public activity. Nor does Epstein speak of an editorially arranged comprehensive Mishnah. The tradition recorded at the beginning of the *Tosefta 'Eduyyoth* and the arrangement of the

corresponding mishnaic tractate of 'Eduyyoth may be explained in two ways between which no final decision can be made, since everything depends on what is to be understood by the words *shello' yehē' davar middiverey torah domeh le-havero*. Even if Albeck is right in the interpretation of this passage, i.e. that the reference is to arrangement, there is no insuperable contradiction here to the existence, prior to Jabneh, of Mishnahs editorially treated and ordered. (As regards the arguments of archaic style and language upon which Ginzberg and Epstein lean in support, Albeck does not consider them, even though by the consistency of such phenomena corroborative proof of the existence of earlier Mishnahs can be adduced.) It is possible that partial *collectanea* were already in the hands of all teachers, but that nonetheless a new beginning was made at Jabneh.

The position regarding the third problem is similar. Did the Redactor intend to establish a fixed halakhic practice—as Frankel and Bassfreund thought—(or if we adopt Epstein's formulation: is the Mishnah composed of juridical decisions?). The foundation of Albeck's view is the consideration that since R. Judah the Prince merely gathered together, without introducing change, a rescension assembled from a variety of sources, we have no right to speak in terms of a fixation of *Halakhah*. But why should R. Judah the Prince have abandoned his predecessors' method and have refrained from tampering with either form or content of existent *Halakhoth*? With regard to the earlier Tannaites Albeck's views are not quite clear, and much indeed hangs on this point. In some places he assumes that the Tannaites prior to R. Judah the Prince were not concerned meticulously to preserve halakhic formulations as they had been transmitted to them (p. 279), but on p. 103 he assumes the contrary. Here is the nodal point. Albeck appears to view the traditions as they were at this period as being something fixed rather than as living, exposed to change even in regard to their contents in the hands of those who transmitted them. The only loophole that he will allow is for additions and new *halakhoth*. If this is really his view, he comes close to Halevy, whose position is that the Mishnah at this period was already a formally ordered entity and nearly fixed. Halevy admitted the presence of merely additions, explanations, and a limited number of notes due to the central authority, i.e. the *beth ha-Wa'ad*. It is unfortunate that Albeck has not given us an explicit account of his own view from an historical angle, instead of contenting himself with a chapter on "*The Mishnahs of the Tanna'im and their method in study*". A whole

complex of problems are intertwined here, and Albeck has chosen to expound them from a single aspect only, i.e. the literary one, and indeed it is possible to part company with him even from this point of view (cf. the present writer's articles on *the original form of Halakhah*, in *Tarbiz* vols. V, XXII, XXIV-XXVI, XXIX). And if it can be demonstrated that the *Tannaim* in general did, indeed, give juridical rulings, make alterations, and establish and correct the text of the *mishnahs* as known to them, there are no grounds for maintaining that R. Judah did not follow suit, even though he was collecting his material from various sources. In doing so there is no element of "forgery", as Albeck would argue. Forgery within the sphere of tradition is the actual process, familiar to us from the invention of traditions (*hadith*) in Islam—"traditions" which are absolutely lacking in any genuine basis. But there is no "forgery" in the working over of living traditions within an attitude concerned either for practical decision or for style: and, in any case, whence all the variant recensions which, on Albeck's own showing, lay before R. Judah the Prince?

The question is not whether the Mishnah is a law code from the rulings of which no deviation is possible. It is rather whether any tendency to produce definitive rulings was operative in the activity of R. Judah the Prince (not *Rabbi u-veth dino*: the court was an institution whose function was to pronounce definitively upon concrete actuality). It might be that Bassfreund was not completely right in the construction of his theory, and possibly not all the proofs adduced by various scholars are indeed capable of demonstrating that R. Judah the Prince did temper with texts and the content of the Mishnah. But that is not to gainsay the contention that R. Judah's part in arranging the Mishnah was not restricted to mere collecting, assembling, and arranging, but that he has also left his imprint upon the final ruling and on the formulation of the subject matter. He was not governed by any single line of approach: in places he preserved the form of the *Halakhah* with accuracy, elsewhere he saw need to introduce change. We are still a long way from fathoming the mind of R. Judah, and there is no obligation upon us to formulate an organically single explanation for his motives. Doubtless many conflicting tendencies were in the air.

To sum up. In spite of some definite defects, Professor Albeck's book is a most important contribution to the literature of the subject. He has done more than merely to translate his own previous monographs and articles; he has added to them, and his learning, his expert

knowledge, and the *acumen* of his mind shine forth on almost every page. What he has to teach us is clearly formulated and is constructed as an articulated unity. Nevertheless, for all its authoritative tone, his book is not the final word, and in spite of all his claims he cannot be said to have undermined the basis of which others have constructed rival theories. It is a pity that the book was not passed for editing to an independent reader with a fair understanding of what it is that the educated public expects and what is not required for the purpose. If that had been done, the author would have earned his reward not only for what he had written, but also for his self-denial in what he had left out.

B. DE VRIES

J. AISTLEITNER, *Die mythologischen und kultischen Texte aus Ras Schamra übersetzt*. Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica VIII. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1959. pp. 113.

This new translation of the mythological and cultic poems brings all this material hitherto found in convenient form into a single volume, arranged according to the sequence of the respective stories (those of Baal, Dan'el, Keret and so on), and not (as in Gordon's *Ugaritic Handbook*) in the order of the publication of the tablets.

Each piece is preceded by a brief introduction, in which the gist of the story is concisely set out and its purpose adumbrated, and very brief (all too brief) notes at the foot of the page elucidate knotty points. Further, two pages of notes at the end of the book contain philological remarks, justifying novelties in the translation. These two pages are, unfortunately, totally inadequate; for, although the translation at countless places contains new renderings which often, if not always, commend themselves as making excellent sense in the context, the reader is left completely at a loss to discover how they have been reached. Many, therefore, must be distrusted as mere guesses, when they may in fact have solid philological justification. The reviewer would like to adopt quite a number of these renderings, if he could so much as guess the evidence on which they might rest.

Not a few renderings, however, must be discarded out of hand as unsound. For example, on p. 49 l. 19, *pz* cannot possibly be the Arabic *fa'su*, "axe"; the loss of *hamzah* is inexplicable and the sibilant equation highly disputable. On p. 53 l. 22, the rendering of *dba'tk* as meaning "that I may have intercourse with thee" involves a very dubious use of the perfect tense. Again, on p. 80, l. 153, the rendering of *gr bt 'el* as "Abkömmling des Hauses El's" gives an incorrect sense to *gr*, sojourner; the point is not that 'Aqhat was descended from El, but that he lived in the sanctuary like the child Samuel in the Old Testament. Other translations are a great improvement on preceding attempts to interpret this or that passage. For example, the recognition that (p. 14 ll. 4-5), *'epdk* means not "thy robe"

(Heb. *'ephod*) but "I will pierce thee" (Arab. *nafadha* "transfixed") gets rid of the proposed "emendation" of *krs* "belly" into *krks* "like a belt", and enables *krs* *'epdk* to be rendered "I will pierce thee in the belly", which perfectly fits the context.

In conclusion, Dr Aistleitner has here and there advanced the study of these difficult texts; and the reviewer may be permitted to express the hope that he will continue his studies, and eventually provide a key to his many new interpretations of a number of obscure words and phrases.

G. R. DRIVER

NORMAN K. GOTTWALD, *A Light to the Nations. An Introduction to the Old Testament*, Harper and Brothers, New York 1959, pp. xxiv + 615, with 33 maps, 10 charts, 49 illustrations. \$6.50.

The book under review is a comprehensive volume on the Old Testament against its historical, cultural, and religious background. It is thus not an *Introduction* in the technical sense of the word, although the author is primarily concerned with the growth and contents of the literature of the Old Testament. The entire material is presented in an attractive and instructive form, and the book may be read with profit and enjoyment by any educated layman who is interested in biblical studies. Although there are very few footnotes and very little detailed discussion, even the specialist cannot but admire the amount of study and thought which has evidently gone into its preparation. The entire book, although it is not an original piece of work, bears the stamp of the author's firm grasp of the various aspects of Old Testament scholarship, and of his balanced and mature judgment. The illustrations are aptly chosen, the maps are well executed, and the charts are illuminating. The subject index, which is indispensable in a work of this kind, has been prepared very carefully. There is also a useful bibliography (of books in English only), and a fairly representative selection of Near Eastern texts related to the Old Testament, gleaned from the works of A. Heidel, S. A. B. Mercer, C. H. Gordon, D. W. Thomas, D. D. Luckenbill, and R. W. Rogers.

The book is in many ways akin to B. W. Anderson, *Understanding the Old Testament* (1957), a work which the author mentions with veneration: both Anderson and Gottwald give us comprehensive, informative volumes on the Old Testament in the light of modern biblical scholarship. And yet, after perusal of the pages of these two books, the reader is struck by an important difference: the author of the present volume emphasizes throughout his book the necessity of treating the Old Testament historically, whereas Anderson's ultimate interest may be fairly described as theological in the sense that he, like the majority of Christian scholars, emphasizes the abiding worth of the Old Testament as part of the Christian Canon. Which of these two approaches one prefers is a matter of personal opinion, but it seems to the reviewer that the particular value of Gottwald's book lies in his determined and sustained effort to interpret the Old Testament writings according to the meaning they carried at their time of composition. That the author is a Christian is clear enough from his book, but it is only very

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rarely that he lapses into the kind of sermonizing which is only too familiar among many Christian biblical scholars who, when writing on biblical subjects, impose the theology of the Church upon the Old Testament. The author rejects the Christological interpretation not only of the *Song of Songs* (p. 421), but also of Job xix: 23-27 (p. 481), and (implicitly) of *Is. vii*: 14 (p. 320)—to mention a few examples only. Throughout the book a sober attempt, free of polemics, is made to understand the Old Testament in its own right.

The picture of the author as a scholar that emerges from this volume is that he is a pupil of Wellhausen rather than of Engnell, and of Gunkel rather than of Mowinckel. Dr. Gottwald acknowledges, in the main, the results of literary criticism, and has little to say on oral tradition; he deals with *Psalms* towards the end of the book, treating them as a late, post-exilic collection, and he takes up a negative attitude to Mowinckel's theory of the Enthronement festival. The reader who looks for a discussion of Sacred Kingship in Israel will be disappointed, and so will he who expects an assessment of the very deep influence of anthropological studies upon Old Testament studies in modern times. The attentive reader will notice a certain amount of influence from Eichrodt's Covenant theology running right through the book.

P. WERNBERG-MØLLER

H. KOSMALA, *Hebräer—Essener—Christen. Studien zur Vorgeschichte der frühchristlichen Verkündigung*. Studia Post-Biblica, I. E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1959. pp. xii+479. 28 guilders.

As indicated in the subtitle, this book offers a historical study of certain aspects of early Christian theology as embodied in the New Testament, and the thesis running through the entire work is that Essene religious thought, as we know it from various writers of Antiquity and especially from the Qumran manuscripts, exerted an important influence upon the formation of early Christian thought. In Dr. Kosmala's view, of the three groups within Judaism with which we are familiar from Josephus, the Essenes, with their messianic hope and expectation of Judgment, were the ones who might most easily be won over to the New Faith; neither the Sadducees nor the Pharisees would, generally speaking, be attracted. It may be noted in passing that Dr. Kosmala's attitude to the value of rabbinic materials for the study of the New Testament and the Qumran writings is decidedly—and indeed explicitly—negative (see, e.g. p. 241 and p. 244). The aim of the book under review is to explain New Testament Christianity as it has grown out of the Essene movement, with which we have now become acquainted through the Qumran manuscripts. If one judges the book as a whole it is quite clear that the author rejects both the "Hellenistic" and the "Rabbinic" school in New Testament studies. To these two camps Dr. Kosmala now adds a third, round which will rally those New Testament specialists to whom the importance of the Qumran manuscripts for New Testament studies has been brought forcefully home. Incidentally, the relationship between certain of

the *Pseudepigrapha* and the Scrolls is not denied: the relevant *Pseudepigrapha* are regarded as Essene literature.

The book is divided into fifteen chapters in all of which the author attempts to trace evidence of Essene (i.e. Qumran) theology in the New Testament. In the first chapter attention is focused on the *Epistle to the Hebrews* which, in the opinion of Dr. Kosmala, is so closely related to the Qumran literature that the letter must be supposed to have been written by an Essene who, having himself adopted Christianity, wished to convert his former brethren; and in order to bring this about, he alluded extensively to doctrines and ideas which, as he knew from his own past, were dear to the Essenes and central to their religious conviction. The belief that Jesus is the Messiah is the only point in which the theology of *Hebrews* is different from the theology of the Essene addressees.

The subsequent chapters deal with the supposedly Essene origin of certain designations applied either to the Essene circles behind *Hebrews*, or to the Christians and the Christian religion in various parts of the New Testament, particularly in *Acts* and the Epistles, such as "the brethren", "the holy ones", "the enlightened ones", and "the Way"; and Dr. Kosmala deals in detail with the exact meaning and character of some aspects of theology, organization, practices, and ethics which the Christians more or less took over from the Essenes; in these chapters such concepts as "Faith", "Truth", the "New Man", the "Hidden" and the "Revealed", and messianic expectations are dealt with.

In a number of appendixes Dr. Kosmala devotes more specific treatment to some problems of interpretation within the Qumran literature and the New Testament, and the book concludes with extensive indexes which for the usefulness of a book of this kind are so important. The entire work is the result of a sustained and careful study of the New Testament with a view to tracing Essene elements in it; and irrespective of whether one agrees with Dr. Kosmala or not in his general thesis, his scholarly and serious approach and the high quality of his book generally cannot but command the reader's respect. The volume will prove of great interest and value to students of the New Testament and early Christianity.

It is not possible in a short review to do justice to the many striking observations made by the author, or to discuss their implication—and, indeed, justification—item by item. Although, from the above remarks, Dr. Kosmala's approach might appear a radical one, this is not really so. In many ways the author is definitely of a conservative disposition; thus, e.g., the Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles is adopted without question; and in an interesting article on the Last Supper the author, by a careful comparative analysis of the gospel narratives and the traditional Jewish paschal ritual, reaches the conclusion that the words "For Many" express an attitude towards the Gentiles different from the one (based on the Old Testament) which the Qumran community shared with their "orthodox" contemporaries. It is perhaps no accident that Dr. Kosmala finds an important reinterpretation of the meaning of Passover in a speech by Jesus himself: outside the Gospels the doctrine of the final destruction of the Gentiles is expressed (p. 189), and the author expresses from time to

time—without going into details—the view that there is a difference between the message of Jesus and the theology of the early Christian Church, the difference apparently being that Jesus was no Essene, but the members of the early Church were (cf. e.g. p. 274). The early Christians were to a large extent recruited from Essene circles, and Essene influence on early Christian thought is to be seen in *Acts* and especially in the Epistles which were addressed either to Essenes (*Hebrews*), or to young Christian communities which were profoundly influenced by Essene religious thinking. This seems to be a fair summing-up of the general trend of the book under review, and the attitude of New Testament scholars to it will depend on their attitude to the old, familiar problem of the relationship between the Gospels and the Epistles (cf. e.g. p. 343, where a distinction is drawn between the original message of Jesus as the Messiah and the theology of the early Christians centred on Atonement and Redemption).

Dr Kosmala is fully aware of the Old Testament being a common source for the New Testament writings and the Qumran manuscripts, and this is, in fact, one of the weak points in his whole argument. If a concept or phrase in the New Testament can be traced back to a Hebrew original which occurs in the Qumran literature, but in the last resort depends on the Old Testament—who is to tell whether that concept or phrase is used in Christian or Essene literature in the Old Testament sense, or whether, as Dr. Kosmala seems to think, it has in the Qumran writings assumed a particular nuance which became decisive for its usage in the New Testament? Or, to put it another way, does the analysis of the New Testament carried out in the book under review take us to the general background of the Old Testament, or to the particular *milieu* of the Essene sect? It may be that Dr Kosmala presupposes the possibility here of finer distinctions than are really possible, and it may be that he sometimes tends to interpret the texts so as to fit his theory. There is no definite proof for the contention, e.g., that *Hebrews* vi: 1-2 shows the addressees to be Essenes, rather than Jewish Christians (pp. 32 ff.; in fact, whereas the doctrine of bodily resurrection is certainly Pharisaic, is it *very* uncertain whether it is also Essenic); and the assertion (p. 11) that the constant theme in *Hebrews* of Jesus being the High Priest reflects particularly the priestly organisation of the Essene (i.e. Qumran) community, is not convincing.

Furthermore, there is another aspect of the problem mentioned above which concerns the eschatological outlook. Living in expectation of the Day of Judgment and the coming of the Messiah seems to constitute, in Dr. Kosmala's opinion, an important characteristic of Essene piety in particular, but this is, of course, not so (as the author himself appears to recognize on p. 80). And even if eschatological expectations could be said to be characteristic of Essenes, would it be right to say, e.g., that a manuscript like 1QS reflects a community which lived in a feverish expectation of the Latter Day? Not all the Scrolls are "eschatological", any more than all the New Testament Epistles are "eschatological". The eschatological point of view can too easily become a doctrine mechanically applied to the Qumran community and to its writings at any stage. It would probably be more correct to say that at one time the *Grundstimmung* was eschatological,

and at other times it was not, in just the same way as Christianity started off as an eschatological movement, but eventually settled down into the quietism reflected, e.g., in the Pastoral Epistles.

It is a pity that the book has no bibliography; the literature which has already appeared on the Qumran manuscripts, and which could in many cases have been of real help to the author, has only been considered to very slight degree.

P. WERNBERG-MØLLER

WILHELM KELBER, *Die Logoslehre von Heraklit bis Origenes*. Urachhaus, Stuttgart, 1958. pp. 296.

The book under review is a gallant attempt at a "History of Logosophy" (a word actually used by the author) from Heraclitus or Origen, including several allusions at the "logosophists" of all time, from the Ephesian *mystai* to present-day anthroposophists. The author is not slow to make his standpoint quite clear: already on p. 9 we are informed that his research is based on the views of Rudolf Steiner (who is quite frequently quoted); accordingly, Jewish Prophecy, other peoples' expectations of God, and—not least—the development of the *logos*-doctrine, are but preparations for the central event in the history of humanity, viz. the epiphany of Jesus as Christ. Kelber, however, is well aware of the fact that such a starting-point is not likely to be appreciated by scholars of the conventional type; he thus accepts the charge of approaching his subject in a non-scholarly way, but retorts that a study of religion (*Religionswissenschaft*) without religion is a study of nothing. As for Kelber's definition of religion as "a view (*Anschauung*) of divine beings actively interfering with the destiny of humanity", the present reviewer does not feel competent to pass judgment on its value; but he would feel somewhat uneasy if it is really intended as a sufficiently wide description of what "religionists" do actually investigate. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Kelber deplores Philo's tragic fate in not having recognized Christ as the actual incarnation of the *Logos* whom he had himself so well described (p. 104). Indeed, Philo's description of divine revelation through the *Logos* only, plus the statement in *John* viii: 58 ("Before Abraham was born, I am"), may well serve to interpret the verse "If you believed Moses, you might believe me too; for about me he wrote" (*ibid.* v: 46): Christ (who speaks in the verses here quoted from the Fourth Gospel) is the pre-existent *Logos* who actually revealed the Ten Commandments to Moses (p. 102 f.).

It might perhaps seem unfair, after these specimens of Kelber's anthroposophical approach, to judge his book by the standards of a more conventional type of scholarship. In fact, nobody will dispute the author's right to hold whatever views he likes. Since, however, he actually invites criticism (p. 10), a few examples of his method ought to be exhibited.

On p. 58f. Kelber discusses 2 *Peter* iii: 5 and its relation to *Ps.* xxiv and John's logosophy. The problem, whether the author of 2 *Peter* knew John's logosophy, is no problem at all to Kelber. On the contrary, the supposition

that a term or a thought originates but where it first appears in literature, shows a want of appreciation of the spirit of early Christianity. Similarly, on p. 125, Kelber has to concede that the context of Heraclitus's famous fragment *B 53 D* ("war is the father of everything") is lost. But, says Kelber, the relation between war and *logos* becomes clear in Philo, who means the same . . . It is open to doubt whether the fairly general reference to the Stoic concept of the *logos spermatikos* really fills the lacuna. Although the author discusses this concept at some length, the question whether the Stoics are reliable interpreters of Heraclitus is—so far as the present writer has been able to detect—never posed.

In a discussion of Marcus Aurelius vi: 1 (p. 49f.) Kelber stresses the fact that he uses the same formula as does Heraclitus (*B1 D*)—disregarding, as it were, the innovation which is found ("about 70 years earlier") in *John i: 3*. Whereas Heraclitus and Marcus Aurelius say "according to the *logos*", the Fourth Gospel has "through the *logos*". Quite apart from the historical problem, systematically disregarded by the author, there would seem to be a philological one in Marcus Aurelius vi: 1: in this context *ginetai* does not mean "*entsteht*" (originates) but "*geschieht*", and *perainetai* does not mean "*wird geleitet*" (is guided) but "*vollendet sich*"; so the present writer would translate: "everything happens quite accordingly to that *logos*". (W. Theiler, *Marc Aurel*, Zürich, 1951, p. 125, translates: "*Alles geschieht und vollendet sich nach jener Vernunft*"). Since this interpretation would appear to square better with the whole context of Marcus Aurelius's saying, the question might be asked, whether the comparison of the three passages still holds water. In any case, a more thorough discussion would be very welcome.

The change from the *Logos according to which* everything is made to the *Logos through whom* things originate is one of the author's main themes. In this connexion Philo is said (p. 103) to "have coined the formula *to (ontos) on for God*"—a rather short statement of a complex situation— which formula describes God's "sub-sisting" as opposed to his "ek-sisting". From the notion of "substance" (no Greek term is mentioned here) God's description as *apoios* is easily reached, but none of these terms is placed within the context of the Stoic categories, although this context (hard though it may be to grasp) would certainly shed light on the meaning of Philo's utterances (which, at this point especially, would have deserved exact references).

Finally, on p. 141, Kelber quotes a fragment from P. Wendland, *Neuentdeckte Fragmente Philos*, p. 9: "*ton d'hena krion epeidē logos heis estin*" and translates "*Das eine Lamm ist nun einmal der eine Logos*". (The one lamb is just the one Logos). Kelber's motivation for this translation deserves full quotation: "*Krios*" means the ram. The passage is certainly taken from an exegesis of an astrological or ritual ram-motive. But, since the *Pesah* lamb also stands for the (astronomical) sign *aries*, which "ruled" that period, we are doing no violence to this sentence when translating it, etc. As against this tortuous argument the reviewer would prefer to think that Philo is here speaking of a sacrifice for which the Torah has demanded *one* ram. It is not the ram, but the numeral "one" on which Philo is commenting here.

These examples may suffice to show that Kelber has reason to expect adverse criticism from scholars who do not reckon themselves anthroposophists. Nevertheless, his book is full of interesting ideas and may well serve as a stimulus for further thought and research. Although the German style is not always flawless, it is, happily, very far from esoteric. The carefully prepared apparatus of notes and indexes, the good paper and the clear print will certainly increase the value to the reader of this uncommon book.

S. LAUER

ISRAEL FRANKEL, *Peshaṭ (Plain Exegesis) in Talmudic and Midrashic Literature*. Toronto, La Salle Press, 1956, pp. 211.

This book proclaims itself a *Ph.D.* thesis accepted by a British university, and appears to be published substantially as presented. Its origin has not, however, preserved it from bearing a markedly apologetic slant throughout (e.g. pp. 24, 27, 28, 30 note 31, 32, 38, 47, 105, 169), and the same feature characterises its two modern-style *haskamoth*—one by Dr Leo Jung and the other a posthumous one from the revered pen of Travers Herford. Whether the author has combined with his wide rabbinic erudition the requisite detachment from his evidence is a question that is inevitably raised by the conclusion to his introduction (p. 32), where he states “*emphatically* [his] firm conviction (*sic*) that behind the Haggadic interpretation there is always a basic conception of the simple sense”. The Targum is regarded (p. 86) as a “faithful” translation; and the rabbinic interpretation at *Ex. xxi: 6* of *le’olam*=jubilee year is reckoned a “secondary meaning” (p. 143), qualifying as such for inclusion in a chapter on the rabbinic understanding of lexicology.

The purpose of the work as stated (p. 40) is to show that “while Rabbinic exegesis as recorded in Rabbinic literature frequently deviates from *Peshaṭ* . . . the Rabbis had a clear appreciation of the plain meaning as distinct from the Midrash superimposed on it”. Unfortunately the author at no point defines what is to be taken as included in the plain meaning: this basic question is repeatedly begged (pp. 23, 27, 50 line 3, 95 note 58), and it is assumed without demonstration that the *peshaṭ* may be equated with the “letter” (pp. 23, 28, 31, 39 note 11, 48, 80). That this is not always so in talmudic and midrashic usage has frequently been noticed, and in a forthcoming article the present reviewer hopes to deal with the problem. Any attempt at an answer must proceed from an analysis of the passages where *peshaṭ* etc., occur; in the book under review the phrase *peshaṭeh da-qera’* receives inadequate examination (p. 72f.), and in the following discussion of the passages where the principle is enunciated that the text cannot be divorced *miydey peshuṭ*, the essential point has not in every case been isolated.

This failure to define terminology is the fundamental weakness of the book, and it has led in its turn to much imprecise categorisation. Thus over half of the book (pp. 83 onwards) is of very doubtful relevance, in spite of the chapter headings given (*The Rabbis and the Study of the Bible*, and

The Rabbis' Appreciation of Peshat). If one leaves on one side the source material that shows the rabbis' familiarity with the text and concern to transmit it at the earliest stages of education, the remainder amounts to no more than the assembly of passages demonstrating an enviable literary *acumen* on their part and an insight into or construction of the text that has often been endorsed or paralleled by the findings of modern scholarship. To have allowed this section so to proliferate as to embrace such topics as the recognition by the Rabbis of euphemistic expression (*lishna ma'alya*, p. 154) inevitably weakens its value, but this material is worth assembling for its own sake, quite apart from apologetic motivation, even though it has no place in this thesis. From that point of view the book is quite a useful restatement of the facts. What it does not do, however, is to give any grounds at all for thinking that the Rabbis of the Talmud and Midrash identified such a common-sense attitude on their own part with the *peshat*, even though in the middle ages that is what *peshat* came to mean. To have side-stepped this question renders the title of this book unjustifiably anachronistic and indeed specious.

RAPHAEL LOEWE

Oṣar Yehudey Sefarad (Tesoro de los Judios Sefardies), Vol. II, 1959. Edited by I. R. MOLHO. Jerusalem (P.O.B. 390).

The second volume of this publication is on the whole similar in character to the first, which has been reviewed in this *Journal* (Vol. X, 1959, pp. 84-6).

Following an editorial note, I. Ben-Zvi publishes some extracts from the interesting diaries of R. Jacob Yiṣḥaḳi, rabbi of Darband in the Caucasus, about his journeys to Jerusalem in 1878 and 1887. These concern Sephardim but indirectly. A. M. Habermann publishes, from a Karaite MS., a wine song signed "Abraham", written in an unusual strophic form (which is not commented upon); its provenience is unknown, and it is open to question whether the author was in fact a Spaniard. N. Allony discusses the topic "where are those who lived before us" in Spanish Hebrew poetry. The subject is of great interest but some of the views put forward in the article are of doubtful validity; for example, the quotations heaped together in order to show that the ultimate source of the motive is to be found in the Bible, include a great number of quite irrelevant passages. J. M. Toledano surmises that the names Toledano and Fāsi was applied to the same family (in Salonica and Morocco). The present reviewer has no competence in this matter, but the arguments do not sound entirely convincing. I. R. Molho, the editor, writes on the Jewish community in Salonica in the seventeenth century. N. Ben-Menahem gives a specimen edition of Ibn Ezra's commentary on *Gen. i: 1-2* with notes, and of Judah Mosconi's supercommentary on the same passage. S. Marcus contributes an article on the history of the Jews in Rhodes under the rule of the knights of St. John. Y. Nadav's article, in contrast to most of the others, takes up a doctrinal subject and analyses the eschatology of Moses de Leon in his book *Mishkan ha-'Eduth*. M. Benayahu collects data about the emissaries of the community of Safed

at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and in particular publishes a letter from R. Me'ir Gavison of Cairo to Safed, concerning the mission of R. Jacob Molkho, and another from the rabbis of Safed to Algeria concerning the mission of R. Meir Maymaran. D. Tamar discusses briefly some of the views advanced by Italian rabbis in the middle of the sixteenth century in order to justify the printing of the Zohar, and especially the idea that it serves as a substitute for the Talmud and the other rabbinic books which were burned in Italy in 1554. He quotes a text referring to this subject from a work extant in manuscript and entitled '*Avodath ha-Qodesh*, which was composed in Pesaro in 1567-8 by an unnamed author.

"R. Joseph Caro and the Jews of Yemen" is Y. Razhabi's subject. There are included in the article two poems on R. Joseph Caro's works, one by R. Zachariah al-Zāhiri (who also describes his visit to Caro's *yeshivah* in Safed in his book of *maqamas*), the other by Solomon b. Sa'id. Under the title "Two MSS from the National and University Library" I. R. Molho describes a letter-book of the Salonica community from the 1920s, and J. M. Toledano a letter from R. Gedaliah b. David ibn Yaḥyā to Don Isaac Abravanel, which he discovered in Morocco. I intend to republish this interesting letter, which concerns the war between Alfonso V of Portugal, and Isabella and Ferdinand, over the succession to the throne of Castile, and which is left by its discoverer without annotation.

I. R. Molho publishes some documents on the conditions in Greece under Nazi occupation. There follows a short biography of Isaac Cohen, (d. 1958) a native of Larissa, who occupied for many decades an important position in the public life of Palestine.

In the section devoted to scholars working on Sephardi subjects, there are notes on I. Baer, the great historian of the Jews in Christian Spain, C. Roth, historian of the Jews of Italy, England and the Sephardi diaspora, A. Hemsí, Sephardi musician, and I. S. Révah, student of Marrano history and of Spanish poetry written by Jews (of his publications the edition of Joao Pinto Delgado's poems may be singled out).

There are short remarks (by the editor and others) about R. Judah Bivas, his MSS, and the date of his death (1852), etc. A contribution by N. Allony, entitled "Concerning the study and collection of the (Hebrew) poetry of Spain" consists mainly of well justified criticism of certain authors who deny the importance of the Arabic language and poetry for the understanding of the Hebrew poetry of Spain.

In the non-Hebrew section (which is in Spanish, French and English) the editor describes the aim and the programme of the Sephardi World Bibliographical Exhibition to be held in Madrid, while P. Themanlys writes (unfortunately without documentation and somewhat uncritically) on the Kabbalistic congregation *Beth El* which existed for two hundred years in the Old City of Jerusalem. In yet another contribution, the editor presents some materials, based partly on personal reminiscences, about Jewish life in Salonica and Constantinople in the years 1916-19. M.O. Alboucrek gives some notes on the popular beliefs of the Sephardi community of Aleppo. Under the heading *Miscellanea* there is a short review of a work *Fontes Hebraici ad res oeconomicas socialesque terrarum Balcanicarum saeculo XVI*

CURRENT LITERATURE

pertinentes, vol. i, Sofia 1958, containing excerpts from *responsa* by various rabbis, with translation and commentary in Bulgarian; of the publication of Jewish epitaphs from St Thomas, a former Danish colony in the West Indies, etc.

A few contributions, of a more ephemeral character, have been passed over here. Finally, it may be noted that the volume contains (pp. 106 and 115) photographs of two pages from a Hebrew MS. written in Leiria in Portugal in 1472 and belonging to the Israeli Ministry of Education.

S. M. STERN

ANDRÉ NEHER, *Jérémie*. Librairie Plon, Paris, 1960. pp. 231. 7.10 Francs.

In this essay of truly poetic penetration, Neher finds the source of Jeremiah's vocation, and the root of his tragedy, in the first verse—which proclaims his descent from the priestly clan at Anathoth that had for centuries been debarred from the performance of sacerdotal functions. A masterly survey of the historical context, as seen from both within and without, is followed by a penetrating analysis of Jeremiah's theology. The key to this is the word *rahoq*; the false comfort of the assurance of God's localised presence has first to be exploded, and thereafter man can recognise that God's very elusiveness, by challenging him to seek, is the warranty of His universal proximity. In chaps. xxx–xxxiii the author has detected an arrangement similar to that of a symphony, and his tracing out of this is deeply rewarding in its suggestiveness.

R. L.

HERMANN KELLENBENZ, *Sephardim an der unteren Elbe—ihre wirtschaftliche und politische Bedeutung vom Ende des 16. bis zum Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts*. Vierteljahrsschrift fuer Social- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beiheft 40. 1958, pp. 606.

The economic role played by Jews in the period of mercantilism has received much more attention than have similar subjects in related fields. It is no slight reflection on Jewish historiography that the two most extensive treatises have been written by Gentiles. The first, by Heinrich Schnee, *Die Hoffinanz und der moderne Staat* (in three volumes) appeared in Berlin 1953–1955; and the volume here under review appeared in Wiesbaden 1958. Kellenbenz's work covers a relatively small group—the Sephardim and Portuguese who settled in Hamburg and the vicinity—from the end of the sixteenth to the beginning of the eighteenth century. The treatment, however, is exhaustive and penetrating.

The book is rich in information based mostly on original archive research. The method of presentation is biographical, the members of the group passing in review one after another. They appear not only in their economic role but also in the light of their participation in communal life, their family connections, etc; the book is thus a contribution to these fields as well. The communal affiliation and family ties likewise explain the measure of their success in the economic field.

Nevertheless it is perhaps not so much in its material as its balanced and unbiased presentation that the chief merits of the book lie. Comparison with Schnee's work is almost inevitable. Kellenbenz surpasses Schnee not only in fairness to his subject but also by reason of his historical perspective. He evaluates the economic activity of the Jews in the light of accepted economic practice of the time, and indeed his object is not to find out what the Jews did or did not do, but to understand a chapter of European economic history wherein certain groups of Jews happened to figure. Thanks to this the book is free not only from anti-Semitic tinges but also from any trace of patronising philo-Semitism a feature which does not make for more pleasant reading when it is encountered.

The book, of course, is relevant to the problem propounded by Sombart, namely, what was the economic role played by Jews in bringing about capitalism. Kellenbenz himself tries to draw the inferences inherent in his material. The Jewish contribution is shown to be extensive; it is, however, in the nature of participation in a development which is dictated by many factors operative in the commencing era of capitalism. Jews were spurred to intensity of effort by virtue of their insecure position, by their world-wide connections, and especially by extensive family ties and kinship—and their business tradition may also have played its part. The material assembled by Kellenbenz does not, however, substantiate a view of the Jews as pioneers in a new form of economic activity, and certainly not of their infusing into mercantile affairs a spirit of capitalism as Sombart would have had it.

J. KATZ

THE INSTITUTE OF JEWISH STUDIES, LONDON

(formerly at Manchester)

University College, Gower Street, W.C.1.

The following Research Papers were read in the Third Term of 1959-60 on Wednesdays, at 5.15 p.m., in the Mocatta Library, University College, Gower Street, W.C.1.

- 4th May: PROFESSOR W. FISCHER (Berkeley, California): The rôle of Jews in the economic and political life of India from the Sixteenth Century onwards.
- 11th May: C. ROTH (Oxford): The Constitution of the Jewish State of 68-70.
- 18th May: PROFESSOR D. DAUBE (Oxford): Direct and Indirect Causation in Biblical Law.
- 25th May: S. STEIN (London): Further observations on Meir ben Simeon's *Milhemeth Miswah*.

This year's Kosteris Lecture was given by PROFESSOR A. D. MOMIGLIANO, M.A., D.LITT., F.B.A. on Persian Historiography, Jewish Historiography, Greek Historiography in the Gustav Tuck Theatre, University College, W.C.1., on Wednesday 29th June, 1960, at 5.15 p.m.

J. G. Weiss,
Director of Research.

SOCIETY FOR JEWISH STUDY

Among recent public lectures given under the auspices of the Society have been the following:

DR. ROBERT WELTSCH:

"Theodor Herzl Centenary Lecture."

REV. DR. JAMES W. PARKES:

"The Period between Ezra and Hillel from Jewish and Christian Standpoints."

RABBI DR. ALEXANDER CARLEBACH:

"The Dualism of Law and Religion in Jewish Tradition."

PROFESSOR DR. ERNST SIMON:

"The Bible and the Modern Jew." (*Annual Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture*).

PROFESSOR CHAIM RABIN:

"The Present State of Research in the Hebrew Language."

DR. LEON ROTH:

"Hebraists and non-Hebraists of the Seventeenth Century."

The lectures given by the late Leo Baeck before the University of Munster after the War have recently been translated into English and published.

At the annual general meeting held in June, 1960, tribute was paid to the retiring Chairman, Dr. E. J. Cohn, for his services in that office during the past seven years.

Particulars of the recently established Manchester Branch are obtainable from its Acting Hon. Secretary, Miss L. Philip, 2 Lady Barn Crescent, Manchester, 14.

Recent public lectures have included the following:

PROFESSOR DR. DAVID DAUBE:

"Texts and Interpretations of Jewish Law."

RABBI DR. E. WIESENBERG:

"Aspects of the Yom Kippur Liturgy."

The following organisations have become corporate members of the Society: Leo Baeck Institute; B'nai B'nith, First Lodge of England; Great Synagogue, Sydney, Australia; Hampstead Synagogue; Liberal Jewish Synagogue; Manchester Congregation of British Jews; New Liberal Jewish Congregation; New West End Synagogue; North-Western Reform Synagogue.

November, 1960.